God, emotion and impassibility by Scrutton,  Anastasia Philippa
Durham E-Theses
God, emotion and impassibility
Scrutton, Anastasia Philippa
How to cite:
Scrutton, Anastasia Philippa (2008) God, emotion and impassibility. Doctoral thesis, Durham University.
Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1930/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
University of Durham 
God, Emotion and Impassibility 
Volume one of two 




The current theological climate presents two extremes in speaking of the emotional 
life of God: Passibilism, which affirms the fullness of God's emotional life, and 
impassibilism, which (claiming fidelity to traditional orthodox Christianity) asserts 
that God cannot experience emotions. Likewise, contemporary philosophy of emotion 
is characterised by the extremes of cognitive views of emotion on the one hand, and 
non-cognitive, physiological or `feelings' views on the other. 
In this thesis I argue for a more nuanced account of both impassibility and 
emotion. I seek to show how a more subtle account of emotion may benefit 
contemporary philosophy of emotion, and how re-conceiving both impassibility and 
emotion would provide alternative possibilities within theology for speaking of God's 
emotional life. I begin by showing how the depiction of early impassibilism and 
modem passibilism as polar opposite views with few theologians inhabiting a middle 
ground is an oversimplification that neglects those in both camps who argue that God 
might choose to experience emotions and to suffer, such that God's emotions would 
not be contrary to God's will or challenge his omnipotence. I then argue that a re- 
appropriation of the Augustinian and Thomist distinction between passiones 
(emotions that are arational, involuntary, and in Thomas, essentially physiological) 
and affectiones (emotions that are potentially rational, in accordance with the will, and 
are not essentially bodily) as a distinction within the overarching and less 
discriminating category of `emotion' may provide important options for both 
theologians and philosophers of emotion that have previously been overlooked. I 
continue by exploring the relationship between emotions and intelligence, will, and 
the body, and the theological implications of this for divine omniscience, 
omnipotence and incorporeality. I suggest that applying the distinction between 
passiones and affectiones to contemporary theology and philosophy of emotion 
contributes to creating a more plausible middle ground between passibilism and 
impassibilism, and between cognitive and feelings accounts of emotion. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author or the university to which it was 
submitted. No quotation from it, or 
information derived from it may be 
published without the prior written 
consent of the author or university, and 
any information derived from it should be 
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Introduction 
This thesis is primarily about how historical and contemporary philosophy of emotion 
can and should affect the debate on divine impassibility in Christian theology, and 
secondarily about how ancient and medieval philosophy of emotion may provide a way 
beyond some of the impasses in contemporary philosophy of emotion. As a working 
definition of impassibility I shall take the idea of impassibility as incapacity for or 
insusceptibility to emotional experiences. In defining impassibility in this way, I follow 
Richard Creel and Marcel Sarotl in moving away from the idea of impassibility as being 
solely about God's incapacity for or invulnerability to suffering, and focus instead on 
the question of whether God can have emotional experiences more broadly. This 
definition of impassibility is a working definition, however, and part of the purpose of 
the thesis is to come to a better understanding of whether experiencing emotions is a 
susceptibility and therefore a weakness, or whether it is a capacity and therefore a 
strength, what we mean when we speak of experiencing emotions, and what sort of 
being can experience emotions. 
In chapter one I explore how ancient understandings of emotion informed the 
early church's understanding of divine impassibility. What emerges from this discussion 
is that while the characterisation of the early church as promoting dnafta as a human 
virtue, and, concomitantly, seeing impassibility as an aspect of divine perfection, is not 
untrue, it is an over-simplification. I suggest two reasons for why this is the case, the 
first of which relates to our concept of emotion, and the second of which concerns our 
concept of impassibility. 
cf. Marcel Sarot, God, Passibility and Corporeality (Kampen, the Netherlands: Kok Pharos Publishing 
House), p. 30, who defines impassibility as `immutability with regard to one's feelings, or the quality of 
one's inner life' and R. E. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 3-9, who defines impassibility as `imperviousness to causal 
influence from external factors' with respect to nature, will, knowledge or feelings. 
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First, the ancient world opted for a diversity of different words for mental 
experiences rather than the modem monolithic category of 'emotion'. Translating terms 
such as irä8os and passiones as 'emotion' can give the impression that the early church 
had a negative view of all emotions. In some cases (particularly in the cases of eastern 
Christians who inherited more extreme Stoic thought on emotion) this is justified, in 
other cases, this portrayal overlooks the fact that other mental phenomena we now class 
as `emotional' are far more positively viewed. 
Second, while impassibility in the early church is often portrayed as unanimous 
and homogenous, I seek to show the many different ways in which the Fathers of the 
early church affirmed impassibility and the many different things they meant when they 
argued for it. In particular, I move away from understanding ancient impassibilism as an 
affirmation of divine emotionlessness, and draw attention to some interesting 
'impassibilist positions proposed by some of the Fathers that seem akin to what would, 
in modem theology, be termed `passibilism'. Building on this, I suggest that some 
forms of modem passibilism may not be as much of a break from tradition as has 
generally been perceived, and propose these moderate positions as a way beyond the 
seemingly insurmountable impasse between impassibilism and passibilism. 
In chapter two I seek to provide a partial answer to the question of why 
impassibilism gave way to a passibilist consensus in the twentieth century and how this 
relates to altered perceptions of emotion. In the first part of the chapter 1 develop my 
response to this question by arguing that the idea that impassibilism was replaced by a 
passibilist consensus is too broad a generalisation. This is not only because (as chapter 
one shows) the positions that come under the category of `impassibilist' in the early 
church are tremendously diverse, but also because most modern formulations of 
passibilism argue for a more complicated and qualified view of passibilism than appears 
to be the case in many overviews of the impassibilist debate and, furthermore, there are 
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also significant exceptions to passibilism in the twentieth century. In discussing the 
diversity of positions within and without the passibilist camp in the twentieth century, I 
aim to give a sense both of the key concerns of twentieth century impassibilists and how 
these relate to their view of emotions, and also a sense of the subtlety and diversity of 
the positions inhabited by passibilists, and how some of these relate to contemporary 
philosophy of emotion. The overall impression that emerges is that, rather than shifting 
from impassibilism to passibilism, Christian theology has shifted in emphasis from 
stressing the invulnerability and omnipotence of God to focusing on the emotional 
fullness of God's life and the suffering of God - partly as a result of contextual 
demands: While the early church needed to emphasise God's otherness in reaction 
against pagan anthropomorphic conceptions of divinity, modem theology has needed to 
speak to challenges to faith arising from our increased awareness of the extent of human 
and animal suffering. 
Despite the fact that portrayals of theology that view impassibilism as being 
overturned in favour of passibilism overlook both significant exceptions to, and 
subtleties within, both passibilism and impassibilism, it still makes sense to ask why the 
shift from emphasising God's omnipotence and insusceptibility to emotion, to stressing 
God's suffering and capacity for emotion, has taken place. In the second part of chapter 
two, I attempt to provide a partial answer to this question by showing how changes in 
our understanding and evaluation of emotions have affected whether, and in what ways, 
we attribute emotions to God. In exploring the impact of modem philosophy of emotion 
on passibilism, I use as a case study the work of the passibilist philosopher of religion 
Sarot, and focus on seven aspects of his view of emotion (reflecting the philosophy of 
emotion of the early nineties when he was writing) that lead to his conclusion that a 
perfect being such as God would be able to experience emotion. The aspects of emotion 
Sarot propounds are that emotions are not inherently passive, irrational, negative or 
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sinful, that emotions are essential to knowledge and intelligence, that emotions require a 
body, that emotional involvement in others' sufferings (e. g. through empathy and 
sympathy) are a consolation to sufferers, and that emotional involvement is entailed by 
perfect love. In discussing the effect these views have on Sarot's passibilism, I seek to 
show the importance of philosophy of emotion to theological debates on divine 
impassibility, as well as to prepare the ground for discussions about the relation 
between emotions and intelligence, emotions and the will, and emotions and 
corporeality, in later chapters. 
In chapter three I develop the idea that, while for most purposes emotions may 
be regarded as a single category united by family resemblances, treating them as an 
homogenous kind of experience is problematic for the philosophy of emotion in that it 
disregards very real differences in terms of the relation of different emotions to our 
intellects, to our wills, and to our bodies, and so gives rise unnecessarily to polar 
opposite views within the philosophy of emotion. I suggest an alternative model of 
emotion based on the Augustinian-Thomist distinction between emotional experiences 
that are affectiones (voluntary, potentially rational, not inherently physiological) and 
passiones (involuntary, arational and, in Thomas, inherently physiological). This, I 
suggest, reflects more accurately the range of human emotional experiences, provided 
that we treat the two experiences as the extreme points on a spectrum with many 
experiences in between, rather than regarding affectiones and passiones as two entirely 
distinct kinds of phenomena (departing from Paul E. Griffiths' categorisation of 
emotions as either `affect programs' or `higher cognitive' emotions2). Re-appropriating 
Augustinian and Thomist philosophy of emotion in this way provides a bridge between 
philosophy of emotion which champions a cognitive and voluntarist view of emotions, 
and that which sees emotions as inherently physiological and involuntary. Furthermore, 
2 Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997) 
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taking as a hint passages in Thomas which seem to attribute affection es to God while 
holding passion es to be proper only to physical beings such as humans, I suggest a way 
forward for the impassibility debate that provides a means to attribute emotional 
experiences to God while excluding those emotions that would conflict with God's 
omnipotence, omniscience, incorporeality and moral perfection. In addition to providing 
a middle ground between passibilism and impassibilism, such a view also provides a 
precedent for attributing emotion to God in Aquinas, and so (in opposition to both 
passibilists and impassibilists who view theology before the twentieth century as 
espousing the emotionlessness of God) further establishes the orthodox foundations 
Christians have for affirming the emotional nature of the divine life. 
Chapters four, five and six share two aims. Their primary aim is to explore how 
contemporary philosophy of emotion can (and should) inform our affirmation and 
understanding of God's emotional life. A secondary aim is to suggest how the 
Augustinian-Thomist distinction between passiones and affectiones might provide a 
way to overcome the deadlock between cognitive and non-cognitive (or `feelings') 
philosophies of emotion. 
In the first part of chapter four I explore the cognitive theory of emotion, and 
argue (pace the cognitive theory) that some emotions are essentially mental events 
involving beliefs and perceptions about the world, while others are better regarded as 
physiological and non-cognitive. Drawing on the work of Martha Nussbaum' and Mark 
Wynn, 4 I agree with Sarot in suggesting that God must have emotions because emotions 
are essential to our intelligence, arguing that emotions are uniquely revelatory of value 
and so give us insight into the way the world is that we cannot gain without emotions. 
3 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 
4 Mark R. Wynn, Emotional Experience and Religious Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) 
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As such, I suggest, emotions are an integral part of God's wisdom, understanding and 
intelligence. 
In the second part of chapter four I discuss three emotion types (compassion, 
anger and jealousy) and explore the ways in which they can be said to be revelatory of 
value and essential to intelligence, and the ways in which they can be deceptive about 
the world. In exploring how these emotion types can be intelligent (and the ways in 
which they can be deceptive) I attempt to come to a better understanding of the sorts of 
emotional experiences we would want to attribute to God, and the sorts of emotional 
experiences we would want to exclude from the divine life, and the means by which it is 
possible to achieve this. 
My discussion of compassion has both a critical and a constructive aspect. The 
critical aspect defends compassion against objections that have been levelled against it, 
and shows that compassion is not intrinsically deceptive or misleading about the world. 
Four objections to compassion are addressed. First, I reply to the objection that 
compassion is misleading because it fails to recognise the dignity of the object of 
compassion, and that blame or praise are better responses to misfortune than 
compassion. Second, I respond to the objection that compassion presupposes that 
contingencies and external goods are important, whereas we ought to root our happiness 
in non-transient things (such as God) or things over which we have perfect control (such 
as our own virtue). Third, I address the objection that a non-emotional attitude of 
benevolence is a better response to others' misfortune than the emotional response of 
compassion because benevolence is rational and impartial, whereas compassion is 
discriminatory and imbalanced, thus giving us a false impression about who is valuable 
and leading us to behave ethically to some people and not to others. Fourth, I respond to 
the objection that compassion is closely connected to `negative' emotions such as anger, 
hatred, revenge and cruelty. The constructive aspect aims to show that compassion is 
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not only not deceptive and misleading but is actually intelligent and uniquely revelatory 
of value in the world, and therefore necessary to a wise and intelligent God. I argue that 
compassion reveals two things about the world that cannot be known except through 
compassion and related emotional responses: It reveals that people are intrinsically 
valuable and therefore reveals the reason that we have a moral duty to behave well 
towards them. This, I suggest, indicates that compassion is an essential aspect of God's 
wisdom and intelligence. 
One of the noteworthy features of twentieth century theology is that, despite the 
emphasis on God's passibility and the fullness of God's emotional life in liberal 
theology, the idea of divine anger has been the preserve of conservative theologians, 
and then primarily on the basis of the prominence of divine anger in the Bible. In my 
discussion of anger, I respond to three criticisms of anger that would seem to make it an 
inappropriate emotion for God. First, I answer the objection that anger is counter- 
productive and leads to destructive behaviour. Second, I reply to the objection that 
anger makes us irrational because it causes us to act before we have seen all the 
evidence. Third, I argue against the objection that anger is closely related to hatred, and 
is therefore at odds with the love of God. Having argued that these objections are not 
conclusive and do not provide a reason for excluding anger from the divine life, I then 
provide three reasons for why we should regard anger as an integral part of God's 
emotional life. Anger, I suggest, recognises both the moral agency of the offender and 
the seriousness of the offence and, in addition, anger, and the waiving of the right to 
anger, is essential to the Christian notion of forgiveness. What emerges from the 
discussion of anger is that far from being irrational, counter-productive and closely 
allied with hatred, anger recognises the value of the offender and the reality of the 
offence, and is also an aspect of God's love and personal involvement with creation. 
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In my discussion of jealousy I argue that, in humans, jealousy is always 
deceptive because it makes us either mistrustful and paranoid, or else unduly credulous 
and trusting. Given the deceptive nature of jealousy in humans, I question what jealousy 
would look like without this deceptive quality, and seek to answer this by exploring 
what the biblical writers were getting at when they attributed jealousy to God. I suggest 
that, for the biblical writers, God's jealousy does not entail that God is deceived about 
the world through mistrust or credulity, and argue that God's jealousy (alongside God's 
anger) is regarded as an aspect of God's personally engaged love for and passionate 
involvement with creation. I then consider whether God's love is best understood as the 
passionate involvement portrayed by the biblical writers that includes both anger and 
jealousy, or whether it is better understood as an emotionally distanced attitude of 
benevolence, such that God is viewed not as lover but as philanthropic benefactor, 
which would not entail jealousy or anger. I suggest that love as personal involvement is 
more perfect than love as benevolence because the former liberates the beloved whereas 
the latter is debilitating, and because the former provides a foundation for the Christian 
belief in the value of each person, while the latter undermines it. I note that one possible 
objection to conceiving of God's love as personally involved love rather than 
benevolence is that personally involved love entails vulnerability which seems 
incompatible with God's omnipotence, and follow Gregory Thaumaturgos and Jürgen 
Moltmann in suggesting that the choice to be vulnerable may be an aspect of divine 
omnipotence rather than a negation of it, such that divine omnipotence does not 
preclude God's personally involved love. I conclude that jealousy might be attributed to 
God, though divine jealousy is always to be seen as an aspect of God's personally 
involved love, and never distinct from it and, in addition, divine jealousy would not 
involve the deceptive qualities characteristic of humanjealousy. 
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Chapter five concerns the relation between emotions and the will, and explores 
the question of whether the passivity of emotions excludes God from emotional 
experience. Emotion and personally involved love involve vulnerability to things 
outside the subject's control and this is, on the face of it, incompatible with God's aseity 
and omnipotence. While the idea that emotions are passive has age on its side, I turn to 
some recent philosophy of emotion and follow Robert Solomon5 in highlighting some 
of the ways in which our emotions can be chosen and cultivated and so active and 
within our control. I also suggest that Solomon echoes Thomas in linking emotions that 
are non-physiological, voluntary and `morally interesting', as distinct from those that 
are primarily physiological, automatic and amoral. From this discussion I suggest that 
the idea that God cannot have emotions because the passivity of emotions render them 
incompatible with divine omnipotence is inconclusive: Emotions are not inherently 
passive and can be chosen, cultivated and even controlled. Furthermore, these 
potentially voluntary emotions are also the ones that are potentially intelligent and 
`morally interesting'. This is interesting for the theological debate on whether or not 
God is passible for it is precisely the intelligent and morally interesting emotions that 
passibilist theologians are concerned to attribute to God. 
One possible objection to the idea that emotions are not essentially passive 
because they can be chosen and cultivated over time has been put forward in an 
unpublished thesis by Robin Cook. 6 Cook argues that the determinative factor for the 
impassibility debate is not whether we have control over our susceptibility to emotion, 
but about whether the subjective experience of an emotion is under the immediate 
control of our will. Emotions, Cook claims, are essentially passive in the relevant 
respect because during an emotion we are involuntarily preoccupied with the object of 
s Robert C. Solomon, Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003); True to our Feelings: What our Emotions are Really Telling (Is (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) 
Robin Cook, `Divine Impassibility, Divine Love', Cardiff, 2006 
the emotion, for this reason, emotions are inappropriate to an omnipotent God. I 
respond to this objection with a critique of some of Cook's key ideas, and conclude 
contra Cook that this kind of passivity is found in some, but not all, emotions, and is not 
essential to emotional experience. 
Having concluded that emotional experience in general does not entail passivity, 
I go on to discuss an objection to the idea that God experiences the emotions involved 
in suffering in particular. While many passibilists have argued that God chooses to 
suffer and that God's suffering is always within God's control, some theologians and 
philosophers have argued that it is integral to suffering that it is something that we do 
not choose and over which we have no control. This is problematic for the passibilist, 
for it suggests that if God chooses and controls his suffering, it is not authentic 
suffering, or at least it is not suffering as humans experience it. In response to this 
problem I argue that it is the reasons and motivations for which chosen suffering is 
undertaken that determines whether or not the suffering is authentic, rather than the 
question of whether or not the suffering is chosen and controlled per se. I conclude the 
chapter by pointing to the ideas of divine suffering and humility as freely undertaken for 
the sake of humanity and as motivated by God's love for humanity found in 
Kierkegaard, Moltmann and Paul Fiddes. 
In chapter six I discuss the relation between emotional experience and the body, 
critically engaging with Sarot's thesis that emotions are essentially physiological, so 
that a passible God must be a corporeal one. Having suggested that Sarot's argument is 
flawed, I go on to explore three questions about the relation between emotions and the 
body. First, I discuss whether emotions are simply kinds of bodily experience, and 
conclude that they are not. Second, I consider whether the body is a prerequisite of 
emotions, and argue that while a body is a prerequisite for both emotional and non- 
emotional `mental' phenomena such as emotions and thoughts in humans, this does not 
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show that a body is a prerequisite for these experiences in the case of God. Third, I ask 
whether the physical experiences we have when we have an emotion are intrinsic or 
extrinsic to the emotion, developing the Thomist distinction between passiones that are 
intrinsically physiological and affection es that are not. I conclude the chapter with a 
case study of the emotional experiences involved in sexual desire, counter-balancing the 
emphasis on cognitive emotions and the fullness of God's emotional life in chapters 
four and five. In so doing, I suggest that some emotional experiences would be excluded 
from the divine nature, but indicate that analogous experiences (e. g. to divine love 
conceived as non-sexual eros or desire) would mean that God would not be less 
intelligent, wise or knowledgeable as a result of not having these experiences. 
Having outlined what this thesis is about, it is also worth mentioning briefly 
what it is not about. One frequent Christian response to the question of whether God is 
passible or impassible is to say that God must suffer because Christ suffered. This 
argument tends to take two forms. The first form is incamational: Because Christ 
suffered and Christ is God, God must have suffered. This argument is found not only in 
non-academic Christian thought, but also, in nuanced and self-conscious forms, in 
Moltmann, Fiddes and Jung Young Lee7. However, this view entails either 
misunderstanding traditional orthodox Christianity or else rejecting it, since it does not 
appreciate the way in which Christ's attributes can (and the ways in which they cannot) 
be predicated to God through the communicatio idiomatum (or 'interchange of 
properties'). According to traditional orthodox Christianity, Jesus suffered in his human 
nature, but not in his divine nature. Suffering can be attributed to God in the person of 
Jesus by virtue of the fact that the divine and human natures are joined in one person, 
Jürgen Moltinann, The Crucified God (London: SCM Press, 1974), pp 214-5,240-7; Paul S. Fiddes, The 
Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), esp. pp. 25-9; Jung Young Lee, God Suffers 
for (Is: A systematic Inquiry into the concept of Divine Passibility (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 
esp. pp. 36-8,52 - 63 
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but that does not mean that Jesus in his divine nature suffers any more than it means that 
Jesus in his divine nature died, or was born of the Virgin Mary, or that Jesus in his 
human nature created the world. Whether or not one thinks that suffering is appropriate 
to the divine nature, deducing God's suffering from Christ's suffering in this way fails 
to maintain the distinction between the two natures and opens the door to obviously 
ridiculous syllogisms. For example, on the basis of this argument it would be equally 
possible to deduce that God is bearded. Jewish and male on the basis that Jesus is God 
and Jesus was bearded, male and Jewish. Of course, it may be possible to deduce the 
suffering of God from the suffering of Christ if one were to re-conceive the relation 
between Christ's divine and human natures, but such a re-modelling would require at 
least a separate Ph. D. thesis and, in addition, would move us away from the question of 
whether God suffers in Godself, and whether an emotionally full life is appropriate to a 
divine being. For this reason I do not discuss the relation between God's suffering and 
the suffering of the incarnate Christ. 
The second, independent but potentially complementary, way in which God's 
suffering is sometimes derived from Christ's suffering is revelatory rather than 
incarnational. Christ reveals God, and so, it is argued, Christ's suffering reveals God's 
suffering. Sarot supports this view, arguing that if Christ is the revelation of God and 
Christ suffers, then it is likely that one of the things he is revealing about God is the fact 
that God also suffers. J. M. Quinn8 objects to this argument on the grounds that God is 
not as Jesus, but Jesus is as God, and to reverse this is fallacious. Jesus reveals God to 
us in human form, taking on the limitations that human nature involves. But this does 
not mean that God also shares these human limitations - including passibility. The 
suffering of Christ does have some revelatory value, however - Christ's suffering and 
death are symbols of the infinite self-communication of the three persons of the Trinity 
8 J. M. Quinn, 'Triune Self-Giving: One Key to the Problem of Suffering', The Thomist 44 (1980) 173-219 
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to one another within the centre of divine nature. Sarot dismisses this argument, since, 
he argues, Jesus' suffering cannot reveal anything about God other than that God is also 
suffering. From this, Sarot concludes that the revelation of God in Christ implies the 
divine passibility. 
To my mind, Sarot's argument overlooks the possibility that (given that 
Christians agree that Christ's suffering was undertaken, one way or another, out of love 
for humanity) what Christ's suffering reveals is not God's suffering, but God's love, for 
which Christ's suffering is undertaken. According to this view, God shows his love for 
humanity in the incarnate Jesus, and in the suffering love of the incarnate Jesus, but this 
does not mean that God's love is also suffering love, for if God is by nature impassible, 
then his love must be non-suffering love, while Christ, as human, can show his love in 
suffering as well as in other ways. This suggests to me that Sarot is mistaken in 
believing that we can derive God's suffering from Christ's suffering, since the argument 
is inconclusive: Christ's suffering might reveal not God's suffering but God's love. 
However, it is possible that if we conclude that God suffers, not on the basis that 
Christ's suffering is revelatory of God's suffering, but on independent grounds, then 
Christ's suffering may still tell us something about the nature and motivation for God's 
suffering, and so Christ's suffering is not without revelatory significance for the 
impassibility debate. In this thesis, therefore, I do not discuss debates concerning 
whether God's suffering can be derived (on incarnational or revelatory grounds) from 
Christ's suffering, though I do seek to take seriously the revelation of God in the person 
of Jesus. 
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Chapter One: Aira(h za and Impassibility 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to reach some kind of appreciation of why impassibilism 
seemed attractive and obvious to early Christian theologians, and (inseparably) what 
precisely they meant when they affirmed it. There are many stories that could be told 
here, but the one I will focus on is about how ancient understandings of emotion 
informed the Fathers' inferences about the divine nature. In focusing upon this 
particular theme, I hope to prepare the ground for the later discussion of the relation 
between understandings of emotion and impassibility, which will be informed by some 
of the views of early Christian theologians. I anticipate that the discussion of human 
x0oS and the goal of human 
ärraot)ia on the one hand, and divine impassibility on the 
other, will enable us to recognise and evaluate the assumptions with which the Fathers 
were working, and so discern alternatives to their lines of argument, as well as to 
highlight our own contemporary presuppositions, and to assess and challenge some of 
these later in the thesis. 
In the second chapter I will complement this chapter with another narrative: A 
discussion of whether, how, why and in what ways the impassibilist consensus gave 
way to passibilist theology and an affirmation of the fullness of the divine emotional 
life. Thus while this chapter engages with the seemingly remarkable question of why 
impassibilism ever seemed appealing to Christian theologians, the second chapter seeks 
to elucidate, in the light of the sense we have made of impassibilism during the course 
of the first chapter, how and why this could have given way to the prevalence of 
passibilist theology in popular belief and academic theology in the twentieth century. 
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Emotion and impassibility in the ancient world 
One way to get to the root of why early theologians affirmed impassibilism, and what 
they meant by it, is to begin with a discussion of early Christian philosophy of emotion. 
Such a discussion is complicated - and informed - at the outset by the heterogeneity of 
early concepts of various different psychological experiences, and by the vast range of 
terms used to describe them. While our term `emotion' encompasses a vast variety of 
phenomena, 9 the ancient world opted instead for a diversity of descriptions of human 
psychological experiences. `Emotion' is in many ways an anachronistic term to use in 
relation to ancient thought, being both conceptually and semantically alien to the early 
Fathers; conceptually, since, as Thomas Dixon writes, `The category of emotions, 
conceived as a set of morally disengaged, bodily, non-cognitive and involuntary 
feelings, is a recent invention"0; semantically, since the modem sense of emotion was 
not used until the mid-nineteenth century, when it was developed in association with the 
rise of secular psychology, and so was defined in opposition to the religious 
worldview. " While the term `emotion' derives from the Latin molus (movement), 
motus and its derivatives were relatively minor terms in classical and medieval 
psychology, and were among a number of terms used to express what we would now 
term 'emotions'. Greek terms such as a 
lo-Oqais, thOos Böuos, 6zOvuiä, öpuil/6`pprypa, 
EyEpais, and Latin terms such as passiones, motus, motus animae, passiones animae, 
affectus, adfectus, adfectio, affectiones, libidines, perturbationes, permotio, sensus, 
concupiscentiae, desiderae, appetitus, commotio, concitatio, iurbatio, tumultus, 
9 Robert M. Gordon suggests that emotions are best seen as a group of experiences and phenomena 
related by family resemblances, since the search to define emotions in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions has proved fruitless (`Emotion', in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], pp. 259 - 60). 10 Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 3. 
11 Dixon, Passions, p. 4-5 
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appetentia, cupido, desiderium, and libido are among the ancient words now often 
translated and conceptually incorporated into our term `emotion', a translation which 
generally fails to convey the distinctiveness of the different terms - and the concepts to 
which they correspond - in earlier thought. This can, I suggest, lead to a 
misrepresentation of the early Fathers by modem scholars, who risk inadvertently 
imposing the concept of the emotion upon pre-modem texts. 
One instance of a Greco-Roman term frequently and misleadingly rendered 
'emotions' is the Greek term emOi, uice, translated into Latin variously as concupiscentia, 
appetitus and desiderae. '2 Plato used rci05piä to refer to instincts, appetites, and 
passions, though by the time of the New Testament the term often connotes sinfulness 
or a longing for what is forbidden. " However, baff pia was still used in a positive 
sense too: In Luke's account of the Last Supper, for example, Christ says: With desire I 
have desired (&' iMpMc briO1, upaa) to eat this Passover with you before I suffer. "4 One 
of the defining characteristics of EruOi pIä is that the term emphasises the active aspect 
of emotions: The `subject' of kiriO uiä is actively desirous, rather than being the 
recipient of emotional forces from without. 15 This emphasis upon the active nature of 
the experience indicates one way in which the modem concept of the emotion does not 
fully convey the meaning of briNpiä: In modem English we do not have a word that 
distinguishes an active experience of an emotion from a passive experience of one. 
Another instance of an Hellenistic concept being inappropriately used as 
synonymous with `emotion' is the concept of iräOos, generally rendered into Latin by 
passiones, or, more specifically, passiones animae. 16 The word rcaTii or passiones is 
12 Dixon, Passions, p. 39 
13 e. g. Mark 4.19; Rom. 1.24,6.12,13.14; Gal. 5.16 - 24; Titus 2.12,3.3, where it is translated variously 
sinful desires', 'evil desires', and 'passions' in the Revised Standard Version . 1' Luke 22.15. The NIV renders it: I have eagerly desired'. 
15 `iiaBiSpiä' and ' rdOos', in Joseph H. Thayer (ed. ), Thayer'c Greek-English Lexicon of the New 
Testament, 4th ed. (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996) 
16 In City of God IX. 4, Augustine notes several Latin translations of the Greek naBry', including affect us, 
affections, passiones, and Cicero's perturbationes animae (cf. Dixon, Passions, p. 40) 
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often translated `emotions' in a broad sense, and, more specifically, 'suffering. 17 
However, the literal meaning of rrädoS is `something outside one's control that befalls 
one', thus (in stark contrast to riOiYpi&8) carrying a sense of the vulnerability and 
passivity of the subject of the emotion. While =©ý are closely linked to passivity in 
quite a general sense, they are associated with a feeling experienced by the mind as 
early as Aristotle: `By pathe I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly 
feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are 
accompanied by pleasure and pain. ' 19 In this sense of the term, iraOi' are morally and 
experientially neutral: The feeling experienced by the mind might be good or bad, 
pleasant or unpleasant. However, in the New Testament, x0os is used by Paul 
specifically and solely of depraved passions, 20 so that iraOi' came to imply the morally 
negative by the time of the early Fathers. Just from this very brief glimpse at a couple of 
Greek terms and the differences between them, we can begin to see that the term 
`emotion' does not do justice to the distinctions between the many concepts prevalent in 
the ancient world and, in particular, in the early church. 
Correspondingly, the Greek & rafh is and Latin impassibilitas are not conveyed 
by the English translation `apathy', suggesting indifference, or even by the English 
impassibility', which has come to connote `devoid of emotion', but are closer to 
invulnerability', or `incapability of being acted upon by an outside force'. 2' In addition, 
because of the Platonic association between rcäeos and mutability on the one hand, and 
the New Testament connection between x0og and sinfulness on the other, ärrafta and 
impassibilitas are sometimes used by the Fathers to mean faithfulness and moral 
" Richard Bauckham, ' Only the Suffering God can Help: Divine Passibility in Modem 'Iheology', in 
Themelios 9 (3), 1984, p. 7 
18 ` iri6tTiiä' and `iräüoc', in Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon 
19 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics 11.5, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) cf. 
'ird0oc', in Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon 
20 e. g. Col. 3.5; Rom. 1.26; 1 'Mess- 4 
21 Marcel Sarot, 'Patripassianism, Theopaschitism, and the Suffering of God: Some Historical and 
Systematic Considerations', Religious Studies 26, p. 365 
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fidelity. 22 This suggests that the modem understanding of `divine impassibility' is at 
variance with the definition accorded to it by the early Fathers and their non-Christian 
contemporaries. 
Passions and divine araü»ia in the early church 
What were the reasons for the consensus on impassibility in the early church? It is well- 
recognised that one of the primary factors instrumental in the early church's assertion of 
divine impassibility is that by and large Christians inherited and adapted a negative 
view of the iraOý or passiones (often as distinct from other kinds of emotional 
phenomena) from the Stoics and Platonists (and other Greco-Roman schools which 
regarded Socrates' attitude towards his death [as portrayed by Plato] as exemplary). 
While it is tempting to suppose that the negative view of the passions was an Hellenistic 
thought imposed upon a previously emotion-affirming Judaeo-Christian tradition23, such 
a view does not take account of the fact that a negative portrayal of the passions was 
present in Christianity right from its birth. Paul himself was among the first of the 
writers (Christian and non-Christian) to use ra6ry' in purely negative, and usually 
sexually negative, terms. In his letter to the Colossians, he advises the community to 
`Put to death whatever belongs to your earthly nature (lit. `your members on earth'): 
Fornication, uncleanness, passion ['r&Ooc], bad desire [ImO 'p: av Ka v] and the 
covetousness which is idolatry. 24 Again, in his letter to the Romans, Paul lays the 
groundwork for Augustine's belief that sinful sexual passions (in the context of 
22 G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (Toronto: Heinemann Ltd, 1936), p. 5 
23 See, for example, T. E. Pollard, `The Impassibility of God', Scottish Journal of Theology S (1955: 353 - 
64; Edward Burnley, `The Impassibility of God', The Expository Times 67 (1955 - 56): 90 - 1, Rem B. 
Edwards, `The Pagan Dogma of the Absolute Unchangeableness of God', Religious Studies 14 (1975): 
305 - 13; John J. O'Keefe, `Impassible Suffering? Divine Suffering and Fifth Century Christology', 
Scottish Journal of Theology p 354 - 365. Some modem passibilist theologians are not sympathetic 
towards the early Fathers, often viewing them as 'betraying' the New Testament revelation of God in 
Christ in favour of Greek philosophical values. T. E. Pollard, for example, begins his article with a 
warning that Christian theologians should beware of accepting the gifts of the Greeks (p. 353) 
24 Colossians 3.5; my translation 
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Romans, homosexuality) are a divine punishment for human sin, writing that 'God gave 
them [sinners] up to passions of dishonour [=O, ariutaSJ'. 25 In his letter to the 
Thessalonians, Paul again displays a negative understanding of passions, and a 
propensity to understand passions as sinful sexual desires, conjoining the terms iräOos 
and tiriOt5piä to produce the sense of the `passions of lust' apparently rife among non- 
Christian Gentiles. 26 
The biblical acceptance of the negative view of the passions was naturally 
adopted by the Fathers of the Church, and developed in ways that were informed by 
their own philosophical proclivities. Clement of Alexandria emphasises the Christian's 
duty to struggle against the passions when he writes that the true Gnostic is the true 
athlete, who in the great arena, the beautiful world, is crowned by reason of [i. e. by 
virtue of the true victory over all the passions. '27 For Augustine, passio (which he 
regards as the Latin equivalent of naO) are movements of the mind contrary to 
reason', 28 and thus both irrational and passive (in that the one who experiences them is 
passive in their experience of them: They are `assailed' by an outside force). The 
association between passion, passivity and suffering also pervades early thought, and is 
demonstrated in the etymological relation between the classical Latin term passivus 
(`passivity') and the later Latin term passio. which came to mean both passion and 
suffering. Further, Dionysius of Alexandria expresses the irrationality and passivity of a 
subject's suffering iräOog in listing connected attributes when he emphasises the 
dissimilarity between God and matter: Those who claim that there are likenesses 
between God and matter should 'give the reason why, if both are unoriginate, God is 
25 Romans 1.26; my translation 
26 1 Thessalonians 4.6 
27 Clement, Stromateis 7.3, cited J. K. Mozley, The Impassibility of God: A Survey of Christian Thought 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1926), p. 56 
28 Augustine, The City of God viii, 17, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 1972) 
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impassible, immutable, immoveable, active in work, but matter on the contrary is 
subject to passion, changeable, unstable, experiencing modification. ' 29 
In addition to the association between 7raOri, passivity and irrationality, passions 
are also often associated with sin, and susceptibility to passions is seen as a result of the 
Fall in some of the early Fathers. We have already noted that in the New Testament 
Paul uses iraOi to refer only to immoral `emotions'. This association between passions 
and sin is made more explicit in Athanasius, according to whom, while our 
susceptibility to passions is partly `natural' because it is the result of our createdness 
and finitude, the extent of our susceptibility to passions is extreme and 'unnatural' 
because we are fallen and sinful. The state of &jraOilia, which is closely connected with 
the salvation brought by Christ, not only removes us from sin, but also makes us 
invulnerable to the susceptibility to passions which results from our finitude and from 
our fallen nature. Christ's identification with us in the incarnation (and our responsive 
identification with him through faith and the sacraments) liberates us from slavery to the 
passions: `And while He Himself [the Second Person of the Trinity] being impassible in 
nature, remains as He is, not harmed by these affections, but rather obliterating and 
destroying them, men, their passions as if changed and abolished in the Impassible, 
henceforth become themselves also impassible and free from them for ever, as John 
taught, saying "And ye know that He was manifested to take away our sins, and in Him 
is no sin. -30 Here, passions have an implicit synonymity with sin. Passions are not only 
thought to entail passivity and irrationality, but are also consequent upon both our 
finitude, and our fallen, sinful nature. 
At the same time, it is important to remember that the negative view of the 
passions was not ubiquitous in the early church. Lactantius, for example, provides an 
interesting counter-example. Lactantius criticises the Stoics for what he regards as their 
29 Text in The Letters and other Remains of Dionvsius of Alexandria, ed. C. L. Feltoe, p. 184, cited 
Mozley, Impassibility, p. 72 
30 Athanasius, Or. III, 32 - 34, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 85 
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rejection of emotion: `The Stoics, therefore, are mad, they do not moderate Spassions), 
but cut them off, and in a way want to castrate a human being of things that are 
implanted by nature. 31 More specifically, Lactantius criticises the Stoics for what he 
sees as their rejection of sympathy [humanitasl, for removing pity [pietas] from human 
beings, for separating themselves from society by the rigour of their inhuman virtue, 
and so increasing vice rather than curing it. 32 We shall see the correspondence between 
Lactantius' view of human emotion, and his understanding of the divine nature, later in 
the chapter. 
The influence of Stoic passions on the Christian concept of sin 
While some of the early Christians were reacting against Stoic psychology, others 
adopted the Stoic idea of first movements or prepassions, the visceral reaction preceding 
passions, which (as Richard Sorabji shows) were developed by early Christians first into 
the `bad thoughts' inciting sinful passions, and later into the temptations preceding the 
seven cardinal sins. 33 The link between the first movements of an emotion and the 
temptation to sin, and between passions themselves and the sins to which they are 
related, indicates a close connection between passion and sin that disinclined the early 
Fathers to any idea of God experiencing any sort of passion. Sorabji's argument is of 
great interest to the impassibility debate, since it demonstrates the degree to which 
passions and sin were connected by the early Fathers, and the way in which Stoic 
prepassions were eventually developed into the temptations corresponding to the seven 
cardinal sins. In discussing his exposition of the early Fathers, I shall tend to follow 
Sorabji in referring to `emotions' rather than `passions' or 'iraOi ' (and related 
31 Div. Inst. 6.15.2, cited in Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, The Emotions in Hellenistic 
Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), p. 220 
32 Div. Inst. 6.10.11, cited Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, Emotions p. 220 
33 Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) What follows is heavily dependent upon Sorabji's work. 
23 
psychological terms). However, I think that 'emotions' are best interpreted here as 
'passions', since, as we shall see, other 'emotional' experiences are viewed far more 
positively by at least some Fathers of the church, and these Fathers might well be 
antithetical to the idea that positive psychological experiences ought to be identified 
with sinful passions. 
The Stoic Seneca and his Christian successors believed that emotions involve 
judgements, and that these judgements are, at least in part, voluntary: While it may 
appear that one is in a bad situation, one can choose whether to assent to or to reject this 
appearance. First movements and prepassions are not themselves emotions, they are 
initial and involuntary feelings, rather than rational value judgements. Disregarding this 
fact can lead us into an undesirable 'emotional' state, since we might induce a passion 
34 simply by observing an initial reaction and taking it as normative. 
The Stoic idea and terminology of prepassions was taken up in Judaeo-Christian 
thought initially by Philo the Jew, and then - quite variously - by the Alexandrian 
theologians Origen, Didymus the Blind, Jerome and Clement. Even at this early stage 
passions are associated with sin, and LuraOi ia, in the sense of freedom from passion, is 
viewed as a perfection at which Christians should aim. Stoic ideals are applied to 
biblical stories and sayings by Christian theologians and exegetes: Christ's grief is 
viewed as a prepassion rather than an actual emotion, and Christ's assessment that 
someone who looks at a woman lustfully has committed adultery in their own heart 35 is 
propitiously interpreted to mean that a man is condemned if he looks at a woman 
deliberately to stir up and satisfy his lustful desires, rather than if he is accidentally 
aroused by one in passing. Accidental arousal, being an involuntary reaction, is a 
prepassion rather than an emotion, and so is not morally culpable. 36 
34 Sorabji, Emotion, pp. 3,150,160,272 
35 Matthew 5.27 - 28 36 This latter example occurs in Jerome, Commentary on Matthew 5.28 § 28 - 29; Augustine, On the 
Sermon on the Mount 1.34.24, and is cited in Sorabji, Emotion, p. 344 
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Ongen made a significant transition by connecting first movements or 
prepassions with bad thoughts 37 Sorabji suggests that this shift makes most sense if 
viewed as a change of focus from Seneca's first movement - the initial shock - to its 
cause, the appearance of the situation. Bad thoughts, the Christian adaptation of Stoic 
prepassions, provide an incitement to sin, though it is ultimately up to the subject 
whether to accept them or to resist. Ongen optimistically writes that it is possible for 
us, once a malign power has begun to incite us to evil, to repel the wicked suggestions 
from us and to resist the worse blandishments, and do absolutely nothing culpable. ' 38 
Despite the sharp distinction made here between bad thoughts/temptation, and the actual 
sin itself, Origen often blurs the original Stoic distinction between prepassion and 
emotion, or portrays the distinction as ambiguous. For example, a passage in the 
Commentary on Matthew suggests that Christ suffered a full-blown emotion to a small 
degree, as opposed to experiencing merely the initial reaction (prepassion) to something 
sad or fearful while rejecting sadness and fear as an appropriate response upon 
evaluation: `So he did indeed begin to be sad and troubled, in accordance with his 
human nature, which is subject to such emotions [rendered passiones by Rufinusi, but 
not in accordance with his divine power, which is far removed from emotion [passionel 
of this kind,. 39 Sorabji suggests that this concession to the idea that Christ has emotions 
is partly because Origen (or possibly Rufinus) did not want to rule out all emotional 
experience from Christ, being keen to emphasise Jesus' humanity over and against 
various Gnostic theories. 
" Sorabji, Emotion, pp. 343 - 357 38 Origen, On First Principles, 3.2.4, cited Sorabji, Emotion, p. 347 
39 Origen, Commentary on Matthew 26.36 - 9, cited Sorabji, Emotion, p. 349. We don't know what word 
Origen used for the term Sorabji translates 'emotions', but Rufinus translates it into the Latin 'passions', 
thus suggesting that the original word used was nagt' or a term connoting a similarly negatively- 
overtoned psychological phenomenon. 
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Didymus the Blind, who is more rigorous than Origen in distinguishing emotion 
from prepassion (which he regards as the beginning of an emotion40), ascribes the 
former to Christ on the grounds that otherwise Jesus' soul would be of a different 
substance to ours, and because it would imply that there was no struggle on the cross. 
However, Christ's soul is thought to have no irrational faculty of desire: His response 
is always a rational one. Christ endures suffering on the cross, is distressed at foreseeing 
his betrayal, and is tempted to sin. However, this temptation does not detract from 
Christ's moral perfection: Didymus insists that there is nothing sinful about prepassion. 
Following the Stoics, Jerome asserts that the transition from prepassion to 
emotion is characterised by assent, will, decision, and judgement. Jerome connects 
prepassions with thoughts, and also adds the idea that some fault attaches to prepassion, 
while recognising that it cannot be avoided and is not punished by God. That 
prepassions are not `sinful' despite the fault attached to them is important in upholding 
Christ's sinlessness: Like Didymus the Blind, Jerome asserts that Christ's beginning to 
be sad is a prepassion, but adds that, having assumed humanity, Christ was truly 
saddened. What seems to be important for Jerome's understanding of emotions and 
Christ's moral perfection is not whether an emotion is experienced at all, but whether 
the emotion dominates in the mind, presumably because this would imply that it 
overcomes reason. 41 
By contrast, Clement of Alexandria states that, because of Christ's divine nature, 
`He was altogether impassible, into Him no movement of passion could find its way, 
neither pleasure nor pain', 42 and asserts elsewhere that the Gnostic, who emulates divine 
äzafta, overcomes not only `negative' passions but also 'positive' emotions such as 
determination, emulation, and cheerfulness. Further, Clement asserts that perfect 
humans - and so, by extension, God - do without the eü&räOeza which many 
40 Didymus the Blind, Psalmen-Kommentar, Pt. 3 (Ps. s 29 - 24), 222.12 - 14, in Sorabji, Emotion, p. 352 41 Jerome, Commentary on Matthew 26, verse 37, cited Sorabji, Emotion, p. 352 
42 Cited in Mozley, Impassibility, p. 57 
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contemporary Stoics regarded not as passions but as good psychological phenomena - 
caution, joy, and edcppovuvq (joy at the deeds of the temperate). 43 In this way, Clement 
presents /xirafta as an ideal that involves not only freedom from negative passions, but 
also freedom from positive and characteristically virtuous emotions. 
Basil of Caesarea offers a positive view of emotion when offering consolation, 
but a more negative one in his discussion of ideals. 44 In the context of consolation, Basil 
adopts Anaxagorus' idea that we should remember that our children and loved ones are 
mortal, but rejects the Stoic conclusion that we should not grieve at their deaths. He 
expresses the goodness of grief, while also emphasising that grief should be moderated. 
Importantly, Basil explicitly states that we must not react without emotion or feeling. 45 
In his discussion of ideals, however, Basil argues that emotional appetites are the result 
of the Fall, and idealises freedom from emotion as a way of making us like God. 
Anal 1, a is not to be achieved by ordinary people; it is reserved for people like St. 
Paul. 46 Somewhat incongruously, Basil does not attribute äarafta to the earthly Christ. 
It is important for us, he argues, that Christ experienced real emotion. 47 Accordingly, 
emotion is not regarded as sinful in and of itself, but is indicative of fallen nature, and 
perfection necessitates freedom from it. 
Evagrius of Pontus develops a distinctively Stoic view of the Christian life, 
advising other anchorites on how to combat prepassions, to ward off emotions and to 
achieve fanat za, which he also describes as health. In his Practical Treatise Evagrius 
speaks of eight thoughts which can beset one: Gluttony, lust, avarice, distress, anger, 
listless depression (äxýSia), vanity, and pride. Echoing Stoic thought, Evagrius regards 
his eight thoughts as the most generic, and as those which encompass all others. (Unlike 
the Stoics, however, he does not show how the others are a species of the eight generic 
43 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 6.9 71 - 4, cited Sorabji, Emotion, p. 397 44 Sorabji, Emotion, p. 391 
45 Id. On Julitta, PG 31, col. s 215 - 19, Letters 5; 62. cited Sorabji, Emotion, p. 391 
°o Basil, Ascetic Sermons, 1.1 -2 (PG 31.969,872), cited Sorabji, Emotion, p. 391 47 Basil, Id. Letter 261, cited Sorabji, Emotion, p. 392 
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ones. 48) The eight thoughts correspond to emotions - and, importantly, to sins - such as 
lust, distress and anger, but are not themselves emotions, rather, they are the 'bad 
thoughts' preceding the respective emotions. As in Origen (who influenced Evagrius), 
these bad thoughts were viewed as first movements. Evagrius sees these bad thoughts as 
often being initiated by demons, so that the Practical Treatise concerns how these 
demons can be outwitted. 
It is not up to us whether bad thoughts assail us, though we can control whether 
they linger and whether they initiate emotions. 49 The thoughts are only temptations and 
are not themselves sinful: Sin only enters the equation when assent is given to the 
pleasure of the thought. The most effective way to dispel bad thoughts is to play them 
off against one another. In order to perfect this technique, Evagrius studies the causal 
interrelations among the thoughts. While most thoughts are vanquished by thinking of 
another, vanity is exceptional: Once the first thoughts have been defeated, vanity 
remains, and can only be overcome by the remembrance of our frailty achieved through 
the entertainment of one of the other seven. Through this method of playing off 
thoughts against one another, one begins to be free of (troublesome) emotion, although 
profound urathi, a is accomplished only when bad thoughts are headed off by humility 
and chastity. 
The idea that listless depression is a bad thought is interesting for three reasons. 
First, because modem thought does not usually view depression as a moral 
imperfection, its status as a sin in Evagrius seems rather severe and uncompassionate. 
The inclusion of listless depression as a bad thought is partly elucidated, however, when 
one realises that Evagrius associated listless depression with idleness, and indeed in 
later lists of bad thoughts the name and idea of `sloth' replaced that of listless 
depression. Two plausible explanations for this transition are offered by Siegfried 
48 Sorabji, Emotion, p. 35S 
49 Evagrius, Practical Treatise 6, cited in Sorabji, Emotion, p. 359 
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Wenzel. First, in Benedictine monasteries, where life was more communal than for the 
desert hermits, the monks were given specific tasks to perform and siestas in the 
afternoons. This last is particularly important, since listless depression was recognised 
as the `noonday demon' (Evagrius), and a siesta provided unconsciousness at this time 
of perturbation. The lack of performing the requisite tasks thus took over as the salient 
feature since listless depression was diminished. Second, by the ninth century it was 
found, in confessions for lay people, far more practical to evaluate the non-performance 
of tasks, rather than an inner spiritual or mental state. 50 
The second reason why listless depression is interesting as a bad thought is that, 
as Sorabji observes, listless depression is a mood rather than an emotion: It `can feed 
itself by latching on to any situation that comes to mind, rather than being directed to a 
particular situation's'. Listless depression had already been viewed by Oxigen as one of 
the general temptations of Christ in the desert 52 (as opposed to one of the specific 
three), and by Basil, who argues, contra Evagrius and others, that listless depression 
might be dispelled by leaving one's solitary cell and venturing out into the wider 
community. 53 
A third reason why listless depression might be regarded as interesting is that, 
while the other bad thoughts correspond to some sort of active emotional experience 
(such as the active and potentially acute feelings of greed, or lust, or anger), listlessness, 
depression and listless depression include characteristics that make it more like the 
absence of an emotional experience. For example, listlessness and depression, unlike 
most `emotions', do not invest value in an object or objects, and are not motivational 
forces: Those suffering from listlessness and depression tend not to be able to see the 
value or meaning in any object, and are thus deterred from accomplishing things. In 
so Siegfried Wenzel, The Sin of Sloth (Chapel Hill, 1960), cited Sorabji, Emotion, p. 369 
51 Sorabji, Emotion, p. 369 
52 Origen, Commentary on Luke, fragment 96, cited by Sorabji, Emotion, p. 369, who notes that the 
fragment may not be authentic 
53 Basil, Constitutiones Monasticae chapter 7, cited Sorabji, Emotion, p. 369 
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contrast, most emotional experiences (virtuous as well as vicious) motivate people to 
action, since they invest or enable people to perceive value and meaning in a particular 
object, and motivate people to act accordingly. Even in the case of sadness (which is 
often spoken of as similar to depression), a value is perceived in the object of the 
sadness (for example, if the object has been lost), and this motivates the subject to 
action (to mourn the object, e. g. through tears), while in the case of listlessness and 
depression no value is invested or perceived in any object. Nor can this dissimilarity be 
put down merely to the fact that, as we have already observed, listless depression is a 
mood rather than an emotion because it has no object: Other moods (such as generic 
cheerfulness) may not be intentional (i. e. not have an object), but they can still tend the 
cheerfully-mooded person to recognise value in those things that they experience in 
their life. 
This account of listless depression as being unusual in its tendency to make 
people oblivious to the value and meaning of various objects (including people), and to 
deter people from action rather than to motivate people to it, is particularly interesting in 
the present context. This is because this sort of experience is not typical of an emotional 
experience on most modern understandings of the emotions, which stress the evaluative 
nature and motivational tendencies of emotions, 54 but is closer to the modern 
understanding of apathy as the absence of emotion. If I am correct in this account of 
listless depression and its similarities to the modern understanding of apathy as the 
absence of emotion, some very interesting suggestions emerge for our account of both 
the early church's understanding of the psychological phenomena that modern people 
class as emotions, and the early church's understanding of divine impassibility: 
If i) listless depression is (in modern terms) an absence of emotion, and shares 
some characteristics with apathy (in the modern sense of the term as absence of 
54 Modem accounts of emotion stress variously the role of emotions as motivations to action, the nature of 
emotions as judgements of value in the object, and the non-cognitive 'assessment' that the object of the 
emotion is valuable, conveyed through 'pure feeling'. 
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emotions), and ii) listless depression is regarded by the early Fathers as a bad thought 
that precedes sin and corresponds to vicious passions, then it would be astounding if the 
absence of emotions (of which listless depression is one type) were also regarded as a 
virtue by the early Fathers, or were predicated by them of God. Yet if we read many of 
the accounts of the early Fathers on fz, raOi za and divine impassibility given by modem 
theologians this is precisely the impression we get: The early Fathers, it is suggested, 
believed that God did not experience emotions, that God is emotionless. It is difficult to 
reconcile the Fathers' portrayal of listless depression as a bad thought with their 
insistence that God is in a state of äwraO, is or impassibilitias, and that this is the sort of 
state to which the Christian, the wise man, or the true Gnostic should strive. This 
consideration provides us with an intimation further to the suggestions we have already 
made that the meaning of a7raOi is is not adequately conveyed by its etymological 
descendent `apathy', meaning the absence of emotion, and, similarly, that the Latin 
equivalent of ixirafto, impassibilitas, is not satisfactorily expressed by the modem 
understanding of the English term `impassibility': Neither a, ra0hta nor impassibilitas 
ought to be understood in terms of the absence of the modem category of emotion. 
All this is not to claim that there is not a strong relation between sin and the 
passions in early church thought. The link between them was strengthened further when 
Pope Gregory the Great developed Evagrius' eight bad thoughts into the seven cardinal 
sins. Gregory removed pride from the list as being the root of all other sins, subsumed 
listless depression into distress, and added envy. 55 In this way, the connection between 
passions and sin was made more concrete in Christian theology, and the intellectual 
context remained far more favourable to impassibilism than to the possibility of a God 
who experienced passions. Yet - and this is crucial - iraOý and passiones are only one 
ss Sorabji, Emotion, p. 370 
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of many emotion category concepts in early Christian thought. 56 I shall turn to the 
question of whether and how any other sort of emotion might be regarded as possible 
for, or appropriate to, God, with a case study of emotion and impassibility in Augustine 
and Aquinas in chapter three. For the present, however, I shall continue with the 
discussion of the early church more generally, and shall indicate how the early Christian 
view of iraOii and passiones relates to the impassibilist consensus. 
Passions and impassibility 
First, as will have become apparent in the course of this chapter, one way in which the 
negative view of passions played a large part in the impassibility discussion in the early 
church was that passions, as imperfections in humans, are certainly inappropriate to 
God. This is most apparent on a moral level. John of Damascus writes that 'God, being 
good, is the cause of all good, subject neither to envy nor to any passion. '57 
Furthermore, as we have seen, for many early Fathers, passions are the `natural' result 
of our createdness and finitude, and overwhelming or involuntary passions are 
associated with sin, and the propensity for overwhelming or involuntary passions is 
often thought to be the result of the Fall58. It is clear that God, as a perfect, absolutely 
good and holy being, would be unable to experience them. In addition, because one use 
of `impassibility' is `faithfulness'59, God's'wraOi za is designed in part to emphasise that 
God is not fickle in his righteousness or in his love for creation. It was partially because 
s° At the same time, the different types of emotion were not clearly systematised: The different emotional 
`tvpes' were not clearly defined in distinction from one another (in fact at times they were used as 
synonyms) but there are tendencies to use certain terms (such as xaO /passiones) in certain ways rather 
than others. 
57 John of Damascus, Exposition I, I (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. ix, cited Mozley, 
Impassibility, p. 99) 
58 e. g. Athanasius, Evagrius, Basil. For Augustine, the uncontrollability of the passions was a punishment 
for the Fall. 
59 G. L. Prestige, God, p. 8 
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of God's moral perfection, then, that the early Fathers maintained the divine 
impassibility. 
Related to the insistence upon God's moral perfection is the fact that the early 
Fathers were keen to emphasise the moral superiority and steadfastness of the Judaeo- 
Christian God over and against the whimsicalness of the pagan deities. Mozley notes, 
for example, that for Justin Martyr it was one of the winning distinctions of Christianity 
that in contrast with the earthly and unedifying experiences ascribed to the gods of 
Greece, it has nothing to say about God which is incompatible with Him being 
"unbegotten and impassible"'. 60 The Fathers were concerned both to distinguish God 
from the immorality or capriciousness of the pagan gods, and, by extension, to distance 
the Christian God from the anthropomorphisms that frequently result in immoral 
attributions to the divine beings. For example, Athenagoras explicitly denounces the 
poets', and particularly Homer's, attribution of immoral emotions to the gods, alongside 
any sexualisations of the divine being/s. He is emphatic that `Neither anger nor desire 
nor yearning nor any generative seed is in God. '61 Thus, while emotions and sexuality 
are not necessarily deemed immoral in and of themselves, the perception that they are 
inappropriate to God or the gods, and that attribution of them to God or the gods often 
results in an immoral portrayal of the divine, means that the early Christians were keen 
to avoid any ethically dubious anthropomorphisms. 
This leads us to a further important consideration in relation to passions and 
impassibility. For modern theology, impassibility has become a positive statement about 
God not having emotions, about God being emotionless, defined in contrast to 
passibilism, interpreted as the idea that God does have emotions. In the early church, 
however, the emphasis is not upon a positive statement about God, but is the negation of 
an anthropomorphic attribute - it is about what God is not (i. e. subject to passions in a 
60 Justin Martyr, Apol. 1,25.2, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 12 
61 Athenagoras, Legatio 21, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p 14 
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weak, human and potentially immoral way) rather than being about what God is. 
Amobius, for example, attempts to avoid the often monstrous anthropomorphisms of 
paganism by addressing the Christian God through an appeal to the apophatic nature of 
our knowledge of God that borders on an extreme doctrine of divine ineffability: 
Thou art infinite, unbegotten, immortal, perpetual, the only One whom no bodily form describes, 
no finitude of qualities limits, transcending every quantitative notion, without place, without 
motion, without guise, of whom nothing can be said and expressed according to the meaning of 
human language; we must be silent in order that Thou mayest be understood, and that conjecture 
may in its wandering be able to trace Thee through the shadows, nothing at all must be uttered. o2 
Amobius goes on to say that we must not even attribute virtues such as courage, 
wisdom and intelligence provision to God; these are human merits. 63 When we read 
about divine impassibility in early Christian theology therefore, we need to bear in mind 
the tradition of negative theology that arose in reaction against pagan 
anthropomorphism, and remember that impassibilism is essentially about emphasising 
God's otherness through an appreciation of what God is not, rather than about saying, in 
positive terms, something about God's nature. 
Second, the early Fathers viewed )anaOi is and/or blissfulness as an ideal on a 
`metaphysical' as well as on a specifically moral level. Because passions tend to be 
involuntary and to overcome reason, the experience of passions would disturb God's 
blessed existence and bliss. Furthermore, because emotion is often conceived of in 
terms of attraction or desire for something 64, it suggests a lack: Something further is 
needed for the subject's fulfilment. A perfect and complete being would not experience 
passions, since a perfect being needs nothing additional for their fulfilment. Thus 
Clement of Alexandria writes, `... the divine nature needs nothing and is without 
passions, wherefore it is not rightly called self-controlled. But our nature admits of 
62 Arnobius, Adv. Nat. I, 31; cf. 1l1, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p 48 
63 Mozley, Impassibility, p 48, fn l 
64 This is particularly the case where all emotions are seen as types of love. See Catherine Osbourne, Eros 
Unveiled. - Plato and the God of Love (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 
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passion and so needs control. '65 Given that passion is thought to indicate both moral and 
metaphysical flaws, the early Fathers had a deep-rooted and generally unchallenged 
predilection towards impassibilism. 
A third way in which the consensus that passions are imperfections entered the 
impassibility debate was through the association between passions and passivity. 
Because of the connection between passivity and passions, the early Fathers perceived 
that a God who suffered at the sin and pain of humanity would be a God partially 
conditioned by his creation: What we do would determine to some degree the quality of 
God's inner life, either positively or negatively. 66 If this were so, then God's autonomy 
and sovereignty would appear to be diminished, and the attribute of omnipotence 
greatly modified. For this reason, later theologians such as Thomas developed the idea 
that God is `pure act', and some definitions of impassibility 'stress the moral freedom of 
God or his insusceptibility to distraction from resolve'. 67 As Augustine is keen to stress, 
no one can hurt the nature of God'. 68 
A fourth way in which the ancient assessment of passions entered the 
impassibility debate is through the early and modem conviction that emotions entail 
change and temporality. For the early church, this rendered God incapable of passions, 
since he was held to be immutable and eternal in the sense of being outside time. As 
Bauckham writes: 'Suffering is connected with time, change and matter, which are 
features of this material world of becoming. But God is eternal in the sense of 
atemporal.... He is absolute, fully actualized perfection, and therefore simply is eternally 
what he is. '69 Given that timelessness and changelessness would prohibit God from 
e5 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 7.11 - 14, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 57 
°b cf. Nicholas Wolterstorff, `Suffering Love', In Philosophy and the Christian 
Faith, cd. TV Morris (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 196 - 237 
67 Sarot, `Patripassianism', p. 365 
68 De nat. bon. Cont. Manich. 1,40, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 109 
e9 Bauckham, `Only a Suffering God', p. 7. In relation to Bauckham's assertion that emotions were 
associated with the corporeal/material world, while there is much of this in Aquinas which is drawn upon 
by Sarot, I have not found much of it in the early Fathers. Indeed, Augustine asserts that the devil is 
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experiencing passions, one may ask why the early church unanimously predicated of 
God the twin attributes of eternality and immutability, since it is in modifying these 
attributes that modem theologians have been able to consider and develop the 
possibility of divine passibility. The answer to this puzzle lies in the early widespread 
acceptance of the Platonic contention that change implies imperfection. For the early 
Fathers it seemed obvious that if something changes, it must change either for the better 
or the worse. But if God changes for the better, he cannot have been perfect in the first 
place. But God, it is thought, is a perfect being. Therefore, If he change at all he can 
only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him to be deficient either in virtue or 
beauty... '70 However, if God is vulnerable to deterioration, then he is less perfect than if 
he is invulnerable to deterioration. Therefore a perfect being would be unchanging, and 
so the early church believed God to be immutable and eternal, and thus prohibited 
passions from the divine nature. 
A fifth way in which ancient attitudes towards passions affected the early 
discussion of impassibility is through the idea that, as we have seen Augustine explicitly 
state, passions are inherently irrational. We have only to recall the status of reason in 
ancient philosophy - in Aristotle and Plato as well as the Stoics - and the significance 
of the identification of the Second Person of the Trinity with the divine Logos, to realise 
how unthinkable it would be for most early Fathers to attribute passions to God. 7' For 
example, Plato's analogy of the charioteer in the Phaedrus to explain the three-part 
division of the human psyche shows how the appetites and passions (represented by the 
ignobly-bred ugly black horse) should be under the control of the charioteer (the 
rational, intellective part of the human being [vovc]). Aristotle also betrays a preference 
incorporeal, and yet that he experiences the passions of jealousy, pride, hatred, and anger, thus implying 
that passions are not intrinsically corporeal. 
70 The Dialogues of Plato, tr. B. Jowett (New York, Random House, 1937), 1,645 
71 Mozley, Impassibility, p. 45 
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for `the active intellect' (vous noierexoc as the only divine, immaterial and impassible 
element of humanity. 72 
One reason for the development (rather than initial acceptance) of the theology 
of divine impassibility in the early church is that the paradox of the Impassible God 
suffering in the Person of Jesus is seen by the Fathers as a paradigm of the extraordinary 
fact of the incarnation and of the love God showed the world by becoming human. In 
his letter to Polycarp, Ignatius writes: `Await Him that is above every season, the 
Eternal, the Invisible, who became visible for our sake, the Impalpable, the Impassible, 
who suffered for our sake, who endured in all ways for our sake. 73 Again, the paradox 
of the incarnation is emphasised through a series of juxtaposed antitheses in Ignatius' 
letter to the Ephesians: `There is only one physician, of flesh and of spirit, generate and 
ingenerate, God in man, true Life in death, Son of Mary and Son of God, first passible 
then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord. '74 Here one might also cite Irenaeus in his 
development of the theology of deification75 in the context of his efforts to refute the 
Gnostic belief that Jesus did not really suffer: 
... 
in every respect, too, He is man, the formation of God; and thus He took up man into 
Himself, the invisible becoming visible, the incomprehensible being made comprehensible, 
the impassible becoming capable of suffering, and the Word being made man, thus 
summing up all things in Himself: so that as in super-celestial, spiritual, and invisible 
things, the Word of God is supreme, so also in things visible and corporeal He might 
possess the supremacy, and... He might draw all things to Himself at the proper time. 7b 
For Irenaeus as well as for Ignatius, the notion that the Impassible suffered in Jesus is at 
the root of the incarnation. While passibilism is the default position of Christian 
theologians today, for the early Fathers the idea that God was `already' passible, and, in 
72 cf. Alfred Weber, History of Philosophy, trans. Frank Thilly (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1908), p. 128f 
" Ignatius, `Epistle to S. Polycarp', 3, trans. by J. B. Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers (London: 
Macmillan and Company, 1891), p. 87 
" Ignatius, 'Epistle to the Ephesians', 7, trans. Lightfoot, Apostolic Fathers, p. 65 
'5 Compare Gregory of Nazianzus: 'by the sufferings of Him Who could not suffer, we were taken up and 
saved' (Theological Oration IV. 5, cited in O'Keefe, 'Impassible Suffering? ', p. 359) 
76 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, III, 16.6 (Roberts-Donaldson English translation, available online at 
http: //www. intratext. com/X/ENG0307. HTM and http: //www. earlychristianwritings. com/irenaeus. html, 
accessed on 17th January 2008) 
37 
particular, that God was -already' susceptible to suffering, would render the incarnation 
less remarkable, for it would imply to them that God `sacrificed' less when he became 
human. 
, 
Different understandings of divine impassibility in the early church 
While impassibility was thus in many ways a foregone conclusion in the early church, 
the way in which it was cashed out by the early Fathers is strikingly diverse, and there is 
some early theology that both anticipates modem passibilism and may be able to 
contribute insights to it. For example, Theophilus of Antioch ascribes anger and mercy 
to God in his relationship with humanity. Interestingly, Theophilus juxtaposes an 
affirmation of certain emotions of God with an insistence upon God's immutability. Of 
God's relation to humanity he writes that God `is angry with the evil-doers, but good 
and kind and merciful towards them who love and fear Him. '77 However, immediately 
afterwards he says that God is 'unchangeable, inasmuch as He is immortal. '78 Perhaps, 
as Mozley suggests. Theophilus understands God's immutability as his impunity to 
79 forces outside himself, and the essential constancy of his nature. 
Origen and Lactantius both suggest divine passibility of a sort. Following his 
teacher Amobius, Lactantius emphasises God's impassibility and freedom from external 
control as an aspect of God's transcendence of human conceptions and human 
language. 80 However, somewhat at odds with Arnobius' apophatic method, Lactanius 
also writes a particular treatise on divine anger, in which he argues against those 
77 Theophilus, Ad Autol. 1.3.4, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 14 
7' Theophilus, Ad Autol. 1.3.4, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 14 
79 Mozley, Impassibility, p 14 
80 Lactantius, epitome inst. Divin. 3, cJ: Mozley, Impassibility, p. 48 - 49 
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(especially among the Epicureans81) who suggest that God is moved by no feeling '112 
and, in particular, those who deny that God does experiences anger. Lactantius suggests 
that to deny feeling of God is to deny existence, because movement is characteristic of 
everything that has life. Moreover, God's blessedness requires feeling, for without it he 
is in a state of torpor, without either rest or motion, deaf to prayer and blind to those 
who worship him. Absolute rest, he argues, is in death alone, and so cannot be attributed 
to God. Some emotions, such as fear and lust and envy, have no 'material' (materia) for 
their existence in God, because there is nothing for God to be fearful, or lustful, or 
envious towards. However, other emotions are appropriate to God: 'Graciousness and 
anger and pity have material for their existence in God, and rightly does that supreme 
and unique Power use them for the preservation of things made. 83 God experiences pity 
in observing human afflictions, graciousness in relation to human prayers, offerings and 
good works, and anger with respect to unrighteousness and neglect of God. When God 
is angry he is always righteously angry, but that righteous anger is possible is shown by 
the fact that there are some things it would be wrong for human beings not to be angry 
about; unlike Amobius, Lactantius argues by analogy from human emotion to divine. 
Lactantius is critical of the Stoics, who, he suggests, are erroneous in condemning all 
anger, failing to distinguish between anger that is just and anger that is not. God's anger 
is defined as the 'movement of the mind as it rises up to check sins' . 
84 Notably, 
Lactantius regards God's anger as voluntary and according to God's will: He is not 
ruled by it, but Himself restrains it just as He pleases'. 85 Thus, although emotions, 
particularly those describable as passions, have a reputation for being uncontrollable 
n Lactantius takes as his antagonist Epicurus, who claims that 'if in God there is a feeling of happiness 
issuing in graciousness, and of hate issuing in anger, He must also be the subject of fear, and lust and all 
the other feelings that belong to human weakness'. 
82 Lactanius, De ira Dei, 2, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 49 
83 Lactantius, De ira Dei, 15, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 50 
84 Lactantius, De ira Dei, 17, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 51 
85 Lactantius, De ira Dei, 21, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 51 
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and involuntary, these attributes are not essential to feeling, and it is perfectly possible 
for God to experience feeling without becoming subject to external forces. 
Origen asserts passibilism in two passages, but in the second he qualifies it by 
saying that when =tý are ascribed to God in Scripture, they are to be interpreted 
allegorically. It seems that Origen is torn between making the relationship between God 
and humanity `personal', and between his `negative' view of 1ra0ý and his Platonic 
metaphysic according to which perfection prohibits change. 86 
While Clement (following Plato) believed that the divine impassibility entailed 
invulnerability to forces outside or inside God's control, 87, other early theologians 
hazarded that impassibility might entail involuntary susceptibility to passions alone. 
Alongside modem theologians, some of the Fathers perceived that the understanding of 
impassibility as an invulnerability to forces outside one's control might leave open the 
possibility that God could choose to suffer, that God could be vulnerable to forces 
within his control. In particular, Gregory Thaumaturgos was keen to explore this idea. 
Both Gregory's conclusions and his line of reasoning are exciting, for they demonstrate 
one possible reconciliation between passibilist and impassibilist concerns, because 
Gregory shows the amount that some ancient impassibilism and some modem 
passibilism share, and because he points out aspects and implications of passibilist 
theology that are, I suggest, sometimes overlooked by modem passibilists. 
Gregory, in common with many modem theologians, takes as his primary 
concern the question of whether God can suffer. In Gregory's treatise, 88 the enquirer, 
Theopompus, poses the problem of excluding voluntary suffering from God: if by 
nature God is impassible, it follows that He can never suffer, even though He should 
8Ö cf. In Ezech. Hom. vi, 6; In Num. Hom. xxviii; Motley, Impassibility, p. 61 - 62. 
87 Sarot, `Patripassianism', pp. 135 - 75 
Printed in Cardinal Pitra's Sacra Analecta, iv, pp. 103 - 20,363 - 76, outlined in Mozley, 
Impassibility, p. 63 - 72 
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will (to suffer), since His nature would then be doing what is contrary to His will. '89 
Thus we have a tension between two types of freedom: Does God's freedom from 
passions prohibit God's freedom to experience what he wills? Gregory replies that 
there can be no such subjection of God to necessity 
by opposing His nature to His will. For if God does not do what He wills, it certainly follows 
that very great suffering befalls Him, since we should have to say that the will of God was 
subjected to His nature... we must understand that God is never prevented by His almighty nature 
from doing what He wills, since it befits us to say that God is superior to everything, and to 
9° nothing is He in subjection... it is impious to take away freedom from almighty God. 
Theopompus presses the question further, restating it in terms of whether the nature, or 
the will, of God is greater. If the will of God is more powerful then God would be able 
to suffer, despite his impassible nature, while if his nature is greater, he would be 
prevented from suffering, despite his will to do so. Gregory replies to Theopompus with 
recourse to the divine simplicity: While humans can experience a conflict between their 
will and their nature, in the case of God 
we do not separate the will of the Godhead from that most blessed essence, which always is as it 
is, remaining one and the same, in one form, in one being, in one unchangeable will: which 
learns of itself, gives orders to itself, and itself, of itself and in itself and through itself, is able to 
do all things, without the will being at any point prevented by the impassible nature From 
effecting what it wills, since at every time it is as it is. 9l 
For Gregory, Theopompus' question is meaningless in the case of God since it misses 
the point of the divine nature. Theopompus, while agreeing that God is simple and not 
composite, argues that Gregory's response does not get to the heart of the matter. He 
patiently rephrases the question again: Could God ever have chosen to undergo human 
suffering, given that by nature he is impassible? 92 Gregory replies that God can indeed 
choose to suffer, but, because this suffering is in accordance with God's will and 
because it is carried out for the good of humanity in overcoming human suffering, it is 
not experienced as suffering, but as triumph. Thus, `in His suffering He shows His 
89 Cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 64 
90 Cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 64 
91 Cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 65 
92 Mozley, Impassibility, p. 66 
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impassibility. ' 93 Of God's own will, he has shared in our sufferings - but he is not 
subjected to them, nor do they in any way harm him. 
Gregory 's treatise is important to our discussion both of the ancient impassibilist 
consensus and of modem passibilism. Gregory anticipates much modem theology in 
suggesting that God might choose to suffer. Furthermore, in contrast to most of the 
early church, but in common with modem theology, Gregory recognises that voluntary 
suffering might be a 'contribution' to rather than a diminishment of God's perfection. 
However, Gregory also perceives that if suffering is chosen and is given meaning and 
purpose, it is in many ways not suffering as most humans experience it, and loses its 
essential nature. I shall return to this point in chapter five; for the moment it is enough 
to observe that this essential insight is often not adequately recognised by some modem 
passibilists who argue that God chooses to suffer, and so Gregory's treatise provides us 
with an obstacle or potential corrective (depending upon how it is developed) to one 
very popular formation of the passibilist thesis. In addition, Gregory's treatise is 
remarkable, for (along with Lactantius, Origen and Theophilus) it demonstrates the 
degree of variation within the early impassibilist consensus and the subtlety of some of 
the theses put forward, indicates that some forms of ancient impassibilism and some 
forms of modern passibilism might have a lot of common ground, and suggests one 
possible reconciliation between passibilism and impassibilism. 
In this chapter I have looked at the early impassibilist consensus through the lens 
of ancient philosophy of emotion. By approaching the theological question in this way I 
hope to have highlighted some of the important questions in the philosophy of emotion 
(ancient and modem) and indicated how these questions about emotions might be 
significant to the impassibility debate. The method of looking at the impassibility 
debate in relation to the philosophy of emotion will recur throughout the thesis, in 
93 Cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 66 
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which it will be argued that a more subtle view of the emotions than is often posited in 
relation to the impassibility debate would inform the debate and provide options for 
emotional experience in God that transcend the passibilist/impassibilist division as 
traditionally construed. In this chapter I have sought to facilitate some sympathy with 
the early emphasis upon divine impassibility, for example through an appreciation of 
the Fathers' attempts to avoid anthropomorphism through an appeal to apophatic 
theology. I have also aimed to show the variety of different types of impassibilism in 
early Christian theology, and to highlight certain insights that will allow us to evaluate 
and critique modem theological thought in later chapters. Perhaps most importantly for 
the purpose of the thesis, I have indicated that while the impassibilism of the Fathers 
was concerned primarily with the denial of passiones or iraOi' in God, these were not the 
only category concept of (what we would call) emotional experiences possible, so that 
in denying passions of God the Fathers were not necessarily arguing that God must be 
free from all emotion, though this is the position of some of the Fathers. I shall return to 
the question of what other emotional experiences exist, and whether these might be 
attributable to God, in chapter three, through a discussion of emotion in the thought of 
Augustine and Aquinas. In the next chapter, however, I want to turn to the rise of 
passibilism in modern theology, with a discussion of how passibilist theology has been 
shaped and informed in part by the modern concept of emotion. 
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Chapter Two: Contemporary Perspectives on Divine Passibility 
Introduction 
Contemporary overviews of the impassibilism debate suggest that the impassibilist 
consensus remained almost entirely unchallenged until the turn of the twentieth centum, 
from which point passibilism increasingly became the predominant position. 94 As the 
Thomist impassibilist Thomas G. Weinandy puts it, 'Since the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, there has been a growing consensus that the traditional claim, held 
to be axiomatic since the Fathers of the Church, of God's impassibility is no longer 
defensible'. 95 The impassibilist Ronald Goetz, reviewing the theological climate ofthe 
late twentieth century, writes that `The age-old dogma that God is impassible and 
immutable, incapable of suffering, is for many no longer tenable. The ancient 
theopaschite heresy that God suffers has, in fact, become the new orthodoxy. 96 The 
passibilist theologian Moltmann asserts that The doctrine of the essential impassibility 
of the divine nature now seems finally to be disappearing from the Christian concept of 
God'97 and the passibilist philosopher of religion Sarot argues that '... during this 
present century the idea that God is immutable and impassible has slowly but surely 
given way to the idea that God is sensitive. emotional and passionate.... By now the 
rejection of the ancient doctrine of divine impassibility has so much become a 
theological common place, that many theologians do not even feel the need to argue for 
it. '98 
14 See Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2000) p. 1-2 
°S Weinandy, Does God Suffer? p. 1 
1° Ronald Goetz, `The Suffering God: The Rise of a New Orthodoxy', in Christian ('enturv April 
16,1986, p. 385 - 392, available at 
http: //64.233.183.104/search? q=cache: ayUJ8U1-ImFK8J. www. reli ion- 
online. org/showarticle. asp%3Ftitle%3D1033+Ronald+Goetz+%22The+SutTering+God%22&hl=cn&. ct c 
lnk&cd_=1 &gt (accessed on 6th January 2008) 
97 Jurgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God (London: SCM, 1991), xvi 
98 Marcel Sarot, `Suffering of Christ, Suffering of God? ', Theology 95 (1992), p. 113 
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Reasons for the rise of the passibilist consensus 
Given the apparently sudden and unprecedented nature of the rise of passibilism in the 
twentieth century, the purpose of this chapter will be to try to ascertain the factors lying 
behind this shift. Why is passibilism the obvious choice for theologians in the twentieth 
century, when impassibilism was virtually uncontested among theologians before this 
time? Ronald Goetz suggests four cultural and intellectual features of the twentieth- 
century that may have occasioned the rise of passibilism: i) the decline of Christendom 
ii) the rise of democratic aspirations iii) the problem of suffering and evil iv) the critical 
reappraisal of the Bible. 99 
The first cultural factor Goetz pinpoints as responsible for the rise of passibilism 
in the twentieth century is the decline of Christendom. The most extreme form of 
passibilism (which Goetz, ostensibly in line with his fidelity to the impassibilism of the 
early church, terms theopaschitism) is Christian atheism: The idea that God has not only 
suffered, but that `God has suffered - terminally'. 
'Oo More generally, the demise of 
Christian triumphalism (from Augustine's theocratic vision that the Church as the 
earthly City of God would come to rule the world, to the liberal hope that the Kingdom 
of God would be established on earth through persuasive evangelism) and the 
perception that the world is getting worse rather than better, has initiated the view that, 
in Bonhoeffer's words, `God lets himself be pushed out of the world on to the cross'. 1°' 
Even though most Christians do not subscribe to the view that God is dead, the belief 
that God is providentially working through history in order to realise the Kingdom is 
now no longer regarded by most Christians as plausible, as Goetz puts it, 'The actual 
redemptive presence of God in the world is discerned less in God's taking the sovereign 
99 Goetz, `The Suffering God', p. 386 
1°° Goetz, `The Suffering God', p. 386 
101 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison: The Enlarged Edition, e d. F. Bethgc, trans. R. 
Fuller et al (London: SCM Press, 1967), p 360 
45 
lead in events and more in God's picking up the pieces after history has misfired". 102 
Goetz does not spell out precisely how this shift in Christian belief might help to bring 
about passibilism, but we might conjecture that if God is no longer believed to bring 
about a better world, then the primary role left for him is suffering with the world. 
The second factor accounting for the rise of passibilism, according to Goetz, is 
the rise of democratic aspirations. The rise of democracy in much of the developed 
world and the hope of democracy in parts of the undeveloped world means that the 
portrayal of God as immutable and impassible is deemed as tyrannical and irrelevant to 
liberated human beings, and so is debunked in favour of a more people-friendly deity: 
These democratic aspirations have contributed to the problem of belief in an impassible, 
immutable God. For if God is conceived of as an unmoved mover -- the unatTected source of the 
world -- he is irrelevant to what free men and women do in the world. And if God's impassibility 
is interpreted as being emblematic of an imperious rule that is finally indifferent to the etlect it 
has on the opinion of the governed -- as in, for example, the classical doctrine of predestination -- 
God appears as a tyrant who must be resisted in the name of human freedom. 103 
Perhaps inevitably, then, the popular demand for accessible, democratically-chosen 
leaders who live in similar situations to the rest of the populous has in turn led to the 
expectation of a similarly immanent God who is not above the sufferings of his creation. 
The third factor accounting for the rise of passibilism is the problem of suffering 
and evil, which is not only by far the greatest and most widely accepted of the factors is 
the problem of suffering and evil, but is also frequently used by passibilists as an 
argument in favour of their position. The Darwinian revelation that pain is built into the 
biological world through the survival of the fittest and natural selection, and that this 
pain has taken place over an enormous period of time, made the idea of a God who 
allows our suffering without experiencing suffering himself unbearable to many 
Christians. The futility and brutalities of the First World War increased this feeling, as 
Goetz puts it, `How could God be love and not lay wounded on the battlefields of 
102 Goetz, 'The Suffering God', p. 387 
103 Goetz, `The Suffering God', p. 387 
46 
France? Only a God who suffered with the victims of the war could speak to the 
disillusionments created by the war'. 104 In 1928 Brasnett remarked, 'Men feel, and 
perhaps will feel increasingly, that a God who is not passible, who is exempt from pain 
and suffering, is a God of little value to a suffering humanity. '105 This statement has 
proved to be prophetic in the light of the Holocaust and Hiroshima, the former of which 
has acquired almost emblematic status in some passibilist thought. 106 
The fourth factor for the rise of twentieth century passibilism given by Goetz is 
the scholarly reappraisal of the Bible. The increasing perception of the distinction 
between biblical, Hebraic thought on the one hand, and philosophical, Hellenistic 
thought on the other, led to an awareness of the imposition of Hellenistic conceptions of 
God as characterised by immutability, aseity and impassibility onto the biblical texts. 
The result of this modern awareness was that biblical scholars felt themselves able to 
divest themselves of the Hellenistic presuppositions and to recognise the passionate and 
passible God of the Bible. Furthermore, the move away from the deism of nineteenth 
century liberalism meant that theologians in the twentieth century were concerned to 
depict God as personally involved in the world. 
In addition to the four factors outlined by Goetz, in a previous article I suggested 
that the rise of passibilism was also occasioned in part by the diminution of the cult of 
saints in much western Christian devotion after the Reformation. 107 The cult of the 
saints and devotion to the sufferings of the earthly Jesus in the early church and middle 
ages provided religious believers with transcendent figures who understood not only 
suffering in general but also (as in the case of saints whose lives meant that they were 
the patrons of those suffering particular misfortunes) the specific sufferings of the 
104 Goetz, 'The Suffering God', p. 388 
ios B 
. 
R. Brasnett, The Suffering of the Impassible God (London: SPCK 1928), ix 
10' See especially Moltmann, The Crucified God, for whom the horrors of Auschwitz are seen as radical 
and ground-breaking in terms of the existence of evil. 
107 Anastasia Foyle, 'Human and Divine Suffering, ' Ars Disputandi lhttp: //www. ArsDisputandi. orgl 5 
(2005), accessed on 18o' January 2008 
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adorant in question. When the practice of devotions to the saints began to die out, a 
need was created for a different transcendent `fellow sufferer who understands' 10x, a 
need which was gradually fulfilled by the idea of a suffering God. This is supported by 
the fact that those parts of western Christianity that still practice a high degree of 
devotion to the saints are less likely to be passibilist, while those, typically Reformed, 
aspects of western Christianity for whom the saints are no longer an active part of 
devotional practice have the strongest elements of passibilist theology. This suggestion 
is fairly speculative, and more controversial than Goetz's four cultural factors, but 
perhaps the diminution of devotion to the saints and to the particular sufferings of the 
incarnate Christ may be a further factor accounting for the rise of passibilism in modem 
theology and religious belief. 
Is twentieth century theology `passibilist'? 
In addition to recognising the cultural factors behind the rise of passibilism in the 
twentieth century, it is also worth noting that the portrayal of Christian theology as 
ubiquitously impassibilist before the twentieth century and unanimously passibilist 
thereafter is oversimplified and even misleading. This is for several reasons. First and 
most obviously, there are exceptions to passibilism in the twentieth century and, as we 
saw in chapter one, there were exceptions to impassibilism (when conceived as the idea 
that God cannot have emotions) in the early church. Second, many theologians who are 
typically characterised as passibilist in fact inhabit a middle-ground or argue for a more 
complicated and qualified view of passibilism than initially appears to be the case. This 
is even true not only of mainstream Christian theologians such as Moltmann, Fiddes and 
Barth, but also of less conventional theology such as the Process Theology of 
108 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Macmillan, 1929, 
repr. 1967), p. 532 
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Hartshorne. It is not possible to do justice to the subtleties of twentieth century 
passibilism and impassibilism in this chapter, but I shall outline a few of the ways in 
which the passibilist revolution of the twentieth century is not as clear-cut as first 
appears to be the case. 
To begin with, there are significant twentieth century dissenters to passibilism, 
including R. E. Creel109 and Paul Helml1° and, more recently, Weinandy' 11 and Cook. 2 
The impassibilist literature encompasses a wide range of different positions, from the 
Calvinism of Helm to the Thomism of Weinandy, but a few shared concerns may be 
noted here as common to most kinds of twentieth century impassibilism. 
First, impassibilism is either seen as an aspect of immutability or as entailed by 
immutability. One argument for this, rooted in the idea of divine eternality (the idea that 
God is outside time rather than within it), is very clearly expounded by Heim. 
Impassibility is entailed by immutability which is entailed by eternality. From a 
Thomist perspective, Weinandy deduces divine impassibility from the fact that God is 
pure esse and pure act and thus immutable. God must be perfect, for a thing is perfect to 
the extent that it is actualised and, being pure being, God is perfection itself. Therefore 
God must be immutable: 'Because God is pure act it is impossible for him to acquire 
more perfection through some change which would make him more actual. ' 3 In 
addition, creation requires an immutably pure act, so God's immutability is the sine qua 
non for creating. "4 This immutability is not opposed to God's vitality and dynamism, 
in fact, the reason that God is immutable is precisely that God is fully in act. God is 
109 R. E. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986) 
110 Paul Helm, `On the Impossibility of Divine Passibility', in Cameron NM de (cd. ), The Power and 
Weakness of God: Impassibility and Orthodoxv (Edinburgh: Rutherford House Books, 1989) Series: 
Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 
... Weinandy, Does God Suffer? 
112 Robin Cook, 'Impassibility' 
113 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, p. 123 
114 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, p. 132 - 134 
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impassible precisely because (as pure act) God is supremely passionate and loving and 
cannot change to become any more passionate and loving. 115 
Second, and closely related to the first point, an impassible God is utterly 
reliable and more able to help sufferers than a non-suffering God. This view is 
expressed by Weinandy when he writes that `A God who does not suffer is more loving, 
compassionate, and merciful than a God who does. ' 116 In some situations, Weinandy 
argues, the human susceptibility to suffering actually hinders the lover's love of the 
beloved: 
In many situations it is precisely sin and the prospect of sutTenng that hinders the full 
development and expression of love. A person may desire, on one level, to love someone 
wholly and entirely, but be incapable of doing so because of the sinfulness which resides 
within his/her own person causing fear of the sacrifices required of such love. Seltishness, 
pride, etc. hinder the full growth and expression of love. "' 
Therefore it is not only the case (contra some passibilists) that suffering is essential to 
love (or essential to love where the beloved is suffering or is failing to live up to their 
full potential through sin), it may also be the case that the prospect of suffering is one 
that hinders love. An impassible God, therefore, is more free to love than a passible God 
who may fear the suffering that love would cause him. Helm agrees that the 
susceptibility to suffering and change are likely to impede God's love and helpfulness, 
such that only an immutable and impassible God can be known to be completely 
reliable: `A God who was subject to change from some external force or agency could 
not console his people in this unconditioned manner. " 18 
A further argument, or set of arguments, for the way in which a suffering God 
may be less helpful to sufferers than an impassible God is discussed by Creel. Creel 
begins by arguing that the comfort that sufferers derive from God is based on the fact 
Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, p. 127 
116 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, p. 159 
117 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, p. 160 fn 25 
118 Helm, `Impossibility', p. 139 
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that God does not share our pain19 and that all will be well in the end. 12" For example, 
if a small child bursts into tears over some insubstantial fright, a mother may be more 
helpful if she dashes towards him with a big smile on her face in order to reassure him 
that there is no danger, than if she were also to burst into tears through empathy with 
him. 121 When we need to be saved from suffering, it is help that we want, not fellow- 
suffering,. 122 In an emergency situation we would feel more admiration for someone 
who helped the victim without being negatively affected by his suffering than for 
someone who helped the victim but was emotionally traumatised by his plight: '1 would 
admire someone all the more for not only being a good samaritan, but also for being 
able to avoid emotional disturbance in an emergency situation. ' 123 All the benefits of 
divine grace can be enjoyed without necessitating God's suffering. ' 24 God's bliss in the 
face of our suffering is not a sign of his aloof indifference, but a sign that ultimately all 
is well because everything that happens is within the parameters of God's wisdom, 
power and goodness. '25 
In addition to this line of reasoning, Creel notes a further argument sometimes 
used by impassibilists, though he himself is critical of it. Some impassibilists, Creel 
notes, observe that the experienced doctor who is inured to the traumas of the hospital 
emergency room is more helpful than the new intern who is traumatised by what he sees 
there and that, similarly, the experienced counsellor is able to get to the root of the 
patient's feelings and to help them work through them without getting personally 
involved in them, while the inexperienced counsellor may become too upset by what he 
hears to be any use to the patient. From this, some impassibilists argue that God would 
be more able to help sufferers if God, like the experienced doctor and the counsellor, 
119 Creel, Impassibility, p 119 
120 Creel, Impassibility, p. 156 - 157 121 See Creel, Impassibility, p. 119 
122 Creel, Impassibility, p. 155 
123 Creel, Impassibility p. 155 
124 Creel, Impassibility, p. 156 
125 Creel, Impassibility, p. 156 - 157 
51 
were able to remain personally uninvolved in the situation and so avoid being 
traumatised by it. 
Third, passibilism, conceived as the susceptibility to emotions, is often seen to 
be at variance with God's wisdom and omniscience, because emotions are regarded as 
frequently if not essentially irrational and deceptive. Helm expresses this view when he 
writes that God cannot have emotions because emotions are incompatible with God's 
rationality and wisdom. He continues that To act upon emotion or passion is to act 
when the judgment is in abeyance. Emotion clouds the judgment, or functions in place 
of the judgment. "26 
Fourth, it is claimed that God cannot be passible because God is omnipotent and 
emotions are something that affect us and are outside our control. Passibilism, for 
Weinandy, is not an option, since `suffering normally implies that some event outside of 
God has caused him to suffer. ' 127 Cook provides an in-depth account of the ways in 
which emotions are, and are not, beyond the control of the subject, and makes three core 
claims: While emotions are not essentially overpowering, certain types of emotion can 
be overpowering; the actual subjective experience of an emotion is beyond the subject's 
immediate control; throughout the duration of an emotion, the subject's attention is 
more or less preoccupied with the emotion's object, and this preoccupation is not 
entirely something over which the subject has much control. This, claims Cook, means 
that God cannot have emotions, for emotions - at least as subjectively experienced - are 
beyond our immediate control, and so experiencing emotions would negate God's 
omnipotence. Cook discusses the claim of some passibilists that God's emotions are 
always freely chosen and never beyond God's control, but concludes that this would 
mean that the experiences God has could not really be emotions, since emotions (at least 
as humanly experienced) `cannot be had at will or stopped at will. They are independent 
12 Helm, `Impossibility', p. 131 
127 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, p. 169 
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of being directly controlled by our will. If emotions are things He brings about Himself, 
a divine emotion is a very different thing from a human emotion. A fundamental 
characteristic of human emotion is missing from divine emotion - namely the fact that 
human emotions always involve passivity in the subject. ' 128 God cannot have emotions 
for nothing can happen to God that is outside God's control, and if emotions are within 
God's control, then they are not emotions as humans experience them. 
I shall discuss the latter two of these impassibilist claims through the lens of 
contemporary philosophy of emotion later on in the thesis, for the present, it is 
sufficient to note that while twentieth century theology has often been characterised as 
ubiquitously passibilist, in fact there is a significant and important impassibilist strand 
in twentieth century theology and philosophy of religion that should not be overlooked. 
In addition to these important exceptions to the `passibilist revolution', it should 
also be noted that most passibilists in the twentieth century do not posit an unqualified 
passibilism, but tend to inhabit a middle ground that holds in tension the fullness of the 
divine emotional life, and, in particular, God's suffering, on the one hand, and the 
omnipotence and freedom of God on the other. This is true not only of 'mainstream' 
theologians such as Barth and Moltmann, but also of more controversial theologians 
such as Whitehead and Hartshorne. In what follows I shall look briefly at the 
passibilism of Barth, Hartshorne and Moltmann, and shall suggest that there is less of a 
separation between the impassibilism of some of the early church, and the passibilism 
of twentieth century theology, than seems to be the case from overviews of twentieth 
century theology that have posited a passibilist revolution. 
128 Cook, Impassibility, p. 85 
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Karl Barth 
In some ways, Barth may seem to be an odd person to begin with in a discussion of 
modem divine passibility from the point of view of philosophical theology, since, on the 
face of it, Barth exemplifies a more biblical than philosophical approach to the subject, 
rejecting natural theology and all a priori reasoning about God as imposing human 
standards upon a Being who is radically other. However, because of his emphasis on 
revelation as the basis of all theological epistemology and God-talk, Barth's biblical 
theology is also his philosophy of religion. Because God speaks the truth about himself 
and because he has chosen to be `for us', we can move from the revelation of God, the 
economic Trinity or `God for us', to speaking of the divine essence, the immanent 
Trinity or `God in Himself. The idea of `God for us', in contrast to God in himself, is 
not simply about how we experience God (as would be the case with the distinction 
between God's phenomenon and God's noumenon), but something of God that is 
nevertheless only to do with his relation to us, and not with his essence as such. Despite 
seeing a deductive link from one to the other, Barth argues that 'God for us' and 'God 
in Himself are not identical: God's essence corresponds to his self-revelation, such that 
there is an `analogy of relations' between how God makes himself known in the world 
and how he is in himself. Thus Barth offers a firm epistemological foundation for 
speaking of and knowing the divine essence, while recognising the limitations of human 
categories and concepts. 
The correspondence between `God for us' and `God in the world' is often 
expressed not simply in terms of 'what can be attributed to God in Christ is also 
attributable to God in Himself". Rather, God in Christ redefines the way that we should 
understand God, and, consequently, divine attributes are often expressed in terms of 
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paradox. As Paul Fiddes paraphrases Barth, `the omnipresence of God in himself is 
exercised by his being able to dwell in one particular place in the world, his eternity, as 
his own history, enables him to enter our time; his omnipotence is displayed by his 
triumph within weakness. ' 129 The epistemological relation between God in Christ and 
God in himself leads Barth not to predicate contradictory attributes of God, but to assert 
that God's omnipresence, eternality and omnipotence are, paradoxically, expressed most 
perfectly in the weakness, and the spatial and temporal particularity, of Christ. 
How does Barth deal with divine impassibility in the light of the passion of 
Christ? It seems logically impossible to reconcile impassibility and divine suffering, 
even along paradoxical lines, as with omnipresence, eternality and omnipotence. 
Impassibility, as the straightforward negation of passibility, cannot be made logically 
compatible with it, just as one could not simultaneously be a spatula and not a spatula. 
Barth attempts to resolve this problem by appealing to the non-identity of God for us 
and God in himself. The suffering of the Trinity in the Christ-event is, he argues, not an 
analogy of the suffering of God in himself, but rather a reflection of the obedience of 
the Son to the Father within the impassible immanent Trinity. The suffering of God is 
confined to the suffering of the Trinity in the Christ-event, and does not affect the 
divine essence. 130 
The context out of which Barth's denial of the suffering of God in Godself 
emerges is Barth's concern that God is self-sufficient and is the One who loves in 
freedom'. God could have remained self-sufficient and impassible - it was choice and 
not necessity that led God to make himself vulnerable in the Person of Christ. God 
chose the way of the incarnation and the cross, but He could have remained satisfied 
129 Paul S. Fiddes, Creative Suffering, p. 121, cf. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G. W. 13romilev 
and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936 - 77), esp. IV/I, pp. 187 -8 "o See Fiddes, Creative Suffering, p 121. M. Steen disagrees with this interpretation of Barth (sec M. 
Steen, `Moltmann's Critical Reception of Barth's Theopaschitism' in Ephemerides Theologicae 
Lovanienses 67 (4), 1991,278 - 311 esp. p. 284 - 5) 
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with Himself and with the impassible glory and blessedness of His own inner life. '' 
God could become passible because He is not a prisoner of his own omnipotence. ' 32 It 
is precisely because he is omnipotent that God is able to `become small' and to 
humiliate himself to suffering and judgement. Here again we have paradox, though very 
differently conceived: `He is absolute, infinite, exalted, active, impassible, transcendent, 
but in all this He is the One who loves in freedom, the One who is free in His love, and 
therefore not His own prisoner. He is all this as the Lord, and in such a way that He 
embraces the opposites of these concepts even while He is superior to them. '"; Because 
he is free, God takes on attributes wholly inappropriate to the divine being, yet at the 
same time is able to remain fully God and to `rise above' them. For Barth, divine 
suffering is always understood in terms of `actio' as well as 'passio'; God's self- 
subjection to suffering is never a surrender of divinity or sovereignty. 134 In contrast to 
the cases of eternality, omnipotence and omniscience, the Christ-event does not re- 
define our understanding of impassibility in relation to God: Rather, God is able to 
suffer in relation to the world, while remaining completely impassible in himself. This 
view is a subtle variation upon the paradox of Cyril of Alexandria that the Impassible 
suffers, 135 which relates only to the person of the incarnate Christ, and asserts that God 
as man suffers while in his divinity Christ remains impassible. For Barth, God takes on 
suffering and yet remains impassible, and yet this is not simply the suffering of Christ 
but the suffering of the whole Trinity in relation to the world. In contrast to some early 
assertions about divine impassibility, the incarnation is not necessary to facilitate divine 
suffering, since God is free to choose suffering for himself - and yet it is, as in earlier 
theology, wholly inappropriate to God and excluded from his essential nature. 
131 Barth, Church Dogmatics 11/2, p. 166, cf. IV/2, p. 345 - 6; IV/l, p. 79 132 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1, p. 214 
133 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/ 1, p. 187; cf. 11/ 1, p. 313 
134 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1 p. 202 
135 Cyril of Alexandria, On the Incarnation Against Nestorius, 4 
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At the end of the day, as Fiddes argues, this means that there is a disparity, a 
non-correspondence, between God as revealed and God in himself, and so an 
inconsistency between the way we experience God and the way God really is. In dealing 
with divine impassibility in the way he does, Barth drives a wedge between God as he is 
experienced by creation, and God as he actually is, that belittles Christ's revelation of 
God. What is most interesting about Barth in the context of our current discussion, 
however, is that Barth asserts God's suffering while attempting to maintain God's self- 
sufficiency and transcendence over suffering. Barth's passibilism, therefore, is not an 
unqualified passibilism, but like the impassibilism of Gregory Thaumaturgos and 
Lactantius and other early theologians, inhabits a middle ground in which divine 
suffering is held in tension with God's impassibility in the sense of insusceptibility to 
forces outside God's control. In Barth's case at least, therefore, twentieth century 
passibilism is not unqualified or clear-cut, but in fact upholds many of the divine 
attributes defended by theologians in the early church. 
Process Theology: Charles Hartshome 
Process Theology, as represented by Whitehead and Hartshorne, is often perceived to 
affirm an unqualified divine passibilism too radical for most mainstream conservative 
and liberal theologians alike. For Process Theology, at least according to the general 
perception, God is the absolutely related, the absolutely passive, and the One Who is 
utterly vulnerable to the world. Goetz, for example, remarks that 'What is unique to the 
Whiteheadian version of the limited deity is its departure from the classical Western 
view that God cannot be affected by the pain of an imperfect world. Indeed, as a seal of 
God's goodness and love, God is, in Whitehead's lovely phrase, the fellow-sufferer 
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who understands. "' 136 On a closer reading, however, it becomes apparent that this 
assessment, if taken without qualification, is misleading and inaccurate. 
Hartshorne bases his thought about God's nature on his metaphysic of human 
nature. Humans, he argues, are dipolar. On the one hand humans have an independent 
pole that remains constant throughout their lives, being `unformed' by their context and 
ensuring that their identity is maintained throughout. On the other hand, humans also 
have a relative pole that changes with the successive states of their existence, and is 
affected by the context in which they live. In humans, both these poles have weak 
forms: in their relative poles they are only imperfectly related to others, while in their 
independent poles they are only partially independent of contextual changes. As 
Hartshorne patriotically speculates, `extreme changes in weather or scenery might 
temporarily or permanently rob even Abraham Lincoln of his moral humaneness'. '37 
This view of humans as dipolar is extended to God. In God's contingent nature, 
or `concrete states', 138 God is related to the world, involved with the world and suffers 
with it. In contrast, in God's independent pole, his 'abstract 139 God is 
remarkably similar to the God of Aquinas and classical theism in general: This nature of 
God is `the uncaused cause, impassible, immutable and all the rest of it. ' 140 This abstract 
nature of God is, for Hartshorne, 141 pure possibility itself. It is the undefined potential 
for the definite possibilities that emerge in the interaction between the world and God in 
his concrete states. 142 This possibility - itself the abstract nature of God - is the 
possibility for God's perfect relatedness to the world in his concrete state, but is itself 
totally independent of the world, unrelated to and unaffected by it, and so impassible, 
13° Goetz, 'The Suffering God', p. 386 
137 Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of Gott (New Haven: Yale I ]niversity 
Press, 1958, repr. 1976), p. 81 
138 Hartshorne's phrase. Whitehead refers to this 'pole' as God's 'consequent nature'. 
139 Hartshorne's phrase. Whitehead speaks of this as God's 'primordial nature'. 
140 Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for our Time (Illinois: Open Court, 1967, repr. 1973), p. 44, cJ p. 27, 
and Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 134,524 
141 Here Hartshorne departs from Whitehead, for whom the primordial nature involves God's perfect and 
eternal vision of all possible values, which he terms 'eternal objects'. 
142 cf. Fiddes, Creative Suffering, p. 125 
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possessing peaceful `indifference to relational alternatives'. 143 Reverting to Whitehead's 
terms, Hartshorne explains the difference between the two poles by saying that `God as 
primordial is strictly eternal in the sense of being immutable and ungenerated. God as 
consequent is `fluent', reaches no final completion, contains succession and is ever in 
`process' of further creation. ' 144 
In contrast to the imperfect dipolarity of humans, both God's concrete states and 
abstract essence are perfect. In his concrete state God is related to all of reality 
perfectly, which means that he knows all and so is affected by all, since a knower is 
changed by the object of their knowledge. '45 In his abstract essence, God is totally 
independent of the world, and is externally rather than internally related to it: He is 
known by but does not know the world. 146 By being externally related to the world, God 
changes the world without being at all affected by it. Fiddes summarises this when he 
writes that: As Supreme, then, he [God] is related to all, as Absolute he is related to 
nothing in particular, though since everything relates to him he might be said to be 
"related to the possible as such", while being indifferent to particular relational 
alternatives. ' 147 In his dipolarity, God is both absolutely related, vulnerable and 
passible, and impassible, in the broader sense of entirely unaffected by the world. 
However, as Fiddes observes, in humans (from whom the analogy is drawn) the 
dipolarity is not complete, and it is easy to see how the two poles act in relation to one 
another. There is, in humans, an overlap from the related, affected side to the 
independent, immutable side such that no aspect of a human person remains uninvolved 
or unaffected. As with Barth, then, the tension between passibilism and impassibilism in 
Hartshorne stands or falls depending on how persuasively God's passibilism and 
143 Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p. 81 
1" Hartshorne, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 283, 
cited Fiddes, Creative Suffering, p. 125 
145 Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, pp. 6-7,18 - 19 14' Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p. 70 
147 Fiddes, Creative Suffering, p. 130 
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impassibilism can be brought together and related to one another. The bipolarity of 
Process Theology is interesting, for it gives us another example of the way in which the 
apparent passibilism of the twentieth century is not as unqualified as first appears, and 
suggests that the distinction between the impassibilism of the early church and the 
passibilism of the twentieth century may in fact be superficial in presenting extremes 
that do not exist in either. 
Jürgen Moltmann 
Moltmann's model of divine suffering is rooted in his social analogy of the Trinity, 
which views the Trinity not in terms of the relationships within an individual person (as 
in Augustine and Aquinas, which Moltmann rejects as too modalist), but as three 
distinct persons within a community. For Moltmann, the persons of the Trinity are 
`individual, unique, non-interchangeable subjects of the one, common divine substance, 
with consciousness and will. Each of the Persons possesses the divine nature in a non- 
interchangeable way; each presents it in his own way. 148 Because human beings exist 
not in isolation from one another but in a unity of relationships, conceiving of the 
Trinity as distinct persons does not entail tritheism; in the perichoresis of the Trinity 
there is truly one God. '49 
Moltmann is critical of attempts to separate the immanent Trinity from the 
economic Trinity, holding to his principle that 'statements about the immanent Trinity 
must not contradict statements about the economic Trinity. Statements about the 
economic Trinity must correspond to doxological statements about the immanent 
Trinity. "50 In particular, the cross reveals the inner nature of God without qualification. 
148 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God, trans. Al. Kohl (London: SCAI 
Press, 1981), p. 171 
149 Moltmann, Trinity, p. 174 -8 
i5o Moltmann, Trinity, p. 154 
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In his earlier work The Crucified God Moltmann had already begun to speak of 
the cross as the event in which all human suffering is `taken up' into God15' so that 
Jesus' suffering contains the entire history of humanity's suffering: 'There is no 
suffering which in this history of God is not God's suffering, no death which has not 
been God's death in the history on Golgotha. 152 Thus the crucifixion seems to be both a 
revelation of God's suffering love and something constitutive of God's suffering love, 
though the relation between the constitutive and the revelatory remains ambiguous: 'He 
is love. His very existence is love. He constitutes himself as love. That is what happens 
on the cross. '153 Part of the answer to the question of how the cross can be constitutive 
of divine suffering, despite the fact that God has suffered in love throughout human 
history, seems to lie in the idea that (because the Trinity is conceived of as distinct 
persons) the event of the cross brings about a new situation for the Trinity in which 
Christ's forsakenness creates a unique breach in the relationship between the Father and 
the Son. 
Despite the strong influence of Barth on Moltmann, Moltmann does not adopt 
Barth's rejection of the Lutheran idea of Deus contra Deum, but rather radicalises 
Luther's view by positing a real cleft and rupture (Riß) within the Trinity. On the cross, 
the Father and the Son are opposed to one another in stasis or revolt. Both suffer, but 
suffer differently. The Father suffers in experiencing the death of his Son. The Son 
suffers because he has been forsaken by the Father. '54 The cross therefore goes to the 
heart of the immanent Trinity itself. By taking human suffering and alienation into 
himself on Golgotha, God heals the human history of suffering by integrating it into 
God's dynamism. While the separation between the Father and the Son creates conflict 
151 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 246 
152 Moltmann, Crucified God, p. 246 
153 Moltmann, Trinity, p. 82 
154 For a criticism of Moltmann's view as theological sadism see D. Sölle, Gott und das Leiden, in M. 
Welker (ed), Diskussion über Jürgen Moltmanns Buch 'Der gekreuzigte Gott' München, 1979), pp. 11I- 
117 
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and even a rupture within the Trinity, the Holy Spirit unites the Father and the Son in 
their shared sacrifice for humanity's salvation. Moltmann is critical of Barth because of 
the gap Barth creates between God in himself and God for us, and because of the 
monotheistic rather than Trinitarian conception of God, which means that Barth, 
according to Moltmann, is insufficiently radical in attributing suffering to God. '55 On 
the face of it, then, Moltmann proposes what seems to be an absolute and radical view 
of the passibility of God. 
In answer to the question of whether God's suffering is free or whether God is a 
prisoner of his own history, Moltmann argues that God's suffering is free, not in the 
sense that God can arbitrarily choose whether or not to suffer, but free in the sense that 
God's suffering comes from God's spontaneous love: The freedom of spontaneous love 
is a more authentic kind of freedom than the freedom of arbitrary choice, the freedom to 
choose to suffer or not to suffer, and it is this former type of freedom that is possessed 
by God. On the other hand, God is not bound by metaphysical necessity such that God, 
by virtue of his essence, could do nothing but suffer. Rather, God's `need' for the world 
is rooted not in imperfection, but in love, and so is different from the suffering of God's 
creatures: It is an active passion freely taken out of love, not a passive or deficient 
suffering thrust upon God against his will. This suggests that while Moltmann's 
passibilism seems on the face of it to be radical and unqualified, because God's 
omnipotence and freedom are maintained there is at least one sense in which 
Moltmann's passibilism inhabits a middle ground and follows much earlier thought in 
maintaining the tension between God's suffering and God's sovereignty. 
Behind Moltmann's thought on the suffering of God lies the Jewish mystical 
image of the redemption of the Shekinah, the dwelling of God among his people. 
155 cf. Steen, `Moltmann's Critical Reception', p. 287 -8 
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According to this tradition, God not only lives with his people, but also suffers slavery 
with them. Moltmann quotes Franz Rosenzweig's explanation of this idea: 
God himself separates himself from himself, he gives himself away to his people, he shares in 
their sufferings, sets forth with them into the agony of exile, joins their wanderings... Nothing 
would be more natural for the `God of the Fathers' than that he should `sell' himself for Israel 
and share its suffering fate. But by doing so, God puts himself in need of redemption. "° 
According to the mystical Shekinah tradition, God withdraws into himself in order to 
make room for creation. Moltmann adopts this idea, and develops it in terms of not only 
God's withdrawing and humiliation in creation and history, but in particular in the 
incarnation and on the cross. God's suffering, then, is `God's supreme work on God 
himself. 157 As Fiddes points out, if we examine the ways in which Moltmann describes 
God's passion, Moltmann seems to be speaking solely of God's own acts on God's 
inner passion; God `is the source of his own suffering'. 158 Fiddes criticises this view, 
because it suggests that while God humbles himself in creation, incarnation and 
crucifixion by withdrawing and making room for us, God does not humble himself 
further by allowing us to contribute to the creative process. God remains unaffected by 
what we do. Because God's suffering is an action of himself upon himself, there is little 
humans can do to have an impact God's suffering, either positively or negatively. 
Consequently, `God seems less the supreme victim than the supreme self- 
executioner'. 159 
This suggests that there are two respects in which Moltmann's passibilism 
adheres to some of the central characteristics of impassibilism as classically conceived. 
First, God's omnipotence and freedom are never compromised, God remains master of 
his suffering and is never subject to it. God's suffering is always active, and never 
156 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. W. W. Hallo (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
1971), p. 409-410, cited Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic 
Ecclesiology, trans. M. Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1977), p. 61 
157 Moltmann, Trinity, p. 99 
158 Fiddes, Creative Suffering, p. 136 
159 Fiddes, Creative Suffering, p. 137 
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unqualifiedly `passio'. Second, because God's suffering is a free withdrawal and self- 
humiliation for the sake of humanity, God can never be affected by what we choose to 
do: We do not cause God's suffering by choosing to sin, nor can we take away some of 
God's suffering by choosing to do good. The most we can do in relation to God's 
suffering is to choose to participate in it and, in so doing, to have our own suffering 
taken up into God's being and redeemed. Thus Moltmann, like Barth and Hartshorne, 
seems to offer us a passibilism that has far more in common with some forms of ancient 
impassibilism that would first appear, perhaps rendering the separation between modem 
passibilism and impassibilism misleading. 
From this broad overview of passibilist and impassibilist theology and 
philosophy of religion in twentieth century theology we have seen that the idea that 
there has been a passibilist revolution in the twentieth century is an oversimplification. 
There are significant exceptions to passibilism from philosophers such as Helm and 
Creel and theologians such as Weinandy, and those theologians and philosophers who 
initially seem to stand in the passibilist camp in fact share many of the characteristics of 
earlier impassibilism. With this in mind, perhaps it is wiser to speak of a shift in 
emphasis from the invulnerability and omnipotence of God to the suffering of God, 
despite the fact that both are held in tension in modern passibilism. With this more 
qualified view of the shift in theology in mind, however, it still makes sense to ask why 
this shift has taken place. Many answers could be given here, but (in addition to those 
suggested by Goetz mentioned earlier in the chapter) among them we might pinpoint the 
fact that `emotion' has changed its meaning, and that we have developed an alternative 
evaluation of emotions from that given in ancient thought. In what follows I shall look 
at one expression of the way in which passibilism is deduced from a consideration of 
the nature of emotion in the work of Sarot, whose analysis of emotion is broadly 
representative of modern rather than ancient characterisations of emotion. 
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What emotions are: Marcel Sarot 
Sarot seeks, through an analysis of what a perfect being would be like, and what 
emotions are, to establish whether emotions are compatible with perfection. Sarot 
begins by establishing a working definition of passibilism as mutability with respect to 
one's feelings or the quality of one's inner life, before moving on to qualify what God's 
passibilism would be like in the light of divine attributes such as omnipotence, 
omniscience and moral perfection. In the course of Sarot's book seven crucial questions 
about emotions can be discerned: 
i) Are emotions essentially passive, in the sense of being something 
outside our control? 
ii) Are emotions inherently irrational? 
iii) Do emotions entail negativity or sinfulness? 
iv) What is the epistemological status of emotions? That is, do they add to 
or detract from the subject's knowledge and intelligence? 
v) Are the emotional experiences involved in suffering through sympathy 
(or empathy) helpful or unhelpful to those sufferers with whom the 
subject sympathises (or empathises)? 
vi) Does love entail passibility? 
vii) Do emotions require a body? 
While isolating these questions from the rest of Sarot's book in some ways fails to 
convey the overall integrity of his thesis, I shall discuss Sarot's treatment of these seven 
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questions because his handling of them highlights how our evaluation of the emotions 
affects whether or not we ascribe emotions to God. 
Passivity and irrationality 
Passibility and irrationality are treated together, since, as objections to passibilism, they 
are closely related. Characteristically, the impassibilist case claims that passibility is 
inappropriate to a perfect being because emotions are both passive and irrational. These 
objections to passibilism can be summarised as follows: 
i) We are passive to emotions, in the sense that emotions overtake us against 
our will. The extent to which passibility and passivity are associated is 
shown by the fact that the two words are etymologically cognate. 
Furthermore, because emotions are passive they are, in one sense, evil. 
Because we are passive to emotions they are, properly speaking, amoral, 
because they are not subject to our wills. However, in practice our emotions 
often lead us to immoral actions. Thus we must fight our passions so that 
they do not make us act immorally. 160 
ii) The irrationality of the emotions is a corollary of the passivity of the 
emotions. When we experience a passion the passion is, properly speaking, 
arational, because it is not guided by our reason. However, in practice 
passions are often irrational too, since they cause us to experience the object 
of our emotion in a way that is adverse to our reason. Emotions can also 
induce us to perform actions we know to be irrational. 161 
1611 Sarot, Passibility, p. 34 
161 Sarot, Passibility, p. 34 -5 
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Sarot seeks to show that passivity and irrationality are not in fact essential to emotion by 
showing that emotions are sometimes experienced without these characteristics. That 
passivity and irrationality are not essential to emotion is suggested by two 'everyday' 
facts: First, we praise or blame people for their emotions, and this would be 
unreasonable if emotions were always outside people's control. Second, we try to 
educate the emotional lives of our children, and this suggests that emotions can be 
guided by reason. 162 
This suggests that emotions are not passive or irrational, and Sarot moves from 
this to a deeper analysis of counter-examples of passivity and irrationality in emotion. 
There are three ways in which an emotion may seem to be passive or irrational: i) 
Emotions may seem to be caused by their objects so that the subject cannot control 
them; ii) Emotions may seem to dictate action so that the subject cannot act counter to 
the emotion; iii) Emotions often seem to involve evaluations that are not founded on a 
thorough consideration of all the relevant evidence. Sarot discusses each of these points 
in turn in order to show that none of these characteristics is essential to emotion. 
i) Emotions, the impassibilist claims, are passive because they are brought into 
being by their object. For example, it seems to George that he cannot help 
being in love with Barbara because Barbara is of unequalled attractiveness. 
The problem with this view is, as Vincent Brummer puts it, the 'impressive 
characteristics are discerned only by those who are impressed. 163 
Furthermore, George's attraction to Barbara springs from his preferences, 
norms and values, in the light of which George evaluates Barbara. Barbara is 
attractive to George because he prefers extrovert, talkative, blonde, slender 
162 Sarot, Passibility, p. 36 163 Vincent Brummer, Theology and Philosophical Inquiry: An Introduction (London 1991), p. 119, cited 
Sarot, Passibility, p. 37 
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women. The fact that our values, preferences and norms lie behind our 
emotions give us a clue as to how we can make emotions less passive, that 
is, how we can gain more control over our emotions: if we are 'victim' to 
an emotion we do not want to have, we can try to change our evaluation of 
the object of the emotion'. 164 We might do this in the following ways: First, 
by inquiring whether the evaluation of our emotion is factually correct. For 
example, George might take a critical look at Barbara's hair and note that it 
is dyed rather than being naturally blonde. Second, by concentrating on 
aspects of the object of the emotion other than those which evoke the 
undesirable emotion. For example, George might concentrate on Barbara's 
`weak-spots', or else try to see the shadow-side of the characteristics of 
Barbara that he finds attractive, such as by imagining how exhausting it 
would be to be married to such a garrulous woman. Third, by trying to 
change the preferences, norms and values that render the object of the 
undesirable emotion impressive. For example, George might attempt to talk 
himself into a preference for buxom rather than slender women. 165 While 
Sarot concedes that this might be a rather naive way of dealing with being in 
love with someone one does not want to be in love with, he suggests that 
with respect to other emotions it may be a useful technique. 166 
ii) The impassibilist might also claim that emotions are passive and irrational in 
that they `dictate' an action in such a way that it is difficult to act counter to 
emotion. The psychological components of an emotion are often directed 
towards a particular course of action. For instance, fear leads to two possible 
responses: The attempt to escape, or (if one deems escape unlikely) freezing 
in the hope that one remains unnoticed. However, Sarot argues, unlike 
164 Sarot, Passibility, p. 37 - 38 
165 Sarot, Passibility, p. 37 - 38 
166 see Sarot, Passibility, p. 38 
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animals, humans can act counter to emotions when they think that there is a 
good reason to do so: `A woman may overcome her fear in order to save 
someone else, for instance by rescuing him from a burning house: a man 
may not show how angry he is with his boss because he realises that he 
might lose his job, a doctor confronted with the ugly wounds of the victim of 
a traffic accident may not show his disgust, but try to calm the victim while 
preparing his treatment'. 167 Sarot concludes from this that, in human beings. 
emotions often urge us to do this, but that they do not compel us to do them. 
iii) A third argument for the passivity and irrationality of emotion is that 
emotions involve evaluations that are not founded on a serious consideration 
of all the evidence. Sarot argues that this is not necessarily the case. For 
instance, one might only become angry after serious reflection on an insult, 
once one has had the time to consider it fully in the light of the context in 
which it was given and the way it was meant, and so to appreciate how 
insulting it really was. Therefore not all emotional evaluations take place 
without prior deliberation, and so not all emotions can be labelled 
irrational. 168 
Sarot concludes from this discussion that emotions are not necessarily passive or 
irrational, though they can be both. This reappraisal of what emotions are, and the move 
from a negative view of emotions to a more positive one, underlies Sarot's conclusion 
that God can have emotions, though his view that emotions are sometimes passive and 
irrational also means that Sarot qualifies his passibilism by saying that God's emotions 
are never passive nor irrational, and that God always remains master of himself 19 
167 Sarot, Passibility, p. 39 
168 Sarot, Passibility, p. 39 
169 Sarot, Passibility, p. 40 
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Ne ativi 
The third question regarding the nature of emotion that can be discerned in Sarot's 
thesis is whether the ability to have emotions entails negativity, and whether this 
negativity is sinful or evil. Sarot characterises the impassibilist position that passibility 
entails negativity and sinfulness as follows. Negative experiences are unpleasant 
experiences. The mutability involved in experiencing emotions means that a passibilist 
being is one who experiences negative emotions: `... when feelings change they change 
for the better or for the worse. When they change for the better, the feeling preceding 
the change will be relatively negative; when they change for the worse, the feeling 
following the change will be relatively negative. ' 170 Therefore a passible being is a 
being who can experience negative feelings. Sarot notes that it is sometimes argued that 
the experiencing of these negative feelings is evil, and we would deny the evilness of 
these negative feelings to the detriment of morality, since if we ceased to regard these 
negative feelings as evil, we would cease to regard causing negative feelings in other 
people evil. 
Following Creel, Sarot argues that the mutuality implied by passibility can be 
understood in two senses: The subject's feelings may change intensively or 
extensively. 171 Our feelings change intensively in that they grow more or less pleasant. 
Our feelings change extensively when they shift from one object to another. In practice, 
intensive and extensive changes of feeling often go together, but they can nevertheless 
be distinguished in principle. 172 
Creel responds to the problem of negativity by arguing that God's happiness can 
be affected extensively but not intensively. But, argues Sarot, this means that God is 
only passible in a futile sense, since an important part of passibilism is that God not 
170 Sarot, Passibility, p. 35 
171 Creel, Impassibility, p. 145, Sarot, Passibility, p. 41 
172 Sarot, Passibility, p. 41 
70 
only experiences positive emotions like joy and bliss, but also negative emotional 
experiences, such as those involved in suffering. Given this, the view that God's 
emotional life only changes extensively is not adequate. 
Sarot proposes an alternative line of defence, pointing out that it is fallacious to 
regard the negativity of the experiences involved in passibility as evil. This can be 
shown when we ask, if negative emotions were evil, what sort of evil would they be'? 
They could not be moral evils, since moral evil refers to intentions and intentional 
actions, and negative emotions are neither intentions nor intentional actions. The 
infliction of negative emotions may be a moral evil if the intention in inflicting them is 
evil, but the negative emotions themselves cannot properly be called morally evil. The 
only other kind of evil that negative emotions could be is a physical or natural evil. 
However, a physical evil is in itself morally neutral. It can be called a moral evil in a 
derived sense by virtue of being caused by an evil action. By the same token, though, it 
can also be called a moral good, as for example when it is freely accepted as a means to 
a good end. Thus negative emotions can be both morally evil and morally good at the 
same time, though both in a derived sense. Given that we praise humans who accept 
negative feelings as a means to a good end, why should we not also attribute this kind of 
experience to God? 173 
In contrast to his discussion of passivity and irrationality, Sarot's discussion of 
emotion concerns not a negative view of emotions per se, but a negative view of 
negative emotions in particular. In overcoming the view that negative emotions are in 
some way sinful or morally evil, Sarot suggests that not only can God have emotions 
generally but, importantly, that God can have the specific emotions that are of concern 
to passibilist theologians, i. e. the negative emotions such as those involved in suffering. 
In showing how negative emotions may in fact be a moral good (as when they are freely 
173 Sarot, Passibility, p. 43 
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accepted for the sake of a greater good) Sarot's view of emotions also gives him an 
additional reason for postulating passibilism in addition to removing a potential 
objection to the idea of divine suffering: Emotions may not only be contrary to God's 
moral perfect - they might even add to it. Here we can see again that the shift from a 
negative view of emotion to the more positive one espoused by Sarot lends itself to an 
affirmation of passibilism. 
Epistemological status 
In discussing arguments in favour of passibilism, Sarot examines the argument from 
omniscience; i. e. because feelings provide `a certain kind of knowledge that cannot be 
obtained in any other way' 174 a being that cannot have feelings cannot be omniscient. In 
connection with this idea, Hartshorne makes the bold claim that an omniscient God 
must not only be able to experience feelings, but that he must be able to share all our 
human feelings with us, in the sense of experiencing them himself. As Hartshorne puts 
it: 
To fully sympathize with and to fully know the feelings of others are the same relationship, 
separable in our human case only because there the 'fully' never applies, and we never know the 
feelings of others but only have knowledge about them, abstract diagrams of how in rough, more 
or less general ways they feel. If we saw the individuality and vividness of the feeling we would 
have the feeling. As Hume said, without perhaps knowing what a contribution to theology he 
was here making, the vivid idea of a feeling is in principle coincident with its 'impression', that 
is, with such a feeling as one's own. 175 
If we suffer and God is omniscient, then God must share in our sufferings. However, as 
Creel points out, this would mean that God would not only have to suffer, but would 
also feel stupid, horny, and take pleasure in vicious acts, because these are all feelings 
that humans have. 176 Sarot agrees with Creel that this conclusion is unacceptable for 
174 Sarot, Passibility, p. 56 
175 Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1941), 
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Christian theology, since it is incompatible with God's goodness, justice and unity. Yet, 
concedes Sarot, perfect knowledge of a feeling does seem to imply that one experiences 
the feeling as one's own. 177 
As a solution to this problem Sarot suggests that knowing someone's feelings is 
knowing how that person's feeling feels, rather than necessarily feeling that feeling 
oneself. He uses the following analogy to demonstrate this point: When one suffers a 
toothache, one knows exactly how it feels, but after it has gone, it is impossible to 
remember the exact feeling of having toothache. Furthermore, when we remember the 
toothache, we do not feel the toothache again. This suggests that having knowledge of 
past toothache does not suggest we feel it again. Therefore, contra Hartshorne, it is not 
the case that an omniscient God must experience our feelings in order to know how our 
feeling feels. 178 
However, Sarot's refutation of Hartshorne still leaves a weaker claim open: That 
it is only possible to know what something feels like if we have felt something. David 
Brown illustrates this point in making the following implicit distinction between two 
types of knowledge: 
Some children have the misfortune to be bom without the ability to experience pain and so 
unless they are educated in time about the consequences of their actions they end up by doing 
themselves permanent damage, even accidentally killing themselves. However, if they survive to 
adulthood, then they will have acquired a good knowledge of the consequences of pain, but even 
so they will remain without any experiential knowledge of what it feels like to be in pain. 
Similarly, it seems to me with God. Of course, without the Incarnation he already had perfect 
knowledge of the consequences of pain, but only the Incarnation could have brought him 
knowledge of what it feels like to be one of us. 179 
As Sarot points out, here there is an implicit distinction between intellectual knowledge 
and experiential knowledge. Perhaps most importantly for Sarot, Brown suggests that 
experiential knowledge adds something to intellectual knowledge, so that someone who 
177 Sarot, Passibility, p. 69 
178 Sarot, Passibility, p. 69 - 70 179 David Brown, The Problem of Pain' in Robert Morgan (ed. ), The Religion of the Incarnation (Bristol 
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has intellectual knowledge knows less than someone who also has experiential 
knowledge. 180 This goes against mainstream Christian theology, for which God is 
omniscient without having experiential knowledge. For example, in The God of the 
Philosophers, Anthony Kenny argues that everything we know about our sensations is 
communicable, and that anything that is not communicable is not worthy of the name 
'knowledge': 
`Only I can know my sensation' means either that others cannot know that I am (e. g. ) in pain, or 
that others cannot feel my pain. If it means the former then it is obviously false; someone who 
sees me falling into flames and screaming as my body burns knows perfectly well that I am in 
pain. If it means the latter then it is true but trivial, and there is no question of knowledge here. 181 
According to Kenny, therefore, experiential knowledge cannot be a type of knowledge 
distinct from intellectual knowledge (since then it would not be knowledge), and since 
all knowledge is communicable we can get all knowledge through means other than 
experience; as Sarot puts it, `If I am in pain, I can tell others that I am in pain and they 
can learn from my words that I am in pain,. 182 The only difference between getting 
knowledge through experience and getting knowledge through someone else's 
expression of it is that in the case of the former there is also the experience of pleasure 
and pain: According to Kenny, a sense is `essentially a faculty for acquiring information 
in a modality which admits of pleasure and pain'. 183 Therefore, an impassible God can 
know everything we know and more, but without the pleasure and/or pain we 
experience with it. 184 
Sarot responds that what Kenny succeeds in showing is that it would be 
nonsensical to hold that it is impossible for someone who is in pain to communicate this 
to others. However, there is a difference Kenny has overlooked between knowing that 
someone is in pain and knowing how that pain feels. In addition to the statement only I 
180 Sarot, Passibility, p. 70-71 
181 Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) p. 31, cited Sarot, 
Passibility, p. 71 
182 Sarot, Passibility, p. 72 
183 Kenny, God of the Philosophers, p. 32, cited Sarot, Passibility, p. 72 
194 Sarot, Passibility, p. 72 
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can know my sensation' having the two possible meanings Kenny proposes, it can also 
have a third meaning: `Only I can know how my sensation feels '. 
185 While we can 
explain to our friends how our pain feels by describing how it differs from other pains, 
in the case of people who are congenitally immune to pain (such as the children in 
Brown's example) we cannot explain to them either how pain feels in general or how 
specific pains feel in particular. This means that not everyone can understand the feeling 
of pain. And this is not only true of the concept of feeling pain, but also of any other 
concept. 186 
Therefore, some knowledge cannot be acquired except by experience. Like the 
people with an immunity to pain, an impassible God would be able to know all true 
propositions about pain, but not be able to know how pain feels. As Keith Ward points 
out, this would be a major qualification of divine omniscience: 
To rule out knowledge by acquaintance from omniscience is to rule out the most important and 
personal knowledge completely... It seems to me an extraordinarily attenuated notion of 
knowledge which it views as the accurate tabulation of true propositions, registered 
passionlessly, as if on some cosmic computer. The whole idea that omniscience could consist in 
simply knowing more true propositions than any other being strikes me as grotesque. "' 
As Brown and Ward suggest, if God has no experiential knowledge, his omniscience is 
seriously restricted. In the light of this conclusion, Sarot asks which experiences a being 
would have to undergo in order to be omniscient. While the experience of pain is the 
only one discussed so far, suffering, feeling stupid, feeling horny, taking pleasure in 
vicious acts, and other human experiences must also be considered. 188 
Sarot points out that we can often form a new concept by combining elements of 
other concepts one already understands. This one might understand the concept of 
pleasure in vicious acts by combining one's conception of pleasure and vicious acts. 
This suggests that we can separate the feeling of experiences from the circumstances 
185 Sarot, Passibility, p. 72 
186 Sarot, Passibility, p. 73 
187 Keith Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 
132, cited Sarot, Passibility, p. 73 -4 
188 Sarot, Passibility, p. 74 
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under which the experience is had. Therefore, when the occasion is such that God could 
not have the experience in such circumstances because that would be incompatible with 
one of God's attributes, God could have the same feeling-experience in another context, 
so that he could understand the concept in question. 189 
Having shown how God might experience those feelings necessary for his 
omniscience without compromising his other attributes (such as goodness and justice), 
Sarot goes on to discuss Brown's idea that it is only through the incarnation that God 
has certain sorts of knowledge. Sarot finds Brown's thesis unsatisfactory, since it means 
that God's omniscience, and thus his perfection, are dependent upon the incarnation, 
and also because it makes human nature more perfect that divine nature. Furthermore, if 
(as Brown and Sarot both hold) God is in time rather than outside time, then it means 
that God would not have been omniscient for some of his existence. Finally. Brown's 
thesis also gives God a non-selfless reason for becoming incarnate: Part of God's 
motivation for the incarnation may have been the perfection of his own omniscience. 
Therefore it is important to hold that not only through the incarnation, but also as part of 
the divine nature itself, God is capable of having certain feeling-experiences. 19" 
In addition to arguing that a being who cannot have certain experiences would 
be lacking in experiential knowledge, Sarot argues that experience is also required for 
purely intellectual knowledge, so that a being who lacked experience would also lack 
some intellectual knowledge. One example of the way in which this might be the case is 
shown in R. A. Sharpe's argument that someone who is congenitally immune to pain 
could not judge whether new descriptions of painful experiences are accurate. The 
person suffering from an immunity to pain would also be unable to propose new 
descriptions. '9' As the knowledge of whether descriptions are accurate or not is a type 
189 Sarot, Passibility, p. 75 
190 Sarot, Passibility, p 76 
191 R. A. Sharpe, `How Having the Concept of Pain Depends on Experiencing it', Philosophical 
Investigations 6 (1983) 142-4; cited Sarot, Passibility, p. 76 
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of intellectual knowledge, people who are immune to pain are limited in terms of 
intellectual knowledge as well as experiential knowledge. This means that even if we 
did formulate omniscience purely in terms of knowledge of all true propositions (which 
Ward has already persuasively argued to be an impoverished conception of 
omniscience) God could not be omniscient if he did not experience certain feelings 
because this would entail that God lacked some propositional or intellectual knowledge. 
For Sarot, therefore, certain emotional experiences are required for divine omniscience 
both in terms of God's experiential knowledge and in terms of God's intellectual 
knowledge. 
Underlying Sarot's argument for passibilism is the understanding of emotions as 
not only not inherently unintelligent- or irrational -making, but as actually necessary to 
intelligence. This shift is part of a wider shift towards seeing passibilism not as 
something that makes us primarily vulnerable or susceptible, but as an ability or 
capacity. In other words, emotions are a necessary part of perfection, and not a set of 
experiences that would detract from it. 
Are sympathy and empathy helpful or unhelpful to sufferers? 
Those concerned with divine impassibility in the light of the problem of evil are divided 
upon whether only a suffering God can help' (Bonhoeffer), or whether God is better 
able to help and console if he is himself removed from the suffering. Some theologians, 
such as Kenneth Woollcombe192 and Richard Creel, tend toward the view that a God 
who does not suffer is better able to console, in that his blissfulness in the face of 
suffering reminds us that all will be well in the end, and that the suffering we now 
experience is within the boundaries God himself sets, determined by his wisdom, 
192 Kenneth J. Woollcombe, `Pain of God', Scottish Journal of Theology 20 (1967) 129 - 48, cited Sarot, 
Passibility, p. 78 
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power, and goodness. Woollcombe bases his analogy on an upset child and a consoling 
parent: it is more reassuring for the child to be consoled by a calm parent, who does not 
share, for instance, their fear of a nightmare, or their pain and shock in relation to a cut 
or bruise. In response to this Sarot points out that, while in the case of minor suffering it 
is often more consoling to be consoled by an undisturbed parent, this clearly will not do 
in the case of more serious suffering. Would the equanimity and emotional indifference 
of another in the face of child abuse, rape, or the discovery of a painful terminal illness 
serve to reassure the victim that in fact all was well, or merely intensify the loneliness 
and confusion the victim was undergoing? Creel discusses (and criticises) a further 
argument for an impassible God: Someone who does not suffer is better able to help in a 
crisis, since they are not traumatised by it. Sarot concedes that it is often the case that 
human sympathy impedes aid, but follows Creel in pointing out that the same cannot 
apply to God, since, because God is omniscient, nothing (including sympathy) can be an 
obstacle to God's judgement and action: `Although it is true that our sympathy can 
interfere with our ability to help, the same consideration cannot apply to God. "93 From 
this discussion Sarot concludes that God would not be able to give perfect consolation 
were he not a fellow-sufferer, and that this fact points to a doctrine of divine passibility. 
As we shall see in chapter four, the question of whether experiences of fellow 
suffering such as compassion, empathy and sympathy are helpful, or whether they 
prevent the subject from helping the sufferer or from viewing them fairly, is a bone of 
contention. From this brief overview of Sarot's discussion, we can see that Sarot 
ascribes a positive status not only to positive (pleasant-feeling) emotions, but also to 
negative (painful-feeling) emotions such as suffering. Furthermore, Sarot also argues 
implicitly that emotions can be empowering - that is, that there are some things (such as 
consolation) that a being can do better with emotions than without them. 
193 Sarot, Passibility, p. 80 
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Love 
Sarot then turns to the relation between love and emotions, in order to enquire whether 
divine passibility is entailed by divine love. In contemporary theology, there are two 
distinct conceptions of divine love, only one of which entails passibility. Both 
conceptions of love are based upon analogy from human life, the impassibilist upon the 
love of the good Samaritan (amor benevolentiae), and the passibilist upon human 
relations of mutual love, exemplified in that of lovers. 194 The primary difference 
between benevolence love (love b) and the love of lovers (love I) lies in the fact that 
love b aims for the well-being of the beloved, while love 1 aims for the happiness of 
both persons. There are four further differences arising from this primary difference, as 
follows: 
i) In love 1, both persons are active and passive, give and receive, while 
in love b, A is active and B passive, A gives and B receives 
ii) In love I, A and B are attracted to one another because they perceive 
an inherent value in the other that they do not find in other people. In 
love b, A perceives no value in B, but simply a need to be fulfilled. 
Love b is therefore disinterested, while love I is interested. 
iii) In love 1, A gives his/her complete being to B, and vice versa, i. e. A 
and B live for one another. In love b, the giving and `amount' of love 
is adapted to the need of the beloved. A does not need to give B 
his/her entire self 
194 It is interesting that Sarot avoids the terms agape and eros, perhaps moving away from the very 
specific overtones these terms have picked up in Christian discussions of love such as those of 
Kierkegaard and Nygren. 
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iv) In love 1, both A and B are irreplaceable and unique. In love b, the 
beloved is not loved for any inherent value or uniqueness, so that A 
could have the same relationship with C or D as with B. 
The significant (and controversial) aspect of divine love conceived as love I is that 
God's offer of love renders God vulnerable, `vulnerable not only to rejection by the 
beloved, but also to whatever negative factors may be afflicting the beloved'. 195 In order 
to be real, vulnerability must involve God's feelings, and thus necessitates divine 
passibility. 
Which view of love is to be preferred as an analogy for God's love of creation'? 
Love b is often considered superior because it stresses the selfless nature of love, and 
the non-manipulability of the lover. However, Sarot argues, these important aspects are 
not essentially or inherently incompatible with love I. Concerning non-manipulability, 
Sarot has already demonstrated that God need not be unconditioned, and so can be 
emotionally involved, without being manipulable. Therefore, love I and non- 
manipulability are compatible. Regarding selflessness, Sarot argues that perceiving 
God's love as love 1 involving vulnerability would not be selfish, if God chose to love in 
this way, to make himself vulnerable, because humanity needs this kind of reciprocal 
relationship with God, and needs to be needed as well as to receive what it needs. This 
suggests that love I is not fundamentally selfish, and may in fact be an act of self- 
sacrifice if the lover chooses to make himself vulnerable for the sake of the beloved: 'It 
will be clear, then, that it is misleading to say that God wants to enter into relations of 
mutual fellowship because that makes him happier. It is just the other way round: God 
wants to enter into such relations because this is a condition for our complete 
happiness. ' 196 This makes love I preferable to love b as an analogy for the divine love, 
'95 Sarot, Passibility, p. 85 
116 Sarot, Passibility, p. 88 
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since, while neither need involve manipulability or selfishness, love I alone involves 
(when applied to God) the self-giving act of relinquishing perfect blissfulness in order 
to become vulnerable and to suffer with and for the object of love. 
Sarot concludes by preferring love I to love b as an analogy for the divine love. 
Love I is a fuller, more self-giving kind of love than love b, since `A loving I God 
would be able to satisfy our need for mutuality in a way a loving b could not' 197 and 
such love could only be brought about by a renunciation of blissfulness on God's part. 
Such love is more perfect, and therefore must, according to the principles of perfect 
being theology, be preferred as a model of the divine love. 
I shall return to the distinction between love as benevolence and love as intense 
passion in chapter four in discussing whether God can experience jealousy. For the 
purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to note that one of the primary distinctions 
between love b and love I is that love I involves strong and intense emotions (and 
involves vulnerability), while love b either doesn't involve any emotions, or only 
involves weak and calm ones. In coming down on the side of love 1, then, Sarot is 
saying, contra the main thrust of Christian theology, that emotional love is superior to 
the kind of love which requires only a small amount of emotional involvement, and thus 
that the ability to have strong emotions is an aspect of perfection rather than a weakness. 
Body 
A large part of Sarot's book is taken up with a discussion of whether and in what way 
passibility implies corporeality. Sarot's discussion will be evaluated in chapter six, but 
can be briefly summarised as follows. Sarot argues that certain bodily sensations are 
necessarily located, thus demanding corporeality. An incorporeal God could only 
197 Sarot, Passibility, p. 90. cf. p. 90-1 for a further argument for love 1, based upon the practice of 
evangelisation. 
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experience `weak and calm emotions', and not the 'strong and intense' emotions 
demanded by passibilist theology. Therefore, we must either reject the idea that God 
suffers intensively with and for us, or else we must develop a doctrine of divine 
embodiment. Sarot then discusses the concepts of the world as God's body that have 
been suggested by Charles Hartshorne, Grace Jantzen, and Luco van den Brom, 
favouring Jantzen's theory as a starting-point for a doctrine of divine corporeality in line 
with passibilism. 
Sarot's treatment of passibilism and corporeality differs from his treatment of 
the other characteristics of emotion (e. g. activity, epistemological status, importance to 
love 1, etc. ) in that the other discussions focus on discerning whether emotions are 
required by, or instead prohibit, divine perfection. By the time Sarot discusses emotions 
and bodiliness, in contrast, he has already concluded that emotions are required for the 
divine perfection, and turns his attention to the question of what other divine attributes 
emotions, and the ability to have emotions, require. Sarot does not evaluate the attribute 
of corporeality, and therefore his discussion of emotions and corporeality tells us 
nothing further about the value he attributes to emotions. However, Sarot's discussion 
of the other characteristics of emotion give an indication of the way in which both the 
understanding and the evaluation of what emotions are has changed. In the first place, 
emotions are treated as one concept-category rather than several, while in the early 
church there was greater discrimination between different category concepts of 
emotional and mental phenomena. When compared to passions or xa% we can also see 
that the modern evaluation of emotion differs in according to emotional experiences a 
far more positive role in human life. For example, emotions differ from passions in that 
they are not essentially passive. In contrast with some, particularly eastern, ancient 
Christian thinkers, emotions also differ from passions in that they are not inherently 
sinful, negative or irrational. In fact, the modem assessment of emotions suggests that 
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emotions may even be a necessary aspect of wisdom and knowledge. The modem 
concern with theodicy has given rise to a new consideration regarding the comfort that 
God gives to sufferers, and this consideration in and of itself gives the emotional 
experiences involved in `suffering with' people a moral importance that has suggested 
to some that divine emotions are essential to, rather than a diminishment of, God's 
moral perfection. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to answer the question of why, given that impassibilism 
seemed obvious to the Fathers of the early church, there seems to have been a passibilist 
revolution in the last one hundred and twenty years. Part of my answer to this question 
is that the apparent shift from impassibilism to passibilism is not as extreme as first 
appears, in that in addition to the fact that some of the early Fathers attributed to God 
emotional experiences in a way that made them very much like modem passibilists, 
most modem passibilists inhabit some sort of middle ground or qualify their passibilism 
by maintaining divine omnipotence and freedom in a way that means they have more in 
common with ancient impassibilism than initial appearances would suggest. I have also 
pointed to several exceptions to the modem passibilist consensus which should not be 
overlooked in surveys of modem theological thought. In so doing, I have proposed that 
we should be cautious of attributing a passibilist revolution to the twentieth century, and 
instead speak in terms of a shift of emphasis from talk of God's omnipotence and 
invulnerability to talk of the fullness of God's emotional life as an aspect, rather than a 
diminishment, of God's omnipotence and freedom. 
In so far as we can speak of a shift, I have suggested that one factor that is 
responsible for this is that there has been a change in the concept of emotion, such that 
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emotion now refers to one set of experiences rather than many, and such that these 
experiences are seen to be potentially active, positive, rational, and even essential to 
wisdom and intelligence. I shall return to a consideration of whether emotions are 
active, positive, rational and intelligent in chapters four and five. In the next chapter, I 
shall focus on the idea of emotions as distinct and diverse sets of mental and physical 
phenomena rather than as one set of experiences that we can analyse as a distinct group, 
through a discussion of passiones and affectiones in Augustine and Aquinas. In doing 
this, I hope to persuade the reader of the diversity of different emotional phenomena, 
and to suggest a way forward for the current impasse between twentieth century 
passibilists and impassibilists. 
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Chapter Three: Augustine, Emotion and Impassibility198 
Introduction 
In the previous two chapters I looked at the way in which the idea of impassibility and 
passibility was developed in the early church and in modem theology in the light of 
their respective views on emotion, and indicated some of the ways in which a middle 
ground between passibilism and impassibilism has been suggested. In this chapter I 
want to return to earlier theology to explore in more depth one of the means by which 
ancient and medieval philosophy of emotion might both help modem philosophy of 
emotion and suggest a way of surmounting at least some of the deadlocks between 
modem passibilists and impassibilists. Re-appropriating elements of Augustinian 
`philosophy of emotion', and, more briefly, developments of Augustine's thought by 
Thomas, I shall suggest that the distinction between passiones' and 'affectiones' is 
more helpful than the broader category of the `emotion', both when analysing human 
emotion and in relation to the impassibility debate. This distinction, I shall argue, leads 
to a clarification of the definition of the divine passibility that goes some way towards 
finding a solution to the concerns of both passibilist and impassibilist theologians. 
Emotion-words in the ancient world 
The modern category of the emotion encompasses a vast variety of phenomena, to the 
extent that contemporary philosophers and psychologists have been unable to provide a 
single definition of the term. W. Reddy observes that the recent surge of experiments 
and studies on emotions has `done little to clear up the vexed question of what, exactly, 
198 Some of the material for this chapter was published in a shorter article in the International Journal for 
Systematic Theology 7.2, April 2005 (169-177), under the title `Emotion in Augustine of Hippo and 
Thomas Aquinas: A Way Forward for the Im/passibility Debate? ' 
emotions are. Disagreements persist, uncertainties abound'. 99 A. S. Reber writes of 
emotion that `Historically this term has proven utterly refractory to definitional efforts, 
probably no other term in psychology shares its nondefinability with its frequency of 
use', 200 while R. Corsini asserts that `its exact nature has been elusive and difficult to 
specify '. 201 Robert M. Gordon concludes that emotions are best seen as a group of 
experiences and phenomena related by family resemblances, since the search to define 
emotions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions has proved fruitless. 202 
Likewise, Aaron Ben Ze'ev comes close to speaking of emotions in terms of family 
resemblances when he argues that `There is no essence which is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for all emotions or even of one type of emotion... Emotions 
constitute a prototypical category, namely a category the membership in which is 
determined by the degree of similarity to the best example. Hence, emotions have no 
clear and definite borders. '203 Amalie Rorty argues that current conceptual analysis of 
emotion suffers badly because we take the concept of emotion at face value, as though it 
were a single coherent concept, without taking into account the differing historical ideas 
and agenda that went into producing the concept we use today: 
The history of discussion of the passions does not form a smooth continuous history, which 
expands or narrows the class of pathe by following a single line of thought. Sometimes the 
transformations (say from the Aristotelian pathe to Stoic passiones) arise from moral 
preoccupations concerning voluntary control; sometimes the transformations (say from the 
Renaissance amor to Hobbesian passions and desires) are impelled by metaphysical and 
scientific preoccupations, sometimes the transformations (say from Hobbesian passions and 
desires to Humean and Rousseauean sentiments) have a political 
direction. If nothing else, this 
should show that pathe, passions, affects, emotions and sentiments do not form a natural class. 
Additions to that class were made on quite distinctive grounds. Before we can evaluate the 
competing claims of current polemical debates, before we can understand the force of their 
various claims, we must first trace the philosophic preoccupations in which they originated. 204 
'99 W. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), ix 
200 A. S. Reber, The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 234 
201 R. Corsini, Encyclopedia of Psychology (New York: Wiley, 1994 12nd edition]), p. 478 
202 Robert M. Gordon, `Emotion', in Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 259 - 60 203 Aaron Ben Ze'ev, `The Nature of Emotions', Philosophical Studies 52 (1987), p. 393 
204 Amalie Rorty, `Aristotle on the Metaphysical Status of Pathe', Review of Metaphysics 38 (I984), p. 
545 
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In fact, the concept of the emotion is exclusive to the modem era. The term did not crop 
up in English until the mid-sixteenth century, when it was used to denote a public 
disturbance, and was not given its current meaning until the early nineteenth century. 
While the term is etymologically derived from the Latin motus, motus denotes 
`movement' and is only indirectly related to the current meaning of emotion. 
Furthermore, no exact translation or equivalent is found in Latin or any of the ancient 
languages. As we saw in chapter one, in contrast to the preference of the modem world 
for a single over-arching category, the ancient and medieval worlds had a diversity of 
descriptions of human experiences, and imposing our category of `emotion' on these 
different concepts can overlook the original implications of each term. 
Augustine on emotion-terms 
In City of God IX. 4, Augustine mentions several possible Latin translations of the Greek 
xa% implying that passiones is the most accurate general term for what we would call 
emotions: Two opinions are found among the philosophers concerning those agitations 
of the soul (animi motibus), which the Greeks call pathe, while some of our Latin 
authors, Cicero for example, describe them as disturbances (perturhationes), others as 
affections or affects (affectiones uel affectus), or again as passions (passiones)..... 205 
This may well be because passiones is etymologically descended from iraOi , while 
perturbationes, affectiones and affectus are not. Earlier on in City of God, speaking of 
Apuleius' assertion that the demons are disturbed by the passions, Augustine tells us 
that `disturbance [perturbationes] represents the Greek pathos (passion)... land] the 
word "passion" [passio] (pathos in Greek) signifies an irrational movement of the soul 
[motus animi contra rationem]. 206 Here the point seems to be that Apuleius translates 
205 City of God IX. 4, trans. Bettenson, p. 345 
201, City of God VIII. 17, trans. Bettenson, pp 322 - 324 
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the Greek 1ra9ý as perturbationes, rather than that perturbationes ' is Augustine's 
preferred translation. Elsewhere, Augustine sometimes uses the terms motus animae 
(movements of the soul), affectus and passiones animae to speak of emotional 
phenomena in their broadest sense. 207 
However, despite this general and morally-neutral use of terms such as 
passiones, affectus and motus animae, Thomas Dixon has shown that there is also a 
tendency in Augustine's work to use passiones (and related words such as 
perturbationes, libido and morbos) in a pejorative sense, and to contrast these with 
virtuous affectus, motus and affectiones. For Augustine, the terms affectu. s and 
affectiones, `referred to acts of will... and are to be contrasted with passiones, which for 
both writers were not active movements of the will but passive movements of the lower, 
sensory appetite. '208 According to this use of pa. ssiones, the passion is a movement of 
the lower animal sou1209, which is involuntary in the sense of not in accordance with the 
will. 
Passiones 
One instance of Augustine's use of passiones in the sense of an involuntary movement 
of the lower animal soul is to be found in City of God VIII. 17. In his discussion of 
Apuleius, Augustine explains that the souls of the demons and of men in this life are 
disturbed by the storms and tempests of the passions (passionum turbelis et 
207 Dixon, Passions, p. 40 
208 Dixon, Passions, p. 48 
209 Augustine employs two (logically incompatible) uses of the term `soul': The Platonic and the 
Aristotelian. On the Platonic model, the soul is the inner self, i. e. the rational and moral part of a human, 
which distinguishes humans from other animals. On the Aristotelian model, the soul comprises not only 
the `intellective soul' (roughly analogous to the soul on the Platonic view), but also the animal/sensitive 
soul, and the vegetative/nutritive soul, the former of which involves both sense perception and animal 
appetites. The sense in which the passions affect the 'lower, animal soul' is in the Aristotelian sense: in 
Platonic terms, they would not be thought to affect the soul at all (cf. De Trinitate XII; Confessiones XIIL 
Gerard O'Daly, Augustine's Philosophy of Mind [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1987], p. 13f. ) 
88 
tempestatibus), while the angels and the blessed in heaven, able to attain perfect 
wisdom, are free from them. 210 In men these disturbances are possible as a result either 
of stupidity or wretchedness. The angels are free from such passions because 'they are 
not only immortal but also happy fbeata]'. 211 Animals are also free from passions, since 
a passion is involuntary, and can never occur in animals, by virtue of the fact that 
animals do not possess reason and so do not have the ability to make informed choices 
(though they may have instincts apparently similar to passions). Without will, animals 
do not have a choice about whether or not to do something moral (i. e. and therefore 
their action is neither voluntary nor involuntary), since their `decision-making faculties' 
are not informed by reason. The demons are liable to passions because, although they 
are immortal, they are not blessed, but wretched, thus having involuntay passions 
forced upon them. 
It is noteworthy that, for Augustine, corporeality does not seem to be necessary 
either to affectiones or to passiones: Augustine attributes various passiones to the 
demons, including desire, fear and anger212 and writes that `... it is not only from the 
influence of the flesh that the soul experiences desire and fear, joy and distress, it can 
also be disturbed by those emotions from a source within itself. '213 Furthermore, while 
the `emotions' are understood as movements of the appetitive soul that affect the body, 
in another sense they are also understood as things that affect the rational soul, forcing 
the rational soul to react against the sensory appetite in order to regain control. Thus, in 
the subjection of the demons to passiones 
It is their mind [mens] that is affected, the superior part of the soul [animi superiorJ, the 
faculty that makes them rational beings, the place where virtue and wisdom, if they have any, 
exercises mastery over the turbulent passions [passionibus turbulentis] of the lower parts of the 
soul by directing and controlling them. It is their mind [mens] which... are tossed about on the 
waves of the passions [passiones]. 14 2 
210 City of God viii. 17 211 City of God VIII. 17, trans. Bettenson, p. 323 
212 City of God IX. 6 
213 City of God XIV. 5, trans. Bettenson, p. 555 
214 City of God IX. 6, trans. Bettenson, p. 350 
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In yet another sense passiones affect the soul, in that external sensory objects act upon 
it, pulling the appetitive soul to and fro. In the case of some emotions the soul may act 
in response to something in the body: 
When the flesh is said to desire or to suffer pain, it is in fact the man himself who has this 
experience... or else some part of the soul which is affected by the experience of the flesh, whether 
a harsh experience producing pain, or a gentle experience, producing pleasure. Bodily pain is 
really nothing but a distress of the soul arising from the body, and a kind of disagreement with 
what happens to the body, in the same way as mental pain, which is called grief, is a disagreement 
with what has happened to us against our will. 215 
Because of the way in which passiones affect and are moved by different elements of 
the human and the world, they are variously described as passiones of the body (i. e. 
because they affect the body, and it is passive to them), passiones of the appetitive soul 
and even passiones of the intellective soul. 216 
Affectus and Affectiones 
In Latin contemporary to Augustine, the term affectus denotes a range of human 
behaviour 
. 
217 It is often accompanied by mentis or animi. though it can also be used on 
its own. It can reflect either (or both) a mental or an emotional state, or simply a long 
lasting disposition. It is also used to mean diligent attention, eager desire, and 
enthusiasm. 218 In Augustine's use of the term, affectus contrasts with passiones: The 
affectus is a movement of the higher, intellective soul, which is voluntary, in that it is in 
accordance with the will. Of virtuous affects, Augustine writes that `If these movements 
215 City of God. XIV. 15, trans. Bettenson, p. 576 
21 Dixon, Passions, p. 58 -9 
217 Gerald O'Daly and Adolar Zumkeller, `Affectus, passio, perturbatio', Augustinus-Lexikon, ed. 
Cornelius Mayer et al, vol. 1 (Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG 1986 - 1994), 166 - 180 218 George Lawless, "infitmior sexus... fortior affectus': Augustine's Jo. Ev. Tr. 121,1 - 3: Mary 
Magdalene', in Augustinian Studies 34: 1 (2003), 111 
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(motus) and affects (affectus), that spring from love of the good and from holy charity, 
are to be called faults, then let us allow that real faults should be called virtues. But 
since these affections (affectiones) are the consequence of right reason when they are 
directed towards their proper objects, who would then venture to call them diseases 
(morbos) or disordered passions (passiones)? i219 Despite being movements of the 
intellective soul, there is no lack of feeling in these affects: in contrast to modem views 
of emotion, Augustine does not contrast those emotions he knew as affectus and 
affection es with reason. As Dixon observes: 
The `affections' and `moral sentiments'... could be understood both as rational and voluntary 
movements of the soul while still being subjectively warm and lively states.... Augustine and 
Aquinas do indeed recommend that the passions be subjected to the rule of reason. However, 
that is not the same as saying ... that the 
Christian tradition recommended the subjection of all 
'emotions' to reason. The rational mind had its own 'emotions', namely those movements or acts 
of will that were known as affects or affections. In other words, the reason-passion dichotomy 
was decidedly not a reason-emotion dichotomy. The higher part of the soul was properly moved 
in its voluntary acts - in its expression of its love. Its position above animal passion (sensory 
appetite) in the hierarchy did not exclude it from all the aspects of life that we would call 
'emotions', only from the wild, violent, unrestrained and unconsidered compulsions of passions 
that it would still seem reasonable advice to seek to avoid. 220 
It does not follow from this that affections are necessarily virtuous, nor that passions are 
necessarily sinful. Rather, what makes an affection an affection rather than a passion 
lies in the fact that it is a movement of the will, which is a part of the higher, inner, 
intellective self, while the passion is an act of the appetite, an aspect of the lower, outer, 
sensual self. What makes an emotion a passion or an affection is not its moral status, but 
whether it relates to the sensitive or intellective self However, in practice it is often the 
case that passions are sinful, 221 because (as a consequence of the Fall) the lower 
sensitive self is in rebellion against the higher intellective self, which should be its 
master and guiding principle. 
219 City of God XIV. 9: Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate uenientes si uitia uocanda 
sunt, sinamus, ut ea, quae uere uitia cunt, uirtutes uocentur. Sed cum rectam rationem sequantur istac 
affections, quando ubi oportet adbibentur, quis eas tune morbos seu uitiosas passiones audeat dicere? 
220 Dixon, Passions, p. 3,54 -5 
221 Dixon, Passions, p. 48 
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Whether a particular passion or affection is virtuous or vicious is dependent upon 
two factors: First, the agreement of the emotion with reason, and, second, the object of 
the emotion, which is closely related both to the direction of the will and to the 
orientation of the subject's love. As we shall see, these two conditions which determine 
the moral status of an `emotion' also incline passions to be sinful, and allow affections 
to be virtuous. 
First, the extent to which an `emotion' is good is partly dependent upon whether the 
emotion is in accordance with reason. Augustine writes that `This is a blessed and 
peaceful life of man when all its emotions [motus] agree with reason and truth, then 
they are called joys and holy affections, pure and good. But if they do not agree, they 
tear the soul apart and make life most wretched, and are called perturbations and lusts 
and evil desires. ' 222 Since the affects or affections are movements of the will, the 
voluntas, which is an aspect of the intellectual self and potentially informed by reason, it 
follows that affects are often in agreement with reason: They are, as Dixon implies, 'the 
emotions of the rational mind'. 223 Indeed, one cannot have a will without having reason 
to inform it (as Augustine's treatment of the 'non-passions' of the beasts indicates), and 
thus all affects have the potential either to be reasonable or unreasonable (there is no 
`third option' available). In contrast, the passions are acts of the appetitive soul that 
affect the physical body, and the question of whether they are `in agreement' with 
reason really becomes a question about whether they are in subjection to reason. As 
involuntary movements, they can never be `reasonable' in and of themselves, since it is 
meaningless to say that there could be reason without a will, i. e. when something is 
involuntary. Thus passions are necessarily and inherently arational, and can never be 
informed by reason. While, as I have already noted, it is not necessarily the case that all 
222 Augustine, De Gen. Cont. Manich. 1,20, cited Mozley, Impassibility, p. 104 
223 Dixon, Passions, p. 54 -5 
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affects are virtuous and all passions sinful, there is therefore a prima facie reason for 
why affects are often virtuous and postlapsarian passions never so. 
Second, the question of whether an `emotion' is good or not also concerns the 
object of the emotion. This is expressed both in terms of the direction of the subject's 
will, and the orientation of their love. A right will (voluntas recta) or a good love (bonus 
amor) results in appropriate affects while a wrong will (voluntas perversa) or a bad love 
(malus amor) produces sinful passions. 224 In relation to the direction of the will, 
Augustine writes, `The important factor in those emotions [motus] is the character of a 
man's will. If the will is wrongly directed, the emotions will be wrong, if the will is 
right, the emotions will be not only blameless, but praiseworthy. The will is engaged in 
all of them, in fact, they are essentially acts of the will'. 225 
The same idea is expressed not in terms of the direction of the will, but the 
orientation of love: `... a rightly directed will is love in a good sense and a perverted will 
is love in a bad sense.... feelings are bad, if the love is bad, and good, if the love is 
good. '226 In relation to the orientation of the subject's love, Augustine stresses that all 
forms of emotion (good or bad, affectus or passiones) are ultimately expressions of 
love. All love is seen as attraction, in the sense of the desire to become united with the 
beloved. The crucial issue is whether this love is caritas, love directed toward goodness, 
wisdom and ultimately God, or whether the love is cupiditas, directed toward mundane 
objects, and therefore essentially idolatrous. 227 All virtues and virtuous affections spring 
from caritas, and caritas reorients the life of the one who loves God so that the subject 
loves all other things because of their love for God, in God and for God's sake, and not 
absolutely as the source of their fulfilment. All sinful emotions arise from cupiditas, 
from a love of the world that seeks to find ultimate happiness in the world itself. Again, 
224 Dixon, Passions, p. 40 225 City of God. XIV. 6, trans. Bettenson, p. 555 
226 City of God XN. 7, trans. Bettenson, p. 557 
227 Interestingly, Augustine uses voluntas and caritas interchangeably in the context of his trinitarian 
theology, opposing both to cupiditas. 
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given the fact that passions are movements of the lower, appetitive self, most 
postlapsarian passions are involuntarily orientated towards the mundane, and thus 
involve cupiditas, while the fact that affections are a part of the higher, intellective self 
and are voluntary gives them the potential to be caritas, to be directed towards God and 
to created beings secondarily, according to their proper place and in correct proportion 
to their being. 228 
To love created beings according to their proper place and in correct proportion 
to their being requires not that one should cease to love them but that one should love 
them as a part of loving God, partly because one can use them as God's creatures to 
come to know God, and partly because, in the case of humans, by virtue of being 
created in God's image they can be enjoyed in their own right. As Martha Nussbaum 
writes: `Not all Christian love is love of God: there may be human loves that are 
distinctively Christian. But these other loves are suffused by the love of God, and... their 
real object always is, in a way, God. '229 Other creatures are never to be loved 
absolutely, as though they are infinite and immortal beings, and as though ultimate 
happiness can be found in them. They are always to be loved as mortal creatures. To fail 
to love humans in this way not only results in idolatry, but also inevitably in deep grief. 
Augustine testifies to this, providing a moving account of his reaction to the death of his 
close friend from Tagaste, which occurred while Augustine was a young man, still a 
Manichaean and prior to his conversion to the Christian faith: 
`Grief darkened my heart' (Lam. 5: 17). Everything on which I set my gaze was death. My home 
town became a torture to me; my Father's house a strange world of unhappiness; all that I had 
shared with him was without him transformed into a cruel torment. My eyes looked for him 
everywhere, and he was not there. I hated everything because they did not have him, nor could 
they now tell me `look, he is on the way', as used to be the case when he was alive and absent 
from me.... Only tears were sweet to me, and in my 'soul's delights' (Ps. 139: 11) weeping had 
replaced my friend.... I found no calmness, no capacity for deliberation. I carried my lacerated 
and bloody soul when it was unwilling to be carried by me. I found no place where I could put it 
down. There was no rest in pleasant groves, nor in games or songs, nor in sweet-scented places, 
228 William Mallard, Language and Love: Introducing Augustine's Religious Thought through the 
Confessions Story (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), p. 42 
229 Nussbaum, Upheavals, p. 528, fn I 
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nor in exquisite feasts, nor in the pleasures of the bedroom and bed, nor, finally, in books and 
poetry. Everything was an object of horror, even light itself, all that was not he made me feel 
sick and was repulsive - except for groaning and tears. 
230 
As Nicholas Wolterstorff observes, 231 it is when reading passages such as these that the 
modem reader empathises most with Augustine, and finds him most appealing. It comes 
as something of a shock, therefore, to learn that it is precisely these aspects of 
Augustine's life that Augustine himself finds most repugnant and culpable. In 
retrospect, Augustine sees his love of his friend as excessive, being directed toward a 
finite and mortal object who will, by virtue of his createdness, die, and distress all who 
love him. Augustine writes, `I was in misery, and misery is the state of every soul 
overcome by friendship with mortal things and lacerated when they are lost.... The 
reason why that grief had penetrated me so easily and deeply was that I had poured out 
my soul on the sand by loving a person sure to die as if he would never die. 232 As 
Augustine discovered, if one loves a finite and mortal creature as though they will live 
for ever one will be inconsolable at their death. Therefore, 'What madness not to 
understand how to love human beings with awareness of the human condition! How 
stupid man is to be unable to restrain feelings in suffering the human lot! '233 The love 
Augustine accorded to his friend was in fact appropriate only to the immortal God, and 
even in his relationship with his mother he was 'guilty of too much worldly 
affection'. 234 Augustine writes, `Blessed are those who love You, 0 God.... No one can 
lose you... unless he forsakes You. '235 The lover should reorient his absolute love to 
God, who alone is the source of human happiness, for loving a creature as absolute can 
result only in acute and excessive bereavement. Thus, as Gerald W. Schlabach puts it: 
230 Augustine, Confessions IV. iv. 9; IV. vii. 12, translated Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p. 57 - 58; p. 59 23! Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'Suffering Love', p. 196 
232 Augustine, Confessions, IV. vi. I I-IV. viii. 13, trans. Chadwick, p. 58,60 
233 Augustine, Confessions, IV. vii. 12, trans. Chadwick, p. 59 
234 Cited by Wolterstorff, 'Suffering Love', p. 197 
235 Augustine, Confessions IV, 9, cited Wolterstorff, 'Suffering Love', p. 199 
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To love other creatures rightly, then, a human being must relativize that love - devaluing its 
object in one way, yet rediscovering its true and stable value in another way. When we love 
friends or neighbors rightly, the value they lose is their value as a tool of our own egocentric 
self-interest; the value we then recognize in them is their value insofar as God, the source of all 
things, creates and secures them. To love one's neighbor rightly, in other words, Augustine's 
abiding conviction was that we must first love God, and then `refer' all other loves to God. 23° 
The caritas Augustine propounds is sourced in the divine love, as is shown by 
the fact that Augustine radically equates God and love'237 and writes that in order that 
we may love God, we must allow God to live in us, and so 'let him love himself through 
us, that is, let him move us, enkindle us, and arouse us to love him. '23 All human 
caritas is in fact God present in humans, the participation of the Christian in the life and 
love of God, and not a human phenomenon that is possible independently of God. 
Through the love of God by which God enables us to experience for himself and for 
creation, God draws human beings into his own inter-trinitarian self-love, thus allowing 
us to share in the enjoyment of himself. At the eschaton there will be one Christ, loving 
Himself, for the love of the members for one another is the love of the Body for 
itself. '239 In this life, human love of fellow humans is in fact love of God, and is good 
(caritas) only when it is rooted in God: `The good which you love [in other humansi is 
from him. But it is only as it is related to him that it is good and sweet. 240 
Crucial to the relation between love of God and love of creation is the distinction 
between love as use (uh) and love as enjoyment (frui). By analogy to the Kantian 
236 Gerald W. Schlabach, `Continence, Consumption and Other Abuses: Or Why an Augustinian Ethic is 
Worth the Bother', a paper given at the Society of Christian Ethics (8 January 2000, Washington D. C. ), 
available at http: //ccat. sas. upenn. edu/jod/augustine. html (accessed on 21st January 2008) 
23 In his homilies on the First Epistle of John, Augustine comments: "For God is love' (Love is God). 
What more could be said, brethren? If nothing were said in praise of love throughout the pages of this 
epistle, if nothing whatever throughout the other pages of the Scriptures, and this one only thing were all 
we were told by the voice of the Spirit of God, 'For Love is God; ' nothing more ought we to require. ' See 
also Lewis Ayres, `Augustine, Christology, and God as Love: An Introduction to the Homilies on I John', 
in Nothing Greater Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer 
(Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2001), p. 86 
238 S. 128.2.4, cited in Tarsicius J. Van Bavel, 'Love', in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, 
ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald, John C. Cavadini et a! (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub, 1999), p. 
115 
239 Tractatus in Epistolam Joannis 10.3 
240 Confessions IV. xii. 18, trans. Chadwick, p. 63 - 64 
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categories of `means' and `ends', the distinction can be imperfectly and somewhat 
anachronistically introduced as follows. `Use' is our correct love for creation, which is a 
means by which we can come into fellowship with God. `Enjoyment' is our correct love 
for God, Who is an end in Himself', and the source of our eüfaipoviä, although (as we 
have seen) there is a sense in which we can love other humans in this sense also, 
because of their creation in the divine image. In this context Augustine discusses which 
category God's love for creation falls into, whether it should be regarded as use or 
enjoyment. God's love cannot be enjoyment, since his happiness is rooted not in 
creation but in himself, the source of all happiness. On the other hand, God's love 
cannot be use in the sense that our love for creation is use, since God does not need us 
to find his own fulfilment, which is himself. Rather, God's love for us is use, not for his 
own selfish end (for what end could that be? ), but for the realisation of our own 
happiness - enjoyment in the beatific vision: 
There is still an element of uncertainty here. I am saying that we enjoy a thing which we love 
for itself, and that we should enjoy only a thing by which we are made happy, but use 
everything else. God loves us (and the divine scripture often commends his love towards us) 1cf. 
Rom. 5: 81, but in what way does he love us - so as to use us or to enjoy us? If he enjoys us, he 
stands in need of our goodness, which only a madman could assert; for all our goodness either 
comes from him or actually consists of him. Is it not quite clear and beyond all doubt that light 
does not stand in need of the brightness of the things which it illuminates'? The prophet says 
very clearly, "I said to the Lord, 'You are my Lord, since you do not stand in need of my 
goodness"' [Ps 15: 2 (16: 2)]. So God does not enjoy us, but uses us. (If he neither enjoys nor 
uses us, then I fail to see how he can love us at all. ) 
But he does not use us in the way that we use things; for we relate the things which we 
use to the aim of enjoying God's goodness, whereas God relates his use of us to his own 
goodness. We exist because he is good, and we are good to the extent that we exist. Moreover, 
because he is also just, we are not evil with impunity; if we are evil, to that extent we exist less. 
God exists in the supreme sense, and the original sense, of the word. He is altogether 
unchangeable, and it is he who could say with full authority "I am who I am", and 'You will say 
to them, "I have been sent by the one who is" [Exod. 3: 141; so it is true of other things which 
exist that they could not exist except by him, and that they are good to the extent that they have 
received their existence from him. So the kind of use attributed to God, that by which he uses is, 
is related not to his own advantage, but solely to his goodness. If we pity someone or take 
thought for someone, we do so for that person's advantage, and we concentrate on that, but 
somehow there also results an advantage to us, since God does not let the compassion we show 
to the needy go unrewarded. This reward is the supreme reward - that we may thoroughly enjoy 
him and that all of us who enjoy him may enjoy one another in him. 
For if we enjoy one another in ourselves, we remain as it were on the road and put our 
hopes of happiness on a human being or an angel. This is something that arrogant people and 
arrogant angels pride themselves on; they rejoice when the hopes of others are placed on them. 
But a holy person or a holy angel restores us when we are weary and when we desire to rest in 
them and stay with them, using either the resources which they have received for our sakes or 
those which they have received for their own sakes (but in either case they have certainly 
received them); and then they impel us, thus restored, to go to the one by enjoying whom we 
likewise are made happy.... 
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When you enjoy a human being in God, you are enjoying God rather than that human 
being. For you enjoy the one by whom you are made happy, and you will one day rejoice that 
you have attained the one in whom you now set your hope of attaining him.... For when the 
object of love is present, it inevitably brings with it pleasure as well. If you go beyond this 
pleasure and relate it to your permanent goal, you are using it, and are said to enjoy it not in the 
literal sense but in a transferred sense. But if you hold fast and go no further, making it the goal 
of your joy, then you should be described as enjoying it in the true and literal sense of the word. 
This is to be done only in the case of the Trinity, the supreme and unchangeable good. 241 
Thus our love for creation can be real, but if it is to be real it must always be secondary 
to our love of God, and all created things must be loved in God. Augustine sometimes 
speaks of love of God as being concomitant with contempt of the self, implying to some 
that Augustine advocates self-hatred. 242 However, the point seems to be rather that self- 
denial is a part of self-love, because through self-denial the Christian moves from 
egocentricity to theocentricity and so finds salvation and ultimate happiness; this is why 
Augustine advises us to 'learn to love yourself by not loving yourself. '243 In rooting our 
love of creation in God we love with caritas, and our affections become rightly oriented 
and so virtuous. Whether or not one buys into Augustine's idea of rooting all our love in 
our love of God, I suggest that the distinction between caritas and cupiditas, and 
between affectus and passiones, leads to a more nuanced and discriminating account of 
emotion than that suggested by modern philosophers of emotion. Furthermore, I shall 
suggest that, in contrast to the modern category of the emotions, the categories of 
passiones and affections may offer to the impassibility debate some distinctions and 
possibilities previously overlooked. 
241 Augustine, On Christian Teaching LXXXI. 35 - LXXXIiI. 37, trans. R. P. H. Green (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 24 - 26 242 See City of God XIV. 28: `We see then that the two cities were created by two kinds of love: the 
earthly city was created by self love reaching the point of contempt for God, the Heavenly City by the 
love of God carried as far as contempt of self. 
243 S. 96.2.2, cited in Van Bavel, `Love', in Augustine: An Encyclopaedia, p. 512 
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Augustine on the ethics of human emotion 
While many ancient eastern Christian theologians adopt whole-heartedly the Stoic 
condemnation of emotion, opposition to the ideal of arraOi za in the present life is found 
particularly among Latin-speaking Christians. 244 
As Peter Brown245 and Martha Nussbaum246 show, Augustine's thought 
regarding the emotions altered during his life as a Christian. In works such as De 
Quantitate Animae (388) and De Genesi contra Manichees (389), written in the period 
following his conversion, Augustine, greatly influenced by Neoplatonic renderings of 
the Symposium's `ladder of love', endorses an essentially Platonic contrast between 
earthly and perfected love, holding up the goal of contemplative self-sufficiency as the 
goal for the Christian, not only in the afterlife, but also in the here and now. 247 
According to this view, the good Christian is increasingly emptied of desire, longing 
and tension. In later works, such as the Confessiones (c. 401), and the slightly earlier 
work the Ad Simplicianum de diversis quaestionibus (396), the apathetic goal is 
replaced by the idea of an ascent in which the subject becomes progressively receptive 
to God and to love, becoming not self-sufficient, but more and more aware of their 
dependence upon God. 248 As Nussbaum explains, the Confessions advances `a picture 
of ascent (or ascent combined with descent) that gives a more substantial and more 
positive role to certain ingredients of ordinary human love. '249 At this point, the 
Platonist goal of self-sufficiency is seen by Augustine as deeply impious, because it is 
rooted in pride, in the same proud deviation from God that caused Adam and Eve to 
disobey the divine command and fall from their state of grace. By the time of De 
244 Richard Sorabji, Emotion, p. 397. 
245 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (London: Faber and Faber, 1967) 
246 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals, pp. 527-557 
Z" Nussbaum, Upheavals pp. 527-557 
248 Nussbaum, Upheavals pp. 537 - 557 zag Nussbaum, Upheavals, p. 531 
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Civitate Dei (413 - 415), Augustine goes further, condemning the classical 
philosophical project of finding happiness and virtue for oneself as essentially pride- 
ridden: 
For we do not yet see our good, and hence we have to seek it by believing, and it is not in our 
power to live rightly, unless while we believe and pray we receive help from him who has 
given us the faith to believe that we must be helped by him. Whereas those who have supposed 
that the Ultimate Good and the Ultimate Evil are to be found in this life... all these 
philosophers have wished, with amazing folly, to be happy here on earth and to achieve bliss 
by their own efforts- 250 
Happiness is not to be found in self-sufficiency and airaBilia, as the Platonists and 
Stoics asserted, but in fellowship with God, which requires openness to certain 
emotional experiences. As Nussbaum shows, Augustine's journey to God is not 
characterised by a neat intellectual progression towards contemplative purity, but by a 
sense of longing, incompleteness and passivity. 25' 
For humans and in this life, Augustine advocates experience of emotion if 
rightly directed and sanctioned by reason and the will (i. e. virtuous affects), departing 
from the Stoic belief that emotions are always and without exception pernicious. 252 On 
this view, every type of what we would call emotion (for example, love, desire, fear, 
joy, sorrow) can be either virtuous or vicious, depending upon its object, its relation to 
reason and the will, and so on. Thus the phenomenon itself (e. g. joy) is morally neutral, 
but how it is instantiated in the human being makes it good or bad. Three exceptions to 
250 City of God XIX. 4, trans. Bettenson, p. 852 
251 Nussbaum, Upheavals, pp. 527 - 557 252 cf. City of God 14.9. Ironically, Augustine supports his view that emotions are good in moderation by 
drawing on an account of the Stoic Epictetus misleadingly-paraphrased by Aulus Gellius. In Epictetus' 
story, a Stoic who grows pale during a sea storm eventually responds to enquirers with recourse to the 
idea of first movements or prepassions. As Richard Sorabji points out, Gellius alters Epictetus' 
`pallescere' (to grow pale) to pavescere' (to grow jittery). That Augustine misunderstands Epictetus' 
meaning, interpreting the `jitters' as indicating some degree of emotion, becomes clear when Augustine 
further paraphrases Gellius' version of Epictetus, resolving the ambiguity in the wrong direction by 
adding 'with fear' after `grows jittery', by asserting that the wise person may shrink with sadness, and by 
describing the Stoic's reaction as a 'passion' (i. e. an emotion) on three occasions. From Epictetus' 
misleadingly-paraphrased account, Augustine wrongly concludes that the Stoics actually allow emotions, 
misconstruing the idea of prepassions and first movements, and writing that the Stoics' disagreements 
with other philosophical schools is purely the semantic issue of how emotions are defined (Augustine, 
Questions on the Heptateuch 1.30, cited Sorabji, Emotion, ch. 24). 
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the idea that these psychological phenomena are (in and of themselves) neutral are 
pride, lust and anger. Pride is never acceptable, since it is the root of all sin, because it is 
the elevation of the self over and against God, and the grounding of the self in the self 
as the basis of all absolute values, rather than in God. Thus Augustine writes: 
And what is pride except a longing for a perverse kind of exaltation? For it is a perverse kind of 
exaltation to abandon the basis on which the mind should be firmly fixed, and to become, as it 
were, based on oneself, and so remain. This happens when a man is too pleased with himself: 
and a man is self-complacent when he deserts that changeless God in which, rather than in 
himself, he ought to have found his satisfaction. 253 
Unlike pride, lust can be harnessed and put to a good purpose (i. e. that of procreation), 
though it is never good in itself. This is because lust itself, and the bodily movements 
which precede or accompany lust, are not under the control of the will . 
214 Anger is also 
never to be `enjoyed' (frui) for itself, since like lust it is a disturbed and undisciplined 
emotion, `leading to acts which wisdom forbids, and ... 
[which therefore needs] the 
control of intelligence and reason. 25' However, like lust, anger can be properly 
channelled and so put to a good purpose. In practice, Augustine suggests, anger can be 
used (uh) in the prevention of public disorder. 256 
Augustine asserts that other emotions are not only permissible in this life if 
experienced in moderation and when controlled by the will, but also that virtuous affects 
- both pleasant and unpleasant - are both necessary and desirable to Christians in the 
current life. Compassion is particularly admired: 
To be indignant with the sinner with a view to his correction, to feel sorrow for the afflicted with 
a view to his release from suffering, to be afraid for one in danger so as to prevent his death - 
those are emotions which, as far as I can see, no sane judgement could reprove. The Stoics, to be 
sure, are in the habit of extending their condemnation to compassion (misericordiam), but how 
much more honourable would it have been in the Stoic of our anecdote257 to have been 
253 City of God XIV. 13, trans. Bettenson, p. 571 - 572 zsa cf. City of God XIV. 16 
255 City of God XIV. 19, trans. Bettenson, p. 580 
25b Dixon, Passions, p. 51 
257 i. e. that of Aulus Gellius, whose Stoic philosopher upon a stormy ship felt, and justified feeling, 
tremors, which Augustine took to be a `tolerance' of certain emotional reactions. 
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`disturbed' by compassion so as to rescue someone, rather than by the fear of being 
shipwrecked! Far more creditable, more humane, and more in harmony with the feelings of true 
religion was the sentiment expressed in Cicero's praise of Caesar, `Of all your virtues, none was 
more admirable, none more attractive, than your compassion'. 258 What is compassion but a kind 
of fellow-feeling in our heart's for another's misery, which compels us to come to his help by 
every means in our power'? Now this emotion (motus) is the servant of reason, when compassion 
is shown without detriment to justice, when it is a matter of giving to the needy or of pardoning 
the repentant. ' 259 
To attempt to achieve ä=tilia in the sense of absence of emotion is morally repulsive: 
If `some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamoured of 
themselves because they are not stimulated or excited by any emotions tut nullo prorsus 
erigantur et excitenturJ, not moved or bent by any feelings [affectu], such persons 
rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity'. 260 Emotions such as love and 
gladness are not to be despised either in this life or the next, while unpleasant emotions 
such as grief and fear are the proper response to the sin and suffering of the present life. 
Augustine criticises the Stoics for asserting that while the ordinary, weak man 
experiences desire, joy, fear and grief, the wise man experiences no grief at all and 
replaces desire, joy and fear with will, gladness and caution. Rather, he argues, will, 
caution, gladness, desire, fear and joy are all `emotions' common to both good and bad. 
But, he writes, 
The good feel them in a good way, while the bad feel them in a bad way, just as an act of will 
may be rightly or wrongly directed. Even 'grief - and the Stoics imagined nothing could be 
found in the mind of a wise man to correspond to this emotion - even 'grief is discovered used 
in a good sense, especially in our Christian authors. The Apostle, for example, praises the 
Corinthians for having felt a grief'in God's way. '2b 
Thus Augustine turns away from the negative view of the emotions championed by the 
Stoics and Neoplatonists. Nussbaum writes of Augustine that `This is not language that 
the Stoic ... wise man would use, extirpating the passions.... 
In some manner Christian 
258 Cicero, Pro Lig. 13,37 
259 City of God IX 5, trans. Bettenson. p. 349 
290 Augustine, City of God. XIV, 9, cited Wolterstorff, 'Suffering Love', p. 205 
26! City of God XIV. 8, trans. Bettenson, p. 560 - 561 
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love has reopened the space within which fear, and anxiety, and grief, and intense 
delight, and even anger, all have their full force. And correct love promises no departure 
from these other emotions - if anything, it requires their intensification. '262 
Augustine not only advocates affections in this life; he also provides a radically 
alternative interpretation of &iraOiiia as the eschatological goal to that of the Stoics. If 
a, raOý, a involves freedom from all emotion, it is not to be sought-after, either in this life 
or the next. He writes that `... if apatheia is the name of the state in which the mind 
cannot be touched by any emotion (affectus) whatsoever, who would not judge this 
insensitivity to be the worst of all moral defects? There is nothing absurd in the 
assertion that the complete final happiness will be exempt from the spasms of fear and 
any kind of grief; but only a man utterly cut off from truth would say that love and 
gladness have no place there. '263 Concomitantly, the state of Adam and Eve before the 
Fall was one of absolute bliss, devoid of sin, death and sickness: the pair lived in a 
partnership of unalloyed felicity; their love for God and for each other was undisturbed. 
This love was the source of immense gladness, since the beloved was always at hand for 
their enjoyment. 161 
Theological perspectives on emotion in Augustine 
As the above quotations suggest, the prelapsarian state and the state of the blessed in 
heaven is not that of apathy in the sense of absence of emotion: While there will be no 
suffering and fear, it is the case that real love and gladness are central. But what about 
God? Does God, in Augustine's view, share these affections with the blessed in heaven'? 
Augustine never describes the `emotional life' of God in great depth, presumably on 
epistemological grounds. He does, however, as I have suggested, indicate both that 
262 Nussbaum, Upheavals, p. 530 
2b3 City of God XIV. 9, trans. Henry Bettenson, p 564 - 565 264 City of God XIV. 10, trans. Bettenson, p. 567 
103 
human and angelic love and gladness are sourced in the divine love and gladness. He 
also indicates that the emotional life of the Christian should be modelled on God. The 
Christian life should, like God's, be devoid of passions, disturbances, agitations of the 
mind, and all emotion contrary to reason and stemming from cupiditas. However, love 
of all creation is essential both to Christians and, by virtue of the fact that God is love 
and the source of all caritas, to God. Thus, he writes, it is folly to worship or venerate 
demons since the demons are prompted by anger, while: 
We, on the contrary, are bidden by the true religion not to allow ourselves to he prompted by 
anger, but rather to resist it. The demons are influenced by gifts; but we are bidden by true 
religion not to show favour to anyone in consideration of gifts received. 'lhe demons are 
mollified by honours, but we are bidden by true religion not to be influenced in any way by such 
things. The demons hate some men and love others - not as a result of a calmly considered 
decision, but because their soul, in the phrase of Apuleius, is 'subject to passions', as for us, we 
have the instruction of the true religion that we should love even our enemies. Lastly, the true 
religion bids us abjure all those movements [motum] of the heart, all those agitations of the mind, 
all those storms and tempests of the soul [turbelas et tempestates antmij which in demons make 
a raging sea of passion. It is nothing but folly, nothing but pitiable aberration, to humble yourself 
before a being whom you would hate to resemble in the conduct of your life and to worship one 
whom you would refuse to imitate. For surely the supremely important thing in religion is to 
model oneself on the object of one's worship. 265 
Despite Augustine's endorsement of certain kinds of emotion as against the Stoics and 
Neoplatonists, his assertion that all Christian love and gladness is rooted in the divine 
love and gladness, and his identification of God with love, many modem theologians 
have tended to take a dim view of Augustine on the emotions of God. While all 
recognise that, on the face of it, Augustine asserts the divine love and blessedness (or 
gladness), many assert that God's love was viewed by Augustine not as an emotion, but 
as an attitude of benevolence toward the beloved. For instance, Paul Fiddes writes that 
'Traditional theology has ... 
[regarded] love as an attitude and action of goodwill 
towards another person. True love, it has been argued, is to will and achieve the good of 
another, and has nothing to do with feelings. Augustine, for example, distinguished 
265 City of God VIII. 17, trans. Bettenson, p. 323 - 324 
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between emotions and moral actions as far as the perfect love of God is concerned.... ' 266 
This seems unjustified in the light of the love and bliss which Augustine attributes to 
God: While excluding negative `emotions' from the divine life, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the positive affections such as love and gladness that are attributed to God 
are merely intellectual attitudes rather than warm and lively feelings or (mutates 
mutandis) `subjective states'. 
However, it is clear from what Augustine says that emotions such as mercy that 
involve suffering in humans can only ever be attributed to God analogously, because 
God cannot suffer. Augustine believes that God cannot suffer for two reasons. First, 
suffering is closely linked to sin in Augustine's thought. Second, Augustine believes 
that God is eternal and immutable, and while it is logically possible to posit eternal 
suffering to God, the theological implications would be disastrous. As Nicholas 
Wolterstorff observes, if God experiences emotions such as suffering, grief, and anger 
etc. in eternity, then he must experience them 'at all times', unchangingly. The logical 
conclusion of this idea is that God would experience suffering and so on even in the 
eschaton, despite the triumph over sin and suffering in the world. Such a conclusion is 
theologically unattractive, but the implications go deeper still. If God experiences 
negative emotions eternally, then the &v6ai, ovid of the blessed, which comprises 
sharing in the divine bliss and joy, cannot be achieved, since God would not experience 
perfect happiness, but a combination of different emotions, some unpleasant. 267 It is not 
clear, therefore, in what our salvation would lie. Thus, Augustine is forced to conclude 
that emotions such as mercy and pity can only be experienced by God without the 
suffering that is an aspect of them in humans: 'With regard to pity, if you take away the 
compassion which involved a sharing of misery with him whom you pity, so that there 
26° Paul Fiddes, Creative Suffering, p. 17. Fiddes bases this on the fact that Augustine attributes love of 
God but excludes suffering, which he takes to be an assertion that there is no feeling in God's love, but 
simply good will and the intention to act benevolently. While suffering is indeed excluded by Augustine 
from God, not all feeling is: God, in Augustine's view, still feels benevolence, mercy, love, joy etc. 2Ö7 cf. Wolterstorff, 'Suffering Love', p. 211 
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remains the peaceful goodness of helping and freeing from misery, some kind of 
knowledge of the divine pity is suggested. '268 However, while Joseph M. Hallman 
concludes from this statement that `the divine mercy is reduced to God's giving of being 
to those who are saved', and that in the final analysis it is emotion-less' 269,1 do not 
think that the evidence leads to this conclusion. Rather, while God cannot feel the 
suffering that we feel in compassion, in the case of mercy he does seem to be capable of 
feeling 'the peaceful goodness of helping and freeing from misery'. 270 While Hallman 
eventually concludes that God `feels nothing, 271 this conclusion does not seem 
justified. Augustine rejects literal interpretations of the divine repentance, anger, 
jealousy and mercy, both because they are inappropriate to a morally perfect being and 
because they either imply or, in the case of repentance, entail, temporality and 
mutability. In the case of love however, Augustine adopts a very literal interpretation, 
asserting that love is God and that God is the source of all human love. Apart from 
being more perfect, the only way in which divine love seems to differ from human love 
is in being atemporal, but this does not seem to be a reason to conclude that the divine 
love is devoid of feeling. To this we might also add the 'emotion' of blessedness or 
happiness. The happiness of the blessed in heaven and of the angels depends upon 
participation in the divine happiness: 'God imparts to them their happiness by granting 
them a share in his own being', and 'they are blessed, not by themselves, but through 
adhering to him who made them. '272 Thus, Augustine attributes love and gladness to 
God in very literal, uncompromising (though atemporal) terms, while also finding 
himself unable to attribute certain emotions of God because of associations between, for 
268 De div. Quaest. Ad Simpl. 11.2.3, cited Joseph M. ITallman, The Descent of God: Divine Suffering in 
History and Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), p. 17 
209 Hallman, Descent, p. 18 
270 De div. Quaest. Ad Simpl. 11.2.3, cited Hallman, Descent, p. 17 
271 Hallman, Descent, p. 19 
272 City of God IX. 23, trans. Bettenson, p. 368 
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instance, sin and suffering, and between immutability and perfection - associations 
which modem theologians have found themselves at liberty to contest. 
Synopsis: Augustine, impassibility and emotion 
In conclusion, the following elements of Augustine's 'philosophy of emotion' and 
`impassibilism' are highlighted. First. Augustine distinguishes between good and bad 
emotion, but, excepting the cases of lust, anger and pride, the moral status of an emotion 
does not depend upon the type of the emotion but upon the direction of the will of the 
subject, or the orientation of the love from which it springs, and upon the agreement of 
the emotion with reason. Second, within the modern category of the emotions, 
Augustine distinguishes between passiones and affectiones, the former of which relate 
to the appetitive soul, and are involuntary, while the latter are movements of the higher, 
intellective and rational self and are voluntary. These affectiones, when properly 
directed, are essential to the virtuous Christian life, and are elements both of the 
prelapsarian state and of the life of the angels and the blessed in heaven. 
The Augustinian distinction between-passions and affections in Thomas 
Thomas follows Augustine's distinction between passions and affections 27' but the 
content of the passions and affections, their moral status and what they are passions and 
affects of differs because Thomas adopts a far more Aristotelian understanding of the 
soul. Like Augustine, Thomas adopts the distinction between the vegetative, animal and 
intellective parts of the soul, viewing the intellective, rational elements of humans as 
273 Though unconsciously, since Thomas, focusing on City of God IX, on the passage in which Augustine 
concludes that passiones is the best rendering of 7ra©p, 
believes that Augustine uses the term passiones 
generally, and that the word is synonymous with aJJectus, affectiones, etc. However, as Dixon 
demonstrates, Augustine elsewhere distinguishes sharply between passions and affects, and the idea that 
the two are synonymous is not consistent with a broader reading of Augustine's work. 
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superior to the irrational lower appetites, although in Thomas the distinction between (in 
Augustinian terms) the intellective soul and the irrational appetite is expressed in terms 
of the higher appetite ('the intellective soul') and the lower appetite ('the appetitive 
soul'). Furthermore, in Thomas the Augustinian concern with the relation between 
changelessness and perfection becomes a preoccupation with the superiority of rest over 
motion. Both the higher appetite and the lower appetite are divided within themselves 
into rest and motion. Within the higher appetite, understanding, resembling rest (since it 
is fulfilled when the object is apprehended) is superior to will, which signifies motion 
(because the will is fulfilled when the lover is drawn by the beloved). 274 In the lower 
appetite, rest and motion correspond to concupiscible and irascible passions 
respectively. The irascible passions (hope, desire, fear, courage and anger) resemble 
motion since they are `movements of the lower appetite towards a sense-good (a 
desirable object of sense) that was hard to attain or away from a sense-evil (an 
undesirable object of sense) that was hard to avoid. 275 Concupiscible passions, such as 
love, hate, desire, aversion, pleasure and sadness, are 'states of potential movement, or 
of affinity, towards sense goods or away from sense evils. '276 Such passions are best 
seen as tendencies towards certain sense-objects, and, while potentially in movement, 
signify rest. 
Thomas is also more concerned with the Aristotelian distinction between 
passivity and activity than Augustine. On a scale depicting activity to passivity, God is 
viewed as pure act, and formless prime matter' (a hypothetical category: Thomas did 
not believe that matter existed without form) as purely passive. Thus, while rest is more 
perfect than motion, activity (which would appear on the face of it to involve motion) is 
more perfect than passivity. This is because the activity of God does not involve motion, 
but is eternal. Human beings fall in the middle of the activity-passivity scale. Generally 
274 Thomas Aquinas, Summa 7heologiae (Si'), 1a. 81,1; Dixon, Passions, p. 35 -6 275 Dixon, Passions, p. 36 
276 Dixon, Passions, p. 36; cf. ST I a. 2ae. 23 
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speaking, the higher appetite (which involves intellect and will and is closely related to 
reason) is active, while the lower appetite is passive. In a different sense, however, the 
higher appetite is also passive in that its potential for understanding often remains 
unrealised. Ultimately, the final end of the blessed is to rest in the eternal unmoved 
divine activity. 277 
Thomas' preference for act over passivity influences his view of the passions as 
greatly inferior: Within his treatment of the 'emotions' he often treats passions as a 
specific instance of the way in which humans are acted upon, closely connecting 
passions to passivity. 278 Thus, passions are inherently linked to imperfection: 
Now passion or passivity implies by its very nature some sort of deticiencv; a thing is passive in 
so far as it is in potentiality to being actualised and thus improved. Those creatures that come 
nearest to God, the first and completely perfect being, have little of potentiality and passivity in 
them; others, of course, have more. Accordingly one will find less of passi%ity, and so less of 
passion and the passions (passiones), in the cognitive faculties, since they are the more priman 
powers of the soul. '279 
Thomas also differs from Augustine in his application of the categories of matter and 
form to the relation between the human body and soul. Matter refers to basic material 
`stuff, while form determines what sort of object the matter will instantiate, what it will 
become. In other words, the form is the set of properties of the matter (e. g. dimensions, 
weight, etc. ). In humans, the body is the basic matter and the soul the form. Clearly, 
this view is potentially materialistic (the soul is reduced to a set of properties of the 
material body) and would not immediately suggest that the soul is immortal, or could 
survive without the body. In order to make his Aristotelian ideas more consistent with 
the Christian concept of the person and belief in the immortality of the soul, therefore, 
Thomas emphasises that the human soul is unlike other forms. The human soul, he 
27 Dixon, Passions, p. 36 
27" Dixon, Passions, p. 41 
2710 Thomas, ST la. 2ae, 22,2, cited Dixon, Passions, p. 42. Tiere I have substituted the translation of 
passiones as 'emotion' to 'passions', since rendering it 'emotions' does not take into account the 
difference between passions and modern-day emotions, and does not help to make sense of the 
association Aquinas makes between passion and passivity. 
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argues, is 'subsistent' - it exists in and of itself rather than merely as a set of properties 
of a material object. This is shown by the fact that the soul has its own activity. and that 
understanding can take place without the involvement of any physical organ. 
Furthermore, the human soul is also immortal - not by nature but by virtue of the grace 
of God. 280 
Like Augustine, Thomas criticises the Stoics for their rejection of all 'emotion', 
and for their failure to make distinctions between different kinds of emotion. However, 
this is cashed out in more strongly Aristotelian terms: 
The Stoics made no distinction between sense and intellect, and hence between the sensitive 
appetite (appetitus sensitivus) and the intellectual appetite (appetitus intellectivus). 
Accordingly they made no distinction between the passions (passiones (rumae) and 
movements of the will (motus voluntates), since the passions (passiones animae) belong to the 
sensitive appetite (appetitus sensitiwus), and movements of the will (morns voluntates) to the 
intellectual appetite (appetitus intellectivus). 281 
All forms of emotion are forms of love, which is interpreted by Thomas as 
movement towards or away from an object - love is a tendency to move towards and be 
united with the beloved. The lower appetite, also known as the sensory love, has a 
natural tendency to move towards sense-goods and away from sense-evils, while the 
higher appetite, or rational love, has a tendency to move towards intellectual goods and 
away from intellectual evils. 282 Sensory love (amor sensitivus) is contrasted with 
intellectual love (amor intellectivus scu rationalis), the former relating to objects of 
sense (food, drink, sex), the latter to an intellectual good (wisdom, truth, God). This 
distinction between different types of love is, as in Augustine, related to the movements 
of the will. For Thomas the question is whether the emotion is a movement of the will 
or not - and this determines both whether an emotion is virtuous or vicious and whether 
it is a passion or an affect. Thus Thomas makes explicit the Augustinian association 
280 Dixon, Passions, p. 38 
281 ST Ia. 2ae. 24,2 
282 Dixon, Passions, p. 43 - 5, cf. ST I a. 2ac. 26, I. 
between what is voluntary and what is potentially reasonable and virtuous. Passions are 
viewed as involuntary, in the sense of not authorised by the will, while affects are both 
voluntary and active. Thomas also accords importance to the question of whether 
emotions are under the control of reason, for the passions (passiones) are not 'diseases' 
(morbos) or disturbances (perturbationes) of the soul, except precisely when they are 
not under rational control... Passion (passiones animae) leads one towards sin in so far 
as it is uncontrolled by reason, but in so far as it is rationally controlled, it is part of the 
virtuous life. '283 
Thomas suggests a further distinction between passions and affections, not 
present in Augustine, that may further provide insight in our discussion of divine 
impassibility. In Summa 7heologiae Ia. 2ae. 24,2, Thomas observes that passions always 
cause an increase or decrease in the rate of the heartbeat. As Sarot observes, Thomas 
anticipates modem psychology in recognising the physical components of - or 
accompaniments to - emotion. However, the statement that Thomas sees emotions as 
entailing corporeality needs qualification. Examining the phrase 'a passion for the 
things of God', Thomas questions whether this suggests that love of God is a movement 
of the lower animal appetite. He concludes that it is not: 'The phrase 'a passion (passio) 
for the things of God' means here affection (a/jectio) for the things of God, and union 
with them through love, but this involves no physiological modification. 'zs4 It seems 
that, while Thomas predicates physiological modification in passions, affects and 
affections are not necessarily related to the physical. 285 The theological implications of 
this distinction for the impassibility debate become apparent in the following passage: 
The words 'love', 'desire', and so on are used in two senses. Sometimes they mean passions 
with some arousal in the soul. This is what the words are generally taken to nican, and such 
passions exist solely at the level of sense appetite. But they can be used to denote simple 
283 ST Ia. 2ae. 24,2, cited Dixon, Passions, p. 52 
284 ST la. 2ae. 22,3 
28 cf also ST I a. 2ae. 22, I; la. 2ae. 22,1 -3 
attraction, without passion or perturbation of the soul, and such acts are acts of will. And in this 
sense the words apply to angels and to God. 286 
Thomas does perceive physiological modification in the passions, and this (along with 
their inherent passivity, mutability and moral dubiousness) makes them improper to 
God. However, the category of emotions known as affects does not entail corporeality, 
and these kinds of emotions - argues Thomas - can be attributed not only to the angels 
but even to God. 287 If the Augustinian-Thomist view is correct in this distinction 
between passions that entail corporeality, and are in other respects inherently unworthy 
of the virtuous life, of the blessed and of God, and affects that may be free of 
physiological change, and experienced virtuously by Christians, by angels and the 
blessed in heaven and even by God, then a new possibility emerges for the impassibility 
debate that meets many concerns of both passibilist and impassibilist theologians and 
helps to unite the position of the two. 
Conclusion: Augustine and Thomas and the modern impassibility debate 
I suggest that re-appropriating the Augustinian-Thomist distinction between passions as 
extreme and overpowering feelings, and affects as feelings that are in accordance with 
reason and/or the will, might elucidate the argument more aptly than recourse to the 
category of `emotion'. In speaking of God being able to experience 'af ects', the 
concerns of the passibilist would be in some ways compatible with the impassibilist 
who, in Sarot's words, seeks to 'stress the moral freedom of God or His insusceptibility 
28b S7, I a. 82,5 ad 1, cited Dixon, Passions, p. 26 
287 A related point is made by Helm in his discussion ofSunima Contra Gentiles 1. X1 that Aquinas 'does 
not object to some of what are affections in human beings being a part of God's character, he only objects 
to those affections which, if they are had by anything, require that individual to be passive and to be in 
time' (Helm, 'Impossibility', p. 126) 
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to distraction from resolve'. 28' Real emotional feeling and personal involvement with 
creation is attributed to God, and yet this is never contrary to God's reason and will, and 
never results in fickleness or infidelity to the world. Of course, partly because of the 
modem rejection of the association between perfection and immutability, the modem 
theologian might include suffering among the affects which God might experience, just 
as types of suffering are included by Augustine as affects experienced by humans in the 
present life. 
Furthermore, if we adopt Thomas' view of passions as entailing corporeality, 
and affects as potentially independent of the body, applying the latter rather than the 
former to God, a further possibility arises. Recent passibilists, such as Sarot, have been 
led by the link between emotion and corporeality in modem psychology to the 
conclusion that if God has emotions, God must, in some sense, also have a body. This 
becomes a further stumbling block for impassibilists, who, hoping to retain the idea of 
God as spirit, are forced further away from positing any 'feeling' in God. But if 
Thomas' distinction between passions as corporeal and affects as independent of 
corporeality is tenable, then a model of 'divine emotion' emerges that may meet the 
concerns of both 'conservative' and 'liberal' theologians. 
But is this view plausible in the modem world, given that we have a very' 
different view of emotion and of what constitutes the human person than that of 
Augustine or Thomas'? In what follows, I seek to show that the distinction between 
passions and affects as characterised by Augustine and Thomas is not only plausible in 
the context of contemporary philosophy of emotion, but that it may actually contribute 
valuable insights to modem philosophy of emotion and psychology. 
288 Marcel Sarot, 'Patripassianisin', p. 365 
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